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This thesis will explore the US commitment to the destruction of the international slave
trade following its abolition in 1808, studying its impact on US sovereignty, the coming of the
Civil War, and abolitionism. Long ignored by historians, the United States’ attempts from 1808
to 1862 to abolish the illegal international trade in slaves has the potential to change the
historiographical understanding of abolitionism in the antebellum period. Slavery was not
eradicated overnight, a fact that we accept unquestioningly; but neither was the international
slave trade. The parallel evolution of abolitionism on the one hand combined with diplomatic,
legal, and antislavery mechanisms related to the slave trade on the other ultimately created the
necessary elements for the institution’s eventual abolition altogether. Ignoring attempts to stop
the international slave trade has obscured the complexity of abolitionism in the United States.
Emphasizing the United States’ commitment to slave-trade suppression means to complicate the
picture of an entirely acquiescent US government, which served as the slavocracy’s puppet, and
demonstrates that, in the end, the Revolution’s abolitionist promise was fulfilled.
KEYWORDS: Antebellum American history; Atlantic slave trade; slave-trade suppression;
abolition; antislavery; antebellum law
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INTRODUCTION
On August 29, 1839, Lieutenant Thomas R. Gedney filed his libel with the United States
District Court for Connecticut. The libel, the traditional pleading by which individuals petitioned
for salvage rights in admiralty cases, alleged that he and the crew of his ship encountered a
“strange & suspicious” schooner anchored off Culloden Point, Long Island, three days prior.
Sending his first officer to investigate with a boarding party, Gedney discovered that the
schooner, identified as the “Armistad,” was a slave ship. Now in Connecticut, Gedney hoped that
prize money awaited him.1
Gedney could not have known that the Amistad, even then, was a strange slave ship.
Gedney and the crew of the Washington “found said Schooner was manned by forty five
negroes” and that two Spanish “Gentlemen,” Cubans Pedro Montes and Jose Ruiz, were
seemingly their captives. The US sailors rounded up the Africans and confined them below,
freeing the Spaniards from their oppressive confinement, and the Washington headed to New
London, Connecticut, with the slave ship in tow. After reaching port, Gedney carefully wrote out
the circumstances by which, two months earlier, the Africans “rose upon” the crew, murdered
two men, including the captain, and took possession of the vessel. This report heavily relied on
the allegations of Montes and Ruiz. But, first, he made a point to enumerate the cargo. Among
the glassware and hardware, skins and fabrics, olive oils and beef were fifty-four slaves—fiftyone men and three women. Altogether, the Africans, Gedney noted, were worth $25,000. That
was in addition to the $40,000 that he estimated for the rest of the cargo. Gedney asked that the
slave ship be forfeited, but not without monetary reward. This was the mechanical, often

1

“Libel of Thomas R. Gedney,” August 29, 1839, National Archives Identifier 2787899, Thomas R. Gedney v.
Schooner Amistad, Case Files 1790 – 1911, Records of the District Courts of the United States, 1685 – 2009, Record
Group 21, National Archives, Waltham, MA, https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/gedney-libel.
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unfeeling process of slave-trade suppression in the United States. As the result of the apparently
callous nature of slave-trade prosecutions, historians have found it difficult to characterize them
as the product of antislavery or part of the abolition movement. Nevertheless, the slave trade, or
the means by which it was suppressed, represents a distinct convergence of the historiography of
abolitionism with those of antebellum US diplomacy and the coming of the Civil War, which
cannot be ignored.2
The story of the Amistad rebellion has become well known since its revived study in the
late 1960s. But historians have disagreed on how the case should be viewed. David Brion Davis
and Howard Jones have argued that the case showed the US judiciary’s antislavery potential,3
whereas Marcus Rediker has dismissed any suggestion of a victorious legal system. For him, the
slaves were the true “heroes” of the story. Exercising individual agency, they worked together
and removed themselves from bondage. Imprisoned as their case worked its way to the Supreme
Court, they further navigated between different interested groups, from abolitionists to
proslavery advocates, to reassert the freedom that they seized along the coast of Cuba.4
Undoubtedly to Rediker’s chagrin, Steven Spielberg’s 1997 titular film has, however,
cemented a triumphalist narrative for the case in popular imagination.5 In part, John Quincy
Adams’ passionate oral argument before the Supreme Court reinforced this interpretation. Over

2

“Libel of Thomas R. Gedney,” August 29, 1839, National Archives Identifier 2787899, Thomas R. Gedney v.
Schooner Amistad, Case Files 1790–1911, Records of the District Courts of the United States, 1685–2009, Record
Group 21, National Archives, Waltham, MA, https://www.docsteach.org/documents/document/gedney-libel. Marcus
Rediker writes that there were only fifty-three enslaved Africans aboard the Amistad, forty-nine men and four
children. Marcus Rediker, The Amistad Rebellion: An Atlantic Odyssey of Slavery and Freedom (New York:
Penguin Books, 2012), 1.
3
David Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World (New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2006), 26; Howard Jones, Mutiny on the Amistad: The Saga of a Slave Revolt and Its Impact on American
Abolition, Law, and Diplomacy (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987), 218–219.
4
Rediker, The Amistad Rebellion, 4–8. It should be noted that, despite this disagreement, Rediker praises Jones’
work as the “pinnacle of scholarship.” Rediker, The Amistad Rebellion, 261n3.
5
Rediker, The Amistad Rebellion, 4–5.
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the course of two days, Adams constructed a logical, yet emotional appeal that seemed to
combine the moral calls of abolitionism and the worldly realities of slavery’s place in the law
without grappling too intensively with specific legislation. He emphasized the humanity of those
same fifty-four enslaved Africans whom Gedney so matter-of-factly enumerated in his libel; and
he framed their freedom as an undeniable consequence of nature. Higher law would be rendered
actuality through the United States’ highest court.6
Setting aside Adams’ rhetoric, however, the reality—the story of the process by which
those slaves were freed—reveals itself to have been one of anticlimactic routine. The Amistad
case bridged two eras of abolitionism. As antislavery moved away from gradualism to
immediatism, the case shows that even these new abolitionists were thinking in traditional
legalistic ways. In its application of the moral appeals of radical abolitionism to slave-ship
seizures, the case of the Amistad Africans was unusual. But its roots were in the often practical,
rarely dramatic process of antebellum slave-trade suppression. This was a process that relied
heavily on the forfeiture of slave traders’ ships and property, rather than trials of the slave traders
themselves. Prosecutors knew that slave traders were rarely convicted, and, when they were,
those convictions could not yet be based on the most serious of crimes: the capital crime of
piracy. The process of ship seizures and forfeitures played out in federal courts throughout the

6

An example of Adams’ rhetorical fusion of these pieces can be found on pages eight and nine of the copy of his
argument published by S. W. Benedict in 1841: “One of Judges who presided in some of the preceding trials, is said
to have called this an anomalous case. It is indeed anomalous, and I know of no law, but one which I am not at
liberty to argue before this Court, no law, statute or constitution, no code, no treaty, applicable to the proceedings of
the Executive or the Judiciary, except that law, (pointing to the copy of the Declaration of Independence, hanging
against one of the pillars of the court-room,) that law, two copies of which are ever before the eyes of your Honors. I
know of no other law that reaches the case of my clients, but the law of Nature and of Nature’s God on which our
fathers placed our own national existence. The circumstances are so peculiar, that no code or treaty has provided for
such a case. That law, in its application to my clients, I trust will be the law on which the case will be decided by
this court.” John Quincy Adams, Argument of John Quincy Adams Before the Supreme Court of the United States, in
the Case of the United States, Appellants, vs. Cinque, and Others, Africans, Captured in the Schooner Amistad […]
(New York: S. W. Benedict, 1841), 8–9, https://lccn.loc.gov/11027427.
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antebellum period, as the United States slowly worked its way toward the slave trade’s
destruction.7 Steadily accumulating precedent, the federal government, by the Civil War’s eve,
had primed the judicial system for the trial, conviction, and execution of a slave trader. Despite
its peculiarity, the Amistad case was among these cases that built toward the slave trade’s total
suppression. It highlighted, albeit sensationally, the legal mechanisms through which antislavery
had been enacted for two decades. While the US judicial system might not have been, in
Rediker’s words, the story’s “hero,” it was certainly the tool by which the nation would be set on
the path to emancipation.
Historians have long debated the sincerity with which the United States worked to
suppress the international slave trade. Having led the world with its constitutional promise to ban
the importation of slaves, which Congress legislated upon in 1808,8 the United States’
commitment to slave-trade suppression appeared hollow within the first years of the law’s effect.
The 1808 Act Prohibiting the Importation of Slaves, in fact, marked a lull in political antislavery
as US foreign policy came to be dominated by British impressment, which reached crisis
proportions with the War of 1812,9 foreshadowing, in the commonly accepted narrative,
traditional abolition’s eventual demise. While it is evident that US citizens engaged in the
African slave trade and that the importation of slaves to the United States continued after 1808,

7

For US laws related to the slave trade, see Appendix A.
16 Annals of Cong. 231 (1806), https://hdl.handle.net/2027/uc1.$c227014; Slave Trade Prohibition Act of March
2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 205, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/sl004.asp; Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the
Courtroom: An Annotated Bibliography of American Cases (1985; Clark, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, 2020), 212.
9
Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 3rd ed. (1936; New York: Henry Holt, 1950), 208; Scott A.
Silverstone, Divided Union: The Politics of War in the Early American Republic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press,
2004), 19; Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty, 622–630, 698–700; George C. Herring, From Colony to
Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008), 116. For American fears of
their antirepublican neighbor Canada, see also Reginald Horsman, “On to Canada: Manifest Destiny and United
States Strategy in the War of 1812,” Michigan Historical Review 13, no. 2 (Fall 1987): 4. For the importance of
neutral trading rights in the Jeffersonian republican mind, see James R. Sofka, “The Jeffersonian Idea of National
Security: Commerce, the Atlantic Balance of Power, and the Barbary War, 1786–1806,” Diplomatic History 21, no.
4 (Fall 1997): 520.
8

4

without significant interference from the US government, most historians have assumed that the
international slave trade ceased to be an important issue and instead have focused on the internal
slave trade. Nevertheless, estimates range wildly over the extent of the trade conducted between
1808 and 1865, with historians asserting that anywhere from 50,000 to 786,500 enslaved persons
were illegally imported to the United States over the period.10 In a recent study, published last
year, John Harris has argued that the trade saw a significant increase after 1850, with as many as
198,000 Africans trafficked between 1853 and 1867.11 At a time when the average day laborer
made $1.18 daily and an average Southern family brought home less than $100 in an entire year,
the illicit sale of an enslaved African could fetch from $400 to $1,500—in one transaction. The
trade’s illegal conduct was repulsively profitable.12 In the literature, whether the importation
trade continued after 1808 is indisputable. While the trade’s scale and the manner by which it
was conducted are matters of debate, they are not the focus of this study. Rather, this thesis
intends to examine the response to the continued illicit trade of African slaves and the
diplomatic, legal, and sociopolitical mechanisms that abolitionists put into place before the Civil
War. It ultimately seeks to answer how the destruction of the slave trade fits into our
understanding of emancipation throughout the antebellum period.
In the United States, the assault against the Atlantic slave trade represented the first step
toward fulfilling Revolutionary republicanism’s hope to set slavery on the course toward

10

Ernest Obadele-Starks, Freebooters and Smugglers: The Foreign Slave Trade in the United States After 1808
(Fayetteville: Univ. of Arkansas Press, 2007), 9–10; Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account
of the United States Government’s Relations to Slavery, ed. Ward M. McAfee (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
2001), 149, 150. Fehrenbacher provided the low end of this range and cited Du Bois’ figure of 250,000, dismissing
it as too high. The version of Du Bois’ Suppression of the African Slave-Trade available to the author does not
contain such an estimate. While almost absurdly high, Obadele-Starks provided the top end of this range,
extrapolating from Philip D. Curtin’s estimates in: Philip D. Curtin, The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census (Madison:
Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1969).
11
John Harris, The Last Slave Ships: New York and the End of the Middle Passage (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ.
Press, 2020), 6.
12
Obadele-Starks, Freebooters and Smugglers, 3–14.
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eventual extinction. Undoubtedly, the contradiction between the United States’ founding
principles and the presence of domestic slavery weighed heavily on the minds of antislavery
advocates in the years after the Revolution.13 These early advocates, driven by Revolutionary
republican sentiments and religious beliefs,14 established “abolitionist” societies across the North
and pushed local legislatures to enact laws leading to gradual emancipation.15 Their efforts were
not limited, however, within their respective states. Rather, these abolitionist societies also
emphasized the closure of the foreign slave trade as a tool to fulfilling the Revolution’s
principles; they saw abroad a crucial answer to the problem of slavery and a potential first,
nationwide step toward emancipation.16 By cutting off the supply of enslaved Africans from their
source abroad and domestically limiting the institution’s spread, slavery would be, the
Revolution-era antislavery advocate believed, choked over time to its demise. Its importance to
the continued growth of the United States’ enslaved population was therefore paramount and
demanded the first meaningful salvo of antislavery in the young republic. Following this
thinking, the Framers imbedded in the Constitution a promise to forbid the international slave

13

See David Cooper, A Serious Address to the Rulers of America, on the Inconsistency of Their Conduct Respecting
Slavery (London, 1783), ed. Rebecca Miller, in Early American Abolitionists: A Collection of Anti-Slavery Writings,
1760 – 1820, ed. James G. Basker, Justine Ahlstrom, Kathleen Barry, Siobhan Phinney, Nicole Seary, Sandra
Trenholm, and Thorin Tritter (New York: Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History, 2005), 61.
14
Filled with scriptural justification and appeals to morality, Cooper’s writing recalls the antislavery arguments of
pre-Revolution America. Along this line, it draws a distinction between the cruelties of domestic slavery and the
Atlantic slave trade. Much like the writings of prominent pre-Revolution abolitionist Anthony Benezet, Cooper
distinguishes the traffic of enslaved Africans across the Atlantic as uniquely vile. For both examples of the emphasis
on Christian ethics and, in particular, the slave trade, see Anthony Benezet, Observations on the Inslaving,
Importing and Purchasing of Negroes (Germantown, PA, 1760), ed. Thomas Wolf, in Basker et al., Early American
Abolitionists, 9–15; Benezet, Notes on the Slave Trade (n.p., 1781), ed. Thomas Wolf, in Basker et al., Early
American Abolitionists, 24–28. A contemporary of Benezet, Cooper had written against slavery and the slave trade
as early as 1772. Cooper, A Mite Cast into the Treasury: Or, Observations on Slave-Keeping (Philadelphia, 1772),
ed. Kristin DeBusk, in Basker et al., Early American Abolitionists, 37–49. Cooper even goes so far as to call on
anyone who approves of the trade to “cease to boast the Christian name.” Cooper, A Serious Address, 66.
15
The Pennsylvania Abolition Society, begun in 1775, and its state’s 1780 Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery
are the classic examples of this shift from simple antislavery to abolitionism. See The Constitution of the
Pennsylvania Society, for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery (Philadelphia, 1787), ed. Sam Rosenfeld, in Basker et
al., Early American Abolitionists, 87–91, 93–98.
16
Jonathan Edwards, The Injustice and Impolicy of the Slave Trade and of the Slavery of the Africans […] A Sermon
([New Haven, CT?], 1791), ed. Sarah Gamertsfelder, in Basker et al., Early American Abolitionists, 161.
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trade after twenty years. And, in 1808, when the Act Prohibiting the Importation of Slaves went
into effect, the United States codified this commitment, seemingly representing the end to the
first part of the Founders’ plan to rid their republic of slavery.
Understanding the complexities of foreign policy during the antebellum period, historians
have taken for granted that the United States was involved in the suppression of the slave trade.
While it has accepted that suppression of the international slave trade was a US diplomatic
commitment, the historiography has dismissed the sincerity with which the young republic
pursued the policy.17 The United States had been founded and bound in union through a
constitution that protected slavery’s existence—and that, arguably, led to the emergence of a
domestic “Slave Power.” That the republic was pursuing slavers on the high seas has been seen
as the reflection of international obligations rather than any genuine desire for slavery’s
destruction. But the seizure and adjudication of slave ships throughout the period reflected the
Founders’ aim to eradicate slavery gradually and was part of a larger abolitionist strategy that,
using the legalistic methods of traditional antislavery, built toward emancipation. The
historiography has therefore failed to see the significant degree to which slave-trade suppression
was a matter of federal policy, and it has accepted without necessary interrogation that the slave
trade continued after the United States’ 1808 ban. Weighed down by historiographical
preconceptions, historians have naturally approached the subject without the inquisitiveness of a

17

W. E. B. Du Bois, The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade (1896; New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), 97;
Obadele-Starks, Freebooters and Smugglers, 3–14; Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The
Transformation of America, 1815–1848 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), 312, 678; Matthew Karp, This Vast
Southern Empire: Slaveholders at the Helm of American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press,
2016), 3–5, 52–57. As early as 1896, W. E. B. Du Bois declared that the nation had stymied any serious
international agreement simply because it wanted to avoid exposing its own “criminal negligence.” Looking
domestically, Ernest Obadele-Starks, in 2007, described a culture of conspiracy deeply imbedded in the South,
which facilitated the illegal trade’s continued conduct. Analyzing US foreign policy during the antebellum period,
Daniel Walker Howe and Matthew Karp have maintained that Southern control of policymaking steered the United
States from international efforts at slave-trade suppression.
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stranger and, as a result, have overlooked a crucial line of inquiry. They have neglected to
consider the simple question: what happened to the slave trade?
At issue is the US government’s relationship to slavery. For, in the historiography of the
early republic and antebellum periods, two distinct portraits of this relationship have emerged.
Whereas some historians have maintained that the antislavery of the nation’s founding played a
crucial role in US policymaking up to the Civil War, others have contended that, regardless of
the republic’s principled origins, the US government was, for all intents and purposes, the
representative of the Slave Power. The works of two historians, in particular—James Oakes and
Don E. Fehrenbacher—best demonstrate this historiographical debate.
In his 2013 book, Freedom National, Oakes told of the decades-long effort to build a
legal framework for the eventual political abolition of slavery. He argued that, over the course of
the antebellum period, antislavery advocates constructed and built on the legal argument that
freedom was a national principle and that individual states were the only governments that could
regulate slavery. This “freedom principle” had its roots in the English decision of Somerset v.
Stewart in 1772, which held that there could be, under common law, no “property in man,” for
freedom was an individual’s natural condition. In the years leading up to the Civil War,
abolitionist-minded attorneys consistently applied it to slavery within the United States. As the
federal government could not forbid states from allowing slavery, these lawyers formulated that
only by surrounding slave states with free territories, thereby pressuring emancipation, or
enacting the well-precedented tool of military emancipation, as a means of quelling civil unrest,
could slavery be extinguished. And it was, according to Oakes, this constitutional argument and
the Republican party’s adoption of that argument that spurred the Southern states to secede.
Going against suggestions that the Lincoln administration slowly moved toward emancipation as

8

an exigency of war, Oakes contended that the Republicans entered the White House in 1861 with
emancipation in mind. It was only as the war progressed that Lincoln and his administration
pursued the policy with greater vengeance. In Oakes’ view, therefore, it was the purposely
abolitionist character of the federal government that brought about emancipation.18
Critically, Oakes’ work reconsidered the nature of abolitionist politics. He demonstrated
that the legal theory on which abolitionist court cases spanning the antebellum period were based
was the result of a carefully planned, logical attack on slavery’s existence. It thus represented the
continuity of a more traditional, legalistic abolitionism that predated immediatism. Anticipating
and responding to the arguments of proslavery constitutionalists, the goal of these advocates—
Salmon Chase, Joshua Giddings, and Charles Sumner, to name a few—was to limit slavery to the
point of extinction. Slowly, this gradualist constitutional argument would reduce the prominence
of slave states in the federal government and set the nation on the path to total emancipation.19
Although it recalled the measured approach of pre-Garrisonian abolitionism, this was, as Oakes
wrote, “the platform on which Abraham Lincoln ran for president, and on which he won.”20
The freedom principle also applied internationally. Republicans believed that, by
“denationalizing” slavery,21 the federal government would become unentangled by the Slave
Power’s influence and move toward protection of freedom abroad. As Oakes wrote, “Wherever
the federal government was sovereign—on the high seas, in the western territories, and in the
nation’s capital—slavery would be abolished by the government.”22 It was, accordingly, a
federal obligation to suppress the international slave trade. As Oakes illustrated, Republicans

18

James Oakes, Freedom National: The Destruction of Slavery in the United States, 1861–1865 (New York: W. W.
Norton, 2013), ix–xiii, xix.
19
Oakes, Freedom National, 1–34.
20
Oakes, Freedom National, 48.
21
Oakes, Freedom National, 26.
22
Oakes, Freedom National, 33.
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understood that duty. That Secretary of State William H. Seward moved within the first months
of the administration to sign a treaty with Great Britain over the slave trade was, Oakes showed,
evidence of this point.23 Freedom National therefore depicted an abolitionist-motivated United
States situated in a world where proactive defense of human freedom was seen as a necessity.
On its face, the argument that Don E. Fehrenbacher laid out in his posthumously
published The Slaveholding Republic (2001) ran parallel to Oakes’ Freedom National.
Fehrenbacher maintained throughout the work that the “federal consensus”—the notion that
slavery was a state concern outside the realm of federal interference—played a significant role in
the intersectional dealings over slavery since the republic’s founding. Certainly, it was, to
Fehrenbacher, within the Constitution’s legal and moral purview that the federal government
could prevent slavery from spreading westward to the territories. But Fehrenbacher held that, by
the Civil War’s eruption, the consensus had become the pawn of sectionalism, with each side
developing its own diametrically opposed version of the Framers’ intentions. While the South
unitedly proclaimed the Constitution to be a proslavery document, the North, Fehrenbacher
pointed out, varied in its assessments. Garrisonians, in particular, asserted that the Constitution
was, in fact, proslavery. Fehrenbacher explained that, although this position was wrong, it was
the product of the patently proslavery precedents of federal government action developed since
the nation’s founding. Fehrenbacher averred that, regardless of the Framers’ intentions, the
federal government had become a proslavery institution. In those eighty-four years of existence,
it had become a “slaveholding republic.”24 It is in this way that he distinguished himself from
Oakes. For, rather than emphasizing a constant effort that moved toward emancipation, he
stressed the degree to which the federal government prevented that struggle.

23
24

Oakes, Freedom National, 262–263.
Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic, 10–13.
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Crucially, Fehrenbacher portrayed the Republican party as far from the abolitionist
character of Oakes’s Freedom National. According to his narrative, pro-abolitionist political
forces were overwhelming Abraham Lincoln by the summer of 1862 with calls for uncolonized
emancipation. Lincoln was, in Fehrenbacher’s view, “often passive, tardy, and at times
discouraging of moving in this direction [emancipation] on his own accord.” While he was
certainly a gradual emancipationist, who, Fehrenbacher explained, believed that “any Union
worth preserving had as a prerequisite that slavery should first be restricted and ultimately be
eliminated,” Lincoln was a pragmatist, a politician who understood the give and take of political
dealing. Hostage to radicals, and with a progressively larger number of enslaved African
Americans freeing themselves, Lincoln tried to gain control of the issue by adopting a more
radical, pro-abolitionist position than he initially intended. “The president,” Fehrenbacher wrote,
“concluded that to maximize his effectiveness in leading this chaotic mix of conflicting interests
he had to move closer to the abolitionist position.”25
Using the United States’ inconsistent suppression of the international slave trade,
Fehrenbacher extended his proslavery depiction into the earliest days of the republic.
Questioning the sincerity of the slave trade laws, he portrayed US slave-trade suppression as
periodic and deliberately decentralized, requiring the “initiative” and “cooperation” of elements
of all levels of government.26 While the early federal efforts to suppress the slave trade were met
with resounding support, this sentiment dissipated as the nineteenth century progressed.
Fehrenbacher concluded that “the history of the federal government’s relation to the African
slave trade begins with impressive legislation but is primarily a study of faulty enforcement.”27
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While Fehrenbacher underscored that the international slave trade was of minor
significance to both the North and South,28 he used it to exemplify international perceptions of
the United States’ as a proslavery state. “Although the nation had been termed ‘a house divided
against itself’ and ‘half slave and half free,’ in one respect,” he wrote, “unity had tended to
prevail over duality.” Pointing to Southern “hypersensitivity to anything touching slavery” that
prevented consistent enforcement of US law,29 he argued that the resulting foreign policy was
generally proslavery. He concluded that “Whatever it might be as a federal union of sovereign
states, the antebellum United States, as a sovereign state itself, was a slaveholding republic. That
was the impression given by the national capital. That was the image presented in diplomacy to
the rest of the world. And that had become the law of the land by edict of the Supreme Court.”30
In Fehrenbacher’s assessment, the interests of the Slave Power were directly reflected in the
policies of the federal government.
Although he implied the construction of and advocacy for “freedom national” extended
internationally, Oakes curiously accepted Fehrenbacher’s analysis of an overtly proslavery US
foreign policy across the period. Prefacing the speed with which Seward entered into
negotiations with the British government over slave-trade suppression, Oakes explained that
“When in 1860 opponents of slavery looked back over the course of American diplomatic
history, they saw an unbroken record of support for slavery.”31 In his endnote, Oakes wrote that
“The actual history of slavery and American foreign policy was more complicated than the
abolitionists suggested, primarily because the territorial expansion was popular in the North as
well as in the South. Nevertheless, there was an indisputably proslavery bias to American
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diplomacy.” He cited Fehrenbacher as this claim’s evidence.32 Oakes’ quickness to embrace the
accepted narrative of antebellum US diplomacy highlights an unexplored aspect of his thesis.
Because the focus of Freedom National was domestic emancipation, Oakes did not attempt to
test the freedom principle’s applicability outside the United States. While he claimed that
freedom was international, Oakes neglected the slave importation cases adjudicated in US courts
during the period, not studying with sufficient depth the relationship between the freedom
principle and the international slave trade.
Oakes’ embrace of Fehrenbacher’s characterization of an adamantly proslavery United
States becomes even more curious when considering the recent rise to prominence of a historical
narrative that emphasizes slavery’s centrality to the United States’ growth as a world power. At
present, the historiography of the early republic and antebellum periods is conflicted over the
degree to which emphasis must be placed on slavery as the roots of the US economic
predominance of subsequent generations. A growing contingent of historians has, in numerous
articles and monographs over the last decade, claimed that slavery was integral to the United
States’ growth as a world power. These New Historians of Capitalism, as they have come to be
called, have painted a grim portrait of US history in which the principles of the Declaration of
Independence—however noble—cannot be extricated from the cruelties of its contemporary
contradiction, slavery.33
The arguments of these historians have been imbedded into the framework of the popular
New York Times Magazine’s 1619 Project, which aimed to suggest that “Out of slavery,” as Jake
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Silverstein wrote in his introduction to the project’s introduction, “grew nearly everything that
has made America exceptional.”34 As the narrative of these historians and non-historians has
gained wider acceptance, the literature has drawn greater attention to the individuals who
suffered as a result of slavery, while dismissing the role that antislavery—the movement to
destroy entirely the institution—played in emancipation.35 For, while the slave trade may have
brought its first cargo to the shores of the present-day United States in 1619, the trade
subsequently continued for more than two hundred years. Emancipation, the precondition for
general abolition, was a years-long process. The tale of the slave trade’s destruction does not end
with the 1808 importation ban, just as the stories of slavery and emancipation cannot be
condensed into the years 1619 and 1863. Rather, these were the result of several actors, both free
and enslaved, complex processes that cannot be presented in such a distilled manner.
To show this process more clearly, the historiography of abolition requires
reconsideration. While in an American context “abolitionism” conjures images of William Lloyd
Garrison and John Brown—whose immediatism seemed to fuel the slavocracy’s rage—
abolitionism was a much more complex movement than suggested in the literature. As Richard
S. Newman’s 2002 study The Transformation of American Abolitionism exemplifies, the
accepted narrative of abolitionism maintains that, with the rise of radical abolitionism, the
traditional form withered away to extinction. Examining the Pennsylvania Abolition Society
(PAS) and the Massachusetts Antislavery Society, which inspired the American Antislavery
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Society, Newman divided abolitionism into two distinct “waves.” The Pennsylvania society
epitomized the gradualist approach of post-Revolutionary abolitionism. Newman argued,
“dominated by societal elites—wealthy philanthropists, political representatives, businessmen,
and, above all, well-known lawyers—the PAS advocated gradual abolitionism by means of
painstaking legal work and legislative action.” Contrary to radical abolitionism, “Emotional
appeals to the public,” he continued, “and religious zeal had no place in its procedure.”36
Largely because of the PAS’s elitism, according to Newman, the radical approach of the
Massachusetts Antislavery Society became popular.37 The PAS “deplored” the immediatism of
the “young upstarts” in Massachusetts, and many feared that “Massachusetts radicals would ruin
the American republic before they destroyed slavery.”38 Arguing that the Massachusetts
Antislavery Society’s rise to prominence was in response to the considerable social and political
changes underway in the 1830s, Newman contended that “Abolitionism became the first social
movement to so completely transform itself.”39
Newman’s argument importantly neglected the continuities of earlier abolitionism into
the antebellum period. His research questions, to some extent, explain this. Rather than study
what elements of Revolution-era abolitionism lingered into the heyday of radical abolitionism,
Newman hoped, through his research, to answer “why” abolitionism changed “when it did in the
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1830s” and “how exactly … abolition’s strategy and tactics change so that Americans would
ever remember the aggressive post-1830s movement as the essence of organized antislavery.”
While continuities were surely not his focus, his research was framed in such a way as to prevent
exploration of Revolutionary-era abolitionism’s survival into the antebellum period.40 But did, as
Newman suggested, American abolitionism “completely transform itself”? Certainly,
methodologically, the distinction between the two eras of antislavery is true. But, as an
examination of the foreign slave trade shows, the legalistic strategies of traditional abolitionism
continued into the Civil War.
This image of two distinct eras in antislavery has bled over into historiography of the
coming of the Civil War. Although the antislavery movement began with attacks against the
slave trade, the historiography of the Civil War’s origins has largely focused on the radical strain
of abolitionism that emerged in the 1830s. After the 1808 importation ban, it was not until the
Missouri Compromise twelve years later that slavery surfaced again as a matter of federal
concern. Antislavery, moreover, only became more popular after William Lloyd Garrison
followed black abolitionists’ lead in rejecting colonization and demanding immediate
emancipation.41 But the dramatic deeds and passionate language of the American Anti-Slavery
Society and immediate abolitionism have attracted historiographical emphasis. One need only
briefly survey the literature of both abolition and the broader antebellum period to see that, with
the arrival of these extreme actors, the older form of abolition seems to disappear.42 In treatments
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of the law in relation to the coming of the Civil War, the 1830s has been similarly shown as a
turning point. Immediatism has been shown entirely to replace gradualism. Rather than suggest
continuity with the preceding fifty years, historians have suggested that antislavery legal
arguments, particularly Somerset, were rediscovered.43 The distinct impression left upon the
reader is that of a tight, thirty-year narrative that tells of the sudden rise of a sincerely driven,
zealous abolitionism almost completely divorced from any moorings in Revolution-era
antislavery.
This thesis intends to answer whether this earlier form of abolition truly disappeared by
examining federal cases involving seized slave ships from 1820 to the Civil War. For how the
slave trade went from a mere constitutionally promised ban to an eradicated commerce reveals
an antislavery-minded US government not sufficiently addressed in the historiography.
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Historians’ questions that probe the sincerity of constant slave-trade suppression diminish that,
between 1808 and 1865, the US government seized and adjudicated illegally imported slave
cargoes and prosecuted US citizens suspected of engaging in the trade. Regardless of their
outcomes, these cases established, case by case, that the US government would go to trial over
the international slave trade. Revealing an antislavery-minded US government not sufficiently
addressed in the historiography, these cases lay bare a distinct portrait that joins the
historiographies of US diplomacy, the coming of the Civil War, and abolitionism, rooting them
in the traditional, legalistic antislavery of the nation’s revolutionary founding. This thesis
endeavors to look for continuities. And, in examining the slave trade, therefore, it will bridge a
historiographical void.
Beginning in 1820, when, as Fehrenbacher suggested, Congress enacted the last
“substantive legislation” against the international slave trade,44 this project will show that
Revolution-era antislavery did not die out with the rise of radical abolitionism in the 1830s. In its
first chapter, “Origins: A Diplomatic Dilemma,” the thesis will examine the case of the Jeune
Eugénie to explain the motivation behind the federal government’s apparent reluctance to join
international efforts to police the slave trade. Seized by the US Navy off the coast of present-day
Liberia in 1821, the ship became the subject of a diplomatic incident between the United States
and France. Against considerable French pressure, the American republic asserted the
sovereignty of its courts. Using diplomatic correspondence in addition to court reports, the
chapter will maintain sovereignty’s place as the priority of foreign policy in the early republic.
The second chapter, “The Means and Ends: Freedom International?,” will study the federal court
cases in which slave ships or US citizens were tried for engaging in the illicit trade between 1820
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and 1862.45 Relying on court reports, this chapter charts the construction of the abolitionist legal
mechanism for emancipation in three vignettes, applying James Oakes’ thesis in Freedom
National to the international through the Atlantic slave trade.46 In the third and final chapter,
“Character: The American Colonization Society, Abolitionism, and ‘The Great Safety Valve of
This Union!’,” this thesis will explore the relationship between the American Colonization
Society (ACS) and our understanding of abolitionism by emphasizing the antislavery nature of
this largely dismissed gradualist organization. Using the annual reports and member publications
of the ACS, the chapter will show that the society was an abolitionist organization and that antislave-trade concerns of traditional abolitionism continued well into the antebellum period.
Together, these chapters will build a portrait of a long abolitionism, which, as Oakes suggested,
slowly, yet constantly, drove toward emancipation. As Timothy Patrick McCarthy and John
Stauffer identified in their 2006 Prophets of Protest, three questions have driven the
historiography of abolitionism, with historians striving to explain the “when,” “why,” “how,”
and “who” of the movement’s progression. These questions, which they named the “origins,”
“means and ends,” and “character” debates,47 provide the structure of this thesis.
The early republic and antebellum periods were awash with contradictions. As it
broadened suffrage and fostered opportunities for white males, the United States was, as
Fehrenbacher concluded, a “slaveholding republic,” which could not, regardless of its proactive
pursuit of slave-trade suppression, completely shake loose its ties to the Slave Power. But the
United States’ motivations in pursuing slave-trade suppression cannot be ignored. Both as a
45
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means of exhibiting its sovereignty as an independent nation and as a continuation of
Revolution-era antislavery, the United States sincerely worked to foreclose the international
slave trade. The 1808 importation ban was a promise of the Constitution and a tool by which
abolition could progress. Emphasizing the United States’ commitment to slave-trade suppression
is not intended to diminish the contradictions of the nation’s first eighty years or the suffering of
those individuals who found themselves enslaved within a republic that professed liberty. It
means to complicate the picture of an entirely acquiescent US government, which served as the
slavocracy’s puppet, and demonstrates that, in the end, the Revolution’s abolitionist promise was
fulfilled. The story that follows tells of the origins, means and ends, and character by which
abolitionists undertook that constitutional commitment.

20

CHAPTER I: ORIGINS: A DIPLOMATIC DILEMMA
At around two o’clock on the morning of November 26, 1821, John Quincy Adams was
wide awake. Anxiety had overtaken the Secretary of State to President James Monroe as the
threat of just one day prior grew on his conscience. Although he had been engaged in stressful
negotiations with the French ambassador, the Baron Hyde de Neuville, for several months,
Adams laid in bed, unable to sleep, for another three hours. After trying in vain for the rest that
he so desperately needed, he took to his diary to record the events of the day before. Neuville, he
recalled, had become enraged: “As a private individual he declared as his opinion that within
three months American vessels would be detained in France.”48 Threatening to seize US
merchant ships, the French ambassador challenged the rights of a sovereign United States.
What spawned Neuville’s statement were the recent seizures of French commercial
vessels, in particular the ship La Jeune Eugénie, accused by the US government of participating
in the African slave trade. These seizures, Neuville claimed, were without justification, leading
him to declare them to be “outrages upon the flag and the national honor of France.” Adams
attempted to calm the French ambassador, indicating that he would relay Neuville’s opinion to
President Monroe. But his response had the opposite effect. Leaping to his feet, Neuville
exclaimed, “if satisfaction is not made to France … La France doit leur déclarer la guerre,” and
swiftly exited the secretary’s office into the night without even his overcoat.49 This overcharged
conversation between Adams and Neuville had coincided with diplomatic discussions between
the United States and Britain over the suppression of the international slave trade. Britain,
desiring its former colonies to aid in policing the trade, asked that the United States take an

48

Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848, ed. Charles Francis
Adams, vol. 5 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1875), 415–416, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044013557053.
49
Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, 415–416.

21

active role in a European priority. But the seizure of the Jeune Eugénie—an act similar to what
Britain’s negotiations asked of the United States—had only weakened the young nation’s
diplomatic position. Thus, the United States’ attempt to position itself as an equal of the two
leading world powers had in fact placed it in a precarious diplomatic situation, offending one and
highlighting how different it was from the other.
By 1821, Britain had long been the European beacon of antislavery. As early as 1772,
Lord Mansfield’s decision in Somerset v. Stewart held that slavery had no basis in English
common law. Steven M. Wise called the decision “the opening salvo in a legal barrage that,
within a century, splintered all of human slavery’s bulwarks.”50 It was not until 1808, however,
when Britain abolished slavery, that it truly thrust itself onto the world stage as the international
enforcer of antislavery. Although the Royal Navy did not begin patrols off West Africa in earnest
until 1819, it seized slavers within the first years of the abolition law. As the Royal Navy battled
with Napoleon across the world’s oceans, older ships policed the African coast for slavers. When
the Napoleonic Wars had finally come to an end, the Royal Navy gradually increased the size of
its efforts at suppressing the slave trade.51 The patrols continued throughout the nineteenth
century, leading to estimates that, between 1811 and 1870, Britain was responsible for
interrupting forty-three percent of the slave trade.52
Critically, Britain led the international community in establishing slavery as a violation of
an emerging system of international law. The European power set up admiralty courts with wideranging, international jurisdiction through which to adjudicate the seizure of slave vessels and
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created the laws by which those courts carried out their duties.53 In 1816, even before the Royal
Navy’s patrols had been conducted in full force, these courts ruled on 130 ships that Britain had
seized as slavers.54 Despite “smacking” of imperialism, Lauren Benton and Lisa Ford have
attributed the basis of modern international law to British efforts during the period. Britain, they
wrote, “negotiated an impressive network of treaties designed to erect in piecemeal fashion what
international opinion could not deliver on its own: an international ban against slave trading and
piracy.”55 Britain was guiding Europe toward antislavery, making British concerns European
priorities. As David Eltis wrote, the British government was becoming the “self-appointed
instrument of international opinion.”56
France, however, had stood as one of Britain’s leading obstacles in its efforts to suppress
the slave trade. The French colonial system depended on slavery, and, in the post-Napoleonic
period, French ships contributed a significant portion of the international traffic of slaves. The
reluctance of the French colonial system to yield to the international mood of antislavery that
consumed Europe following the Congress of Vienna was an annoyance to the British
government. According to Nelly Schmidt, the French government preferred to maintain slavery
in its colonies because of those colonies’ economic importance. This dependence on its colonies
for cane sugar and exclusive commerce encouraged an “uncommon immobility” within the
French government to abolish slavery—the institution on which the French West Indies
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survived.57 In 1821, therefore, the French government was merely a nominal supporter of the
slave trade’s suppression.
Having led the world with its constitutional promise to ban the importation of slaves in
twenty years, the United States, on the other hand, had fallen behind. In 1806, Congress began
debating the prohibition of the importation of slaves, which the Constitution mandated, passing
the legislation in 1807—twenty-three days before Britain’s abolition. Although the initial bill
wished for the death penalty to be imposed upon those Americans found to own or captain
vessels participating in the trade, the enacted law contained minimal punishments, which were
rarely enforced.58 Whether from salutary neglect or due to the distractions of the War of 1812,
the United States continued not to enforce the importation ban throughout the 1810s. With illegal
importation still occurring, Congress enacted legislation in 1818, 1819, and 1820 that increased
the penalties for slave importation. In 1821, US law maintained that it was piracy, subject to
capital punishment, for any American-owned vessel or US citizen to participate in the slave
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trade, bringing the nation’s position on the issue in line with the European standard.59 In 1824,
however, the United States declined to ratify an 1823 agreement between itself, Britain, and
France that aimed to coordinate the nations’ suppression efforts, backing away from
internationally policing the practice for twenty years and threatening its status as a “civilized”
power.60 As Paul Finkelman observed, “At the same time the United States prohibited the trade,
the British Parliament also took steps to end it.”61 While Britain patrolled the seas, therefore, the
United States almost seemed ambivalent toward the slave trade’s end.
Historians have long disagreed about the causes of the United States’ inactivity in the
early years of slave-trade suppression. Revolutionaries in the study of diplomatic history, in
particular Samuel Flagg Bemis, held that the Monroe Doctrine, characterized by republicanism
and hemispheric limitations, represented the United States’ primary foreign policy goals during
the period.62 Later historians, such as Scott A. Silverstone and Gordon S. Wood, have delved
deeper, however, suggesting that the United States’ international focus was not to provoke
Britain or France; the United States thus stood as a constant neutral party between the two
nations, not yet having been accepted on the world stage. Wood insisted that, by the conclusion
of the War of 1812, the United States felt secure as a state, marking an end to the idea common
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throughout the early republican period of an internationally vulnerable North American
republic.63
Don E. Fehrenbacher and, more recently, Daniel Walker Howe, Matthew Karp, and
James Oakes have argued that US abstinence in slave-trade suppression reflected the growing
control of Southerners in foreign policymaking that came to characterize the antebellum period.
Not eager to see the domestic trade collapse, Southerners, they have argued, steered the United
States away from international suppression. This was in spite of the significant impact of
growing foreign antislavery opinion on the United States.64 In 1821, the United States thus found
itself at the intersection of two distinct approaches to international politics. At this time, the early
republic’s sense of self-doubt in the nation’s permanence on the world stage coincided with the
growing prioritization of domestic sectional interests in addressing the larger world.
Significantly, the works of Eliga Gould and Seymour Drescher have offered a lens
through which suppression of the slave trade may be better seen as tied to sovereignty. The
United States wished to be seen on the world stage as a sovereign nation that could exert its
power over the Americas, free from the influence of its former colonial master. But the young
nation still had to operate within European parameters.65 The Monroe Doctrine, Gould claimed,
was, therefore, purely the encapsulation of the status to which the United States aspired. Rather
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than the star it became in the American firmament, the Doctrine, to Gould, lacked any real-world
implications. It was the declaration of a state that could only ward off European colonial interests
as long as Europe was indifferent toward the Western Hemisphere.66
The United States, according to Gould, assented to Britain’s interference with foreign
vessels as it recognized the US Navy did not have the infrastructure to police its own importation
ban. Despite contemporary debates over the impressment of American citizens, the United States
allowed the British Navy to seize American slave ships.67 To contribute to the suppression of the
international slave trade—a European priority—the United States thus sacrificed an aspect of its
sovereignty to Britain. After all, to Gould, “Americans accepted the legal order of which Europe
was still the center.”68 And, as Drescher crucially noted, while the United States understood the
realities of this system, its foreign policy was a constant balance between suppressing slave
importations and resistance to British pressure to join an international coalition to do so.69
Although it accepted European priorities to ensure it was viewed as a notable world power, the
United States had little desire to play a constant role in slave-trade suppression. It would only
participate as a means of underscoring its worthiness as an unignorable sovereign state operating
within the European system.
The instance of the Jeune Eugénie stood in curious contrast to the United States’ pattern
of inactivity. The diplomatic incident, which began after the ship’s capture in mid-May 1821,
reflects the framework of Gould and Drescher. When a US Navy ship seized the French-flagged
La Jeune Eugénie off the coast of present-day Liberia, the United States, for a brief moment,
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entered the international struggle against the slave trade. Although likely an American vessel that
was undeniably engaged in the slave trade, the case of the Jeune Eugénie placed the United
States at odds with one of its earliest European allies, France, exacerbating a previously
deteriorating diplomatic relationship with the continental power. While it diplomatically insisted
that the executive could not interfere with the case as it worked its way through the court system,
the United States internally pushed the court to release the ship back to the French, despite
evidence and codified law that demanded otherwise. Externally, therefore, the United States’
integrity was maintained, while it ensured that its neutrality between Britain and France would
not be disturbed. Only three years later, the United States forwent joining Britain in a coalition to
rein in the slave trade. The years between 1808 and 1823 stood as a unique time for the United
States and its desire to suppress the international slave trade, when early republican fears of the
Union’s permanence combined with rising antebellum tensions over the domestic slave trade.
The case of the Jeune Eugénie thus serves as a case study for this early US approach to the
suppression of the international slave trade; for, during this period, the United States participated
in an international system, which it would later repudiate, in which its sovereignty found itself
constantly on shaky ground.
When the USS Alligator intercepted the Jeune Eugénie in May 1821, its orders were not
to police the African coast for slavers. In fact, the Alligator’s primary mission had been at the
behest of the American Colonization Society. Depositing a group of African American emigrants
and an agent of the organization at Freetown, Sierra Leone, the Alligator joined several other US
warships anchored in the harbor tasked with establishing a permanent West African colony for
African Americans. While the officers of the other US Navy ships—in particular Edward
Trenchard and Matthew C. Perry of the USS Cyane—had failed to convince local tribal leader

28

King Peter to part with a concession on which an African American colony could be assured,
they had encountered and seized American slave ships while scouting potential sites along the
coast. The Alligator’s captain, Robert F. Stockton, was determined, however, to obtain a
concession from King Peter. Upon his arrival at Freetown, Stockton attempted to negotiate with
King Peter. But, swiftly meeting the same obstacles that his predecessors had, he arranged a
second, later meeting, which proved much more successful. Convincing the king to concede
what would become Monrovia, Liberia, at gunpoint, he offered “guns, furniture, a bundle of
mirrors, rum, and cigars worth about $300” in exchange.70 Through coercion, the Alligator’s
official mission was accomplished. That primary objective, which supported the removal of free
African Americans from the United States, importantly alludes to the increasing fragmentation of
antislavery as the republic left its revolutionary era and entered the antebellum period.
Having successfully obtained land for an African American colony in West Africa,
Stockton and his Alligator had time to join the other US Navy ships in their informal
investigations of American slavers operating in the region. During his “negotiations” with King
Peter in Freetown, Stockton had been informed of ships taking on slaves just inside the mouth of
the Gallinas River, south of Freetown. Should those ships have been sailing either under
American flag or with American crew members, they were acting in violation of US law and
subject to Stockton’s seizure. This intelligence was confirmed when, en route to the Gallinas, the
Alligator picked up the crew of a small sloop, who had only recently left the two slavers
anchored there.71 On the evening of May 17/18, the crew of the Alligator found the Jeune
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Eugénie anchored at the mouth of the Gallinas, near Cape Mount, just as the reports had
suggested. They boarded and seized the vessel, marking the first prize of their cruise.72
Inspecting the ship, Stockton quickly identified the Jeune Eugénie to be a slaver.
Reporting to US Secretary of the Navy Smith Thompson in July 1821, Stockton recalled that she
was “in all respects prepared for the reception and accommodation of slaves; the decks laid,
water stowed, and gratings for the admission of light and air, with a large quantity of rice and
water on board.”73 He continued, “The officer in command of the vessel declares that on
discovering us, he made preparations to repel every attempt that would be made to discover who
or what he was; an evidence sufficiently conclusive as to the nature of the business in which he
was engaged.”74 Stockton’s inspection revealed a ship whose object, he believed, was clearly to
transport slaves. That no slaves were on board was purely a matter of fortunate timing and did
not diminish Stockton’s certainty. The Jeune Eugénie was undoubtedly a slaver whose “cargo”
had simply not yet been loaded.
With enough provisions for the transport of slaves, the ship’s structure further suggested
that it had long been in use as a slaver. While the ship’s papers claimed its journey was from
Basseterre, Guadeloupe, to St. Thomas, and then to the coast of Africa for “the ostensible
purpose of procuring palm oil and other products of Africa,” two of Stockton’s crew, who were
later deposed, stated that the Jeune Eugénie had permanent structural alterations indicative of a
slave ship. One midshipman noted that “The Eugenie had a moveable deck, that her main

https://books.google.com/books?id=5xcfH7l8YXIC&lpg=PA33&ots=PBCS3j_KaD&dq=edward%20trechard%20a
%20view%20of%20the%20present&pg=PA1#v=onepage&q=edward%20trechard%20a%20view%20of%20the%20
present&f=false.
72
Stockton, in A View of the Present State, 40; William P. Mason, A Report of the Case of the Jeune Eugénie,
Determined at the Circuit Court of the United States, for the First Circuit, at Boston, December 1821 (Boston:
Wells & Lilly, 1822), 3, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.law/llst.057.
73
Stockton, in A View of the Present State, 40.
74
Stockton, in A View of the Present State, 41.

30

hatchway was very large, and grated with three iron bars, that the water on board was sufficient
to supply two hundred men for a month. And her provisions, including rice, enough for her crew
for a twelve-month.” Another crewmember, a seaman, noted the presence of handcuffs and
fetters, which contradicted the owners’ claim that the ship was sailing to obtain palm oil.75
Instead of carrying the cargo that the ship’s log suggested, the Jeune Eugénie had been
structurally modified to transport slaves, permanent alterations that had likely been used before.
Obviously prepared for the transportation of slaves, the Jeune Eugénie’s nationality was
all that remained for Stockton to claim her as prize. Having inspected the vessel, Stockton was
convinced that she was an American ship falsely sailing under French flag. Of course, that the
Jeune Eugénie had been flying French colors before the Alligator’s arrival had not stopped
Stockton from proceeding with his search. However, the search yielded evidence that satisfied
Stockton, showing the ship to be, in fact, still American owned and operated. He claimed in his
report to Thompson that “although in her papers it is admitted that she was built in the U.S. they
could not shew any legal proof of a transfer from her original owners.”76
The documents that Stockton found aboard indicated she had belonged to Jean Pierre
Raibaud and Jean Marie Labatut, French residents of Guadeloupe, since February 1819.77 At the
time, Guadeloupe was an especially active center for the slave trade. Leading the slavery-
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dependent French colonial system in slave importation, the island annually acquired an average
of 38,000 enslaved persons. Only ten years earlier, Guadeloupe held its maximum enslaved
population of 103,000.78 Meanwhile, French slavers led the world in the slave trade. One British
officer, in fact, claimed that in the first half of 1820 he had encountered twenty-five to thirty
slavers sailing under French flag, bearing an estimated total of 40,000 slaves.79 Regardless of
whether they were genuine, the ship’s papers suggested that she originated in the core of the
slave-trading world. Destined for a slave-trading center and rigged for the transportation of
slaves, the circumstantial evidence was plentiful that pointed to the Jeune Eugénie’s status as a
slaver. Not proven to have been legitimately transferred from American ownership, the Jeune
Eugénie could be subject to US seizure and returned to the United States to be adjudicated as
Stockton’s prize.
Stockton’s intuition as to the Jeune Eugénie’s nationality seemed confirmed when, just
one week later, on May 24, the Alligator seized two other schooners, the Daphnée and the
Matilda. He reported to Thompson that “the former of which had a French flag flying at her
main, and a Dutch flag at the foremast head, the latter having a French flag at her main.”80
Satisfied that the ships’ external appearances suggested American construction, he boarded them,
convinced that “the colours she had hoisted were assumed for the occasion, and not true; for it
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was well understood that the slave trade had been denounced by both nations whose protection
she appeared to claim.”81
Those familiar with the trade further confirmed Stockton’s suspicion. Eli Ayers, the
American Colonization Society agent whom Stockton transported to Freetown, wrote in 1823
that, “Although our flag has nearly ceased to be disgraced by this inhuman traffic, it is yet to be
feared that much American capital is still employed in the trade under the protection afforded by
the French and Spanish flags, as some of our citizens have occasionally been heard of on board
of French and Spain vessels.”82 In the international slave trade, it seemed that nationality
mattered only to the extent that it offered haven from punishment; and, since seizure was the
worst punishment, to lose one’s vessel meant to lose the potential profits that its human cargo
might yield. What resulted was a culture of internationalism among those participating in the
slave trade where national identities were only fickle facilitators of further profit.
Nevertheless, having assumed a French identity, the Jeune Eugénie threatened to
guarantee the collapse of the already delicate relationship between the United States and France.
From outward appearances, the case involved the seemingly unjust boarding and seizure of
French citizens’ private property. But the two nations’ diplomatic relationship was in turmoil.
Throughout June and July 1821, discussions between Adams and Ambassador Neuville revolved
around the issue of US interference with French commercial vessels, particularly in the matter of
the Apollon, which was then working its way through the federal court system. Caught off the
coast of Florida, the Apollon was detained for attempting to avoid a tonnage duty by smuggling
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goods and specie into the United States through the St. Mary’s River. Critically, mounting
evidence indicated that the ship had acted with the backing of the French government.
Although eventually settled by the US Supreme Court in 1824, the matter was yet
unsettled in the summer of 1821. Neuville pressed Adams that the Apollon matter be dropped for
the sake of the most-favored-nation principle and the rights of French citizens.83 However,
Adams was adamant that the US judicial system would not be subverted, especially against
French pressure. Writing to Monroe about Neuville’s reaction to hearing that the Apollon case
would be taken to trial, Adams reported that “he seemed to be displeased that it had been
brought. I told him that so far as private rights were concerned, the Judicial tribunals were
entirely competent to their protection.”84 Prior to the Jeune Eugénie, Adams maintained that the
US government would not bow to French demands, resolute that the federal judiciary was a
manifestation of the nation’s sovereignty.
The Jeune Eugénie’s arrival in Boston on July 14 coincided with the nadir of Adams’
conversations with Neuville regarding the Apollon. Thus, the foundation on which the
increasingly difficult issue of the Jeune Eugénie would be discussed was exceptionally poor. In a
letter to Monroe on July 25, Adams protested the expressive attitude that Neuville had adopted in
his recent negotiations. “I cannot disguise to you,” Adams wrote, “that if I have profoundly felt
the conduct of Captain Edou [the Apollon’s captain], as it effects the rights and interests of our
Country, I have been much more indignant at the attempt of the Baron de Neuville to palm it off
upon the World for the suffering of injured innocence and to trample upon the honour of this
Nation, by exacting, upon the most paltry pretences [sic], that the American Government should
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degrade itself, and, by the basest of concessions, set the seal to its own shame.”85 Nearly a week
later, Adams reported to Monroe that further negotiation on the matter was futile. He concluded,
“there is nothing to negotiate upon. There is nothing but chicanery in the claim.”86 Neuville and
the Apollon matter had worn down Adams’ patience. Adams saw Neuville’s repeated requests as
groundless deceit, frivolous irritants that had only proved to test his own diplomatic restraint.
Although first only mentioned tangentially, as early as July 31, 1821, Adams’ correspondence to
Monroe referenced the Jeune Eugénie as the subject of his conversations with Neuville.87 As
Stockton registered his claim with the US District Court of Massachusetts, therefore, the Jeune
Eugénie became its own source of controversy that aggravated the difficult diplomatic situation.
The Monroe administration once again became embroiled in discussions with a French
government with whom its relations were fragile at best.
Once August 1821 had passed, the administration’s internal correspondence delved
deeper into the case of the Jeune Eugénie. In an attempt to diffuse the situation, Stockton’s
orders were conveyed to Neuville. Navy secretary Smith Thompson spoke with Neuville and
assured him that no US Navy warships would have interrupted the travel of a ship without firm
evidence suggesting it to have been a slaver. Undoubtedly, he recalled in a letter to Monroe on
September 5, 1821, “the seizures in the cases referred to were made under a belief and strong
impression (growing out of the inconsistancies [sic] and the wait [sic] of the usual documents to
show they were French vessels) that they were American vessels and were seized as such.”88
Stressing that his orders only allowed US Navy ships the right to visit American vessels engaged
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in the slave trade, he wrote, “The general instructions to all our … vessels authorize them to take
only American vessels concerned in slave trade where found without the waters of the U. S.”89
While it maintained that Stockton’s seizure was justified, the US government displayed a keen
interest in quickly resolving the building diplomatic incident by parsing out the Alligator’s
orders. What thus resulted was an implied portrait of Stockton as a rogue officer, which aimed to
salvage the United States’ position with France.
The secretary’s letter, more importantly, revealed an avowed position within Monroe’s
cabinet to concede to the French government’s demands. Thompson’s letter exposes a skepticism
as to Stockton’s evidence for seizing the Jeune Eugénie. He admitted, “The documents said to
have been produced to show they were French I have not seen. If Mr. Adams on examination
should be satisfied that the owners were Frenchmen I should think the most advisable course
would be to give up without trial.” He continued, “The Government might be under obligation to
make them a compensation. There however would be no object as it would be much more
acceptable to the French Government so far as they might deem their natural rights invaded to
have the vessel delivered up voluntarily than by decree of the Court.”90 Despite not having the
chance to review the evidence with which Stockton had justified the Jeune Eugénie’s seizure,
Thompson urged the matter’s expeditious resolution, fearing the possible diplomatic
consequences. Although he feigned deference to the opinion of Monroe’s senior foreign policy
advisor, Thompson advocated that the administration deliver the ship to the French without
having its ownership properly adjudicated in the federal court system. In its discussions with the
French government, therefore, the Monroe administration supported Stockton’s actions,
defending his seizure, while internally maintaining that the matter needed to be swiftly rectified.
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Thompson was, by no means, alone. Monroe, too, was eager that the controversy be put
behind him. Materializing as General Andrew Jackson’s heavy handed governorship was
creating increasing tension between Spanish Floridians and their American occupiers, the Jeune
Eugénie affair was far from a foreign policy success. In his diary, Adams noted a conversation
with Monroe and John C. Calhoun, the US Secretary of War, regarding the latest updates on both
situations. “I had some desultory conversation with him concerning the case of the French vessel
La Jeune Eugénie and Lieutenant Stockton, and also concerning Jackson’s transactions with
Callava and Fromentin.” Although these were “all subjects of very insignificant import in
themselves, but very important from circumstances and principles connected with them,” Adams
stressed that “The President is not a little embarrassed with them.”91 Monroe’s embarrassment
hinted at a fear of the strength of the United States’ sovereign image.
Hoping to avoid further international disputes, Thompson went further to prevent future
incidents similar to that of the Jeune Eugénie. He ordered Stockton not to seize any vessel flying
a foreign flag, severely limiting the Alligator’s potential to police the slave trade while showing
timidity amid a conflict with a major European power. In a letter to Monroe on September 15,
1821, Thompson indicated that Stockton had again set sail. This time, however, he bore more
specific orders. Referring to the orders that Stockton received prior to his departure for Africa,
Thompson explained, “I had ordered him not to seize or interrupt any vessel under a foreign flag
unless he had the strongest and most satisfactory evidence that she was American, and using the
flag as a mere cover.” He continued, stressing a key change: “I have again to day instructed him

91

Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, 366. The incident to which Adams referred was Jackson’s imprisonment of José
María Callava, the former governor of Spanish Florida. Eligius Fromentin, appointed by Monroe to serve as Judge
for West Florida, had issued a writ of habeas corpus, which Jackson overturned, claiming it to have “interfered with
his authority.” By the time that Adams discussed the matter with Monroe and Calhoun on September 15, newspapers
across the country had published the correspondence of Jackson and Fromentin complaining to the Monroe
administration about one another. But the press had rallied behind Jackson. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, 359.

37

for the present and until further orders not to seize or search any vessel under a foreign flag.”92
To Thompson, caution—more specifically, avoiding conflict with France—was much more
important than stopping the slave trade.
Unlike Thompson, the nation’s senior diplomat saw little reason to change the Navy’s
behavior. More familiar with Neuville’s emotional demands, Adams urged the cabinet to avoid
concessions and let the trial run its course. Stockton, Adams was convinced, had acted correctly.
Hypothesizing about the consequences of yielding unquestioningly in a letter to Monroe, Adams
wrote, “I wish it should be submitted to the consideration of the President how this can be done
without a strong, though tacit censure of Lt. Stockton.” He continued, “By giving up the vessel
we not only admit the fact, that she was entirely French property, but we deprive our officer of
the means of shewing judicially his reasons for believing her to be American—We surrender not
only the question of public right, but the justification of the individual.”93 Rather than
immediately handing over the Jeune Eugénie to the French, Adams argued that the case be
settled in court. He stressed, “I am confirmed in the opinion, that the Jeune Eugénie should be
left to the regular course of the law, without the inference of the Executive.”94 Seeing the
importance of the United States’ solid support of Stockton’s actions, Adams recommended that
the trial be held as any other. The representation of a sovereign United States, the US justice
system could not succumb to the slightest push of a foreign power.
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In spite of Adams’ opinion, the cabinet continued to debate the use of executive authority
prior to the trial’s conclusion as a means by which the controversy could be brought to an end.
Significantly, Thompson had, by the trial’s commencement on October 29, altered his position,
arguing instead that Monroe should not use his authority to interrupt the proceedings. While a
faction still existed within the cabinet that advocated the trial be left to go unfettered, the cabinet
was divided on the merits of the issue. Monroe, Calhoun, and Treasury secretary William H.
Crawford—all Southerners—favored presidential interference. According to his own account,
Adams again urged caution and proposed a compromise between the two sides:
I suggested … that the District Attorney should be instructed to make a suggestion to the
Court, that the French Minister had demanded the delivery of the vessel as a French
vessel, amenable only to the jurisdiction of French tribunals, and that the President
considered the claim to be well founded; the Court would act upon this suggestion as they
should think proper. If they should decide to deliver up the vessel, the claim of the French
Minister would be admitted, and the question at an end. If they should maintain their own
jurisdiction and condemn the vessel, they would assign reasons for their decision, which
would be subject to reversal or revisal by the Supreme Court of the United States, and
furnish the answer to be given to the claim on the part of France.95
The US government would, therefore, relate the French demands to the court to allow a fuller
picture of the case. As the attorney general, William Wirt, was still hesitant, Adams
recommended that an official opinion be written on the matter to ensure solidarity within the
cabinet. Wirt concluded that “It is, therefore, no interference with judicial authority and
independence; it is, in truth, as it is called, a suggestion merely of the true character of the case,
as it has been presented by the minister of a foreign sovereign; of the official demand of the
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vessel by that minister in the name of his sovereign, as not amenable to our tribunals.”96 Through
this compromise the government would appear to be actively trying to remedy the diplomatic
crisis, while maintaining the court’s integrity.
Temporarily, this compromise seemed to allay tensions. As a conversation between
Adams and Neuville suggested, the letter that Adams drafted and sent to the US District Attorney
in Boston regarding the case put Neuville at ease. When Adams read the letter to Neuville, he
observed Neuville “to be entirely satisfied.” Neuville remarked, “if the vessel was engaged in the
slave-trade, nothing was farther from his disposition than to screen the concerned from
punishment; for France was perfectly agreed with the United States both in the principle of
suppressing the slave-trade and in that of refusing to agree to the right of search in time of
peace.”97 As a world power, France had adopted the European priority of the slave trade’s
suppression, publicly maintaining its support of the endeavor.
Whether Neuville’s words concerning French cooperation were sincere would only be
answered as the court case dragged on. With time, Adams found it increasingly difficult to hold
off Neuville’s persistent antagonism. In his frequent visits to Adams’ office throughout October
and November, Neuville repeatedly explored already trodden ground. Adams, familiar with
Neuville’s tendency toward exaggeration, adopted a strategy of powerlessness, insisting that the
executive could not interfere with the judiciary more than it already had in the letter it sent to the
court the previous month. On November 1, Adams “told him that the President had been
constantly inclined, from the time when he first made the demand, that the vessel should be
delivered up, but that the capture had been made on the presumption that she was an American
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vessel; and the case was regularly before the judicial tribunal, from which the President had no
power to take it.”98 The judiciary, as an equal branch of the federal government, could not be
interfered with by the executive. Adams’ position reflected an attempt to show solidarity amid
external pressure.
In Paris, the French government was simultaneously becoming more forceful in its
dealings with the American ambassador, Albert Gallatin. When the Baron Pasquier, the French
foreign minister, spoke with Gallatin on the subject on November 16, he accused the Alligator of
piracy. Although Gallatin defended Stockton’s actions, stating that the evidence indicated the
Jeune Eugénie to have been American owned and outfitted for the slave trade, Pasquier claimed
that the French government could not possibly recognize the authority of another nation’s courts.
He declared, “since it was the act of an officer of the United States, there could be no pretence
[sic] for a trial before a court, and government might and ought at once to have ordered an
immediate restitution.”99 The United States government, however, stood firm, determined that its
courts had jurisdiction to try the case.
On November 25, this French hostility reached its climax when Neuville suggested that
the French would declare war. It fell to Adams to convey the message to Monroe. At one o’clock
on the afternoon of November 26, Adams met with the President at the White House to host
Stratford Canning, the British ambassador.100 As soon as Canning departed, Adams relayed the
conversation of the day prior to a “surprised and quite indignant” Monroe. The two agreed to
alter the language of the president’s state of the union address, to show “the real state of things,”
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noting that “with the exception of the disagreement upon the commercial negotiation our
relations with France are friendly.”101
Calling a cabinet meeting the following day, Monroe stressed that the United States could
not be viewed as the instigator. Insisting that France be seen as “in the wrong,” the President
hinted at the United States’ precarious position in world affairs. “He believed that we could not
have a quarrel with any one member of the Holy Alliance without bringing down the whole body
of them upon us,” wrote Adams. “They all hated us for our principles. They dreaded the effect of
our example, the standing refutation of their doctrines in our prosperous condition, and the
danger to themselves in our constantly growing power.”102 The Monroe Administration thus saw
the case of the Jeune Eugénie as dangerous to the United States’ position in world affairs.
Although it believed that the United States was becoming a world power, Monroe’s
administration believed that the case of the Jeune Eugénie held the potential to upend the
sovereignty of the United States.
The stability of Franco-American relations largely depended on the trial’s outcome. But
Justice Joseph Story, who presided over the trial at the US District Court of Boston, was a
dangerous variable in a case with such tremendous implications. Only two years earlier, in 1819,
Story’s Charge to the grand juries of Boston and Providence, published and circulated across the
United States, condemned the slave trade, codifying his antislavery convictions and dubbing it
the “most detestable traffic.” Greed had infested the human heart, leading many individuals to
value the accumulation of wealth over the inhumanity of the trade. Noting the “severe”
punishments for slave-trading, Story wondered, “Under such circumstances it might well be
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supposed that the Slave Trade would in practice be extinguished;—that virtuous men would by
their abhorrence stay its polluted march, and wicked men would be overawed by its potent
punishment.” He concluded, “Avarice has grown more subtle in its evasions; and watches and
seizes its prey with an appetite quickened rather than suppressed by its guilty vigils.”103 As a
publicly avowed antislavery moralist, whether Story would be able to render a shrewd verdict
was unclear.
Story’s views on the United States’ role in the suppression of the slave trade seemed to
present further cause for worry. In 1819, Story had suggested a desire that the United States be
more proactive in the slave trade’s suppression. “The government of Great Britain,” he declared,
“has indeed employed the most indefatigable and persevering diligence to accomplish this
desirable object; and treaties have been made by her with all the principal foreign powers,
providing for a total abolition of the trade within a very short period.” He continued, “May
America not be behind her in this glorious work; but by a generous competition in virtuous deeds
restore the degraded African to his natural rights, and strike his manacles from the bloody hands
of his oppressors.”104 Commending Britain’s actions in suppressing the trade, Story urged the
United States not to tarry in contributing toward that end. He was, therefore, a professed
proponent of the proactivity that brought the Jeune Eugénie before his bench.
History and religion, Story believed, justified the slave trade’s suppression. After all, the
United States had liberated itself from its former colonial masters: “We boast of our noble
struggle against the encroachments of tyranny, but do we forget that it assumed the mildest form
in which authority ever assailed the rights of its subjects; and yet that there are men among us
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who think it no wrong to condemn the shivering negro to perpetual slavery?”105 Having shaken
itself loose of the shackles of a “tyrannical” Britain, whether the United States should increase its
role in halting the slave trade was, to Story, self-evident. Christianity further dictated that
humans treat one another with much more respect than the trade allowed. “There are men calling
themselves Christians who degrade the negro by ignorance to a level with the brute, and deprive
him of all the consolations of religion. He alone of all the rational creation, they seem to think, is
to be at once accountable for his actions, and yet his actions are not to be at his own disposal; but
his mind, his body, and his feelings are to be sold to perpetual bondage.” He concluded, “To me
it appears perfectly clear that the slave trade is equally repugnant to the dictates of reason and
religion, and is an offence equally against the laws of God and man.”106 As a Christian nation,
the United States needed to choose the “civilized” path of suppressing the slave trade.
Even in 1819, however, Story was aware that an outright condemnation of slavery would
exacerbate the domestic political situation. Although he hated that the institution existed in the
United States, he carefully avoided blaming contemporary Southerners. “It is to be lamented
indeed, that slavery exists in any part of our country,” he expressed. “But, it should be
considered that it is not an evil introduced in the present age. It has been entailed upon a part of
our country by their ancestors; and to provide a safe and just remedy for its gradual abolition, is
undoubtedly as much the design of many of the present owners of slaves, as of those
philanthropists who have labored with so much zeal and benevolence to effect their
emancipation.” Slavery had been thrust upon contemporary Southerners, but strides were
nevertheless being made to improve the institution and limit its scope. He thus patriotically
emphasized the United States’ global role as the originator of the institution’s demise. “To our
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country belongs the honour as a nation, of having set the first example of prohibiting the further
progress of this inhuman traffic.”107 Story knew that the slave trade threatened a fragile domestic
political landscape. As such, despite his famous denunciation of slavery and praise of British
efforts to suppress the slave trade, in his Charge, Story revealed a willingness to sacrifice the
morally correct path for the larger cause of the nation’s continued stability.
When he ruled on the Jeune Eugénie, Story followed the same pattern as his renowned
Charge, beginning by condemning the slave trade. To Story, that the ship was a slaver was
undeniable. Pointing to her false deck, extraordinary amount of provisions, and the number of
arms aboard, Story declared, “If there are any persons, who entertain doubts as to the real
destination and employment of this vessel, I profess myself not willing to be included in that
number.” He continued, “Upon the evidence in the case it is irresistibly established to my mind,
that the sole purpose of the voyage was a traffic in slaves; and that the intention was to carry
them from Africa to some one of the French colonies, and, in all probability, to the port, in which
the enterprise originated.”108 The Jeune Eugénie was, as far as the US judiciary was concerned, a
slave ship.
Whether the Jeune Eugénie had been legitimately conveyed to Raibaud and Labatut,
however, was never sufficiently established. And the evidence that the two Guadeloupeans
presented far from convinced Story. Referring to the laws of 1818, 1819, and 1820, Story
believed that Americans would naturally try to hide their citizenship to avoid US prosecution. “If
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American citizens were engaged in the traffic, it is manifest, that they would conceal their
interests under a foreign flag and passports, and wear any disguises, which might facilitate their
designs and favour their escape from punishment,” he explained. Any claim that the ship was no
longer American, therefore, required further investigation as “such disguises might be cheaply
bought, and promptly obtained through the instrumentality of private agents in foreign countries,
who would be ready to assume a nominal ownership, no one, that has been much acquainted with
the real business of this commerce, would be inclined to doubt or deny.” Unable to prove their
ownership, Raibaud and Labatut’s claims were deemed illegitimate.109
The ship was also never proved to be still under American ownership, however. Without
proof showing such, the Jeune Eugénie was not subject to the piracy provisions of the act of
1819, making Stockton’s claim for prize impossible. But the proof was unlikely ever to surface.
As Paul Finkelman explained, “The ship had been involved in the slave trade, so the secret
American owners did not come forward to claim the ship and perhaps contest the case.”110 While
the French citizens who possessed the ship at the time of its seizure were not its proper owners,
any American person who may have held title to the vessel remained unidentified. The Jeune
Eugénie was thus a nationless ship, ambiguously tethered to an abstract international jurisdiction,
whose future was almost as unclear as its past.
Although impossible to determine with certainty whether the United States held national
jurisdiction, Story was tasked with the responsibility of finding some resolution. He nevertheless
noted the potential controversy that his decision might bring. “The case has already, as we are
informed, and truly, become the subject of diplomatic intercourse between our government and
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that of France,” he observed. “It is not, perhaps, too much magnifying its grave character to
declare, that rarely can a case come before a court of justice more deeply interesting to the cause
of general justice and humanity, or more likely to excite the jealousies of a foreign government,
zealous to assert its own rights … It is bound to administer the law, as it finds it, fearlessly and
faithfully.”111 Holding that the ship would be delivered to the French government for
prosecution, Story wrote: “It enables the foreign sovereign to exercise complete jurisdiction over
the case, if he shall prefer to have it remitted to his own courts for adjudication. It enforces the
policy, common to both nations, of repressing an odious traffic, which is denounced by both.”112
Both the United States and France were publicly committed to suppressing the international
slave trade, and, Story argued, the enforcement of either nation’s laws would serve that interest.
Importantly, underneath this decision lie suggestions of an interest in distancing the
United States from that responsibility. He continued, “It makes our own country, not a principal,
but an auxiliary in enforcing the interdict of France, and subserves the great interests of universal
justice.”113 The United States would pass whatever burden remained for punishing Raibaud and
Labatut, as well as any prize of the Jeune Eugénie, to France, for, as Story claimed, “the
American courts of judicature are not hungry after jurisdiction in foreign causes, or desirous to
plunge into the endless perplexities of foreign jurisprudence.”114 Although also committed to the
suppression of the international slave trade, the United States eagerly retreated on the issue,
allowing another nation to resolve it instead.
Aware of slavery’s potential to divide the nation, in his opinion in the Jeune Eugénie
case, Story painstakingly created a dichotomy between domestic and international slave trades.

111

La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 840.
La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 850.
113
La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 850. Emphasis added.
114
La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas., 851.
112

47

While Story denounced what he repeatedly emphasized was the slave “trade,” he did not
condemn the institution itself. For Story believed that the trade was, in practice, inhuman.
Analyzing whether the trade could be found in the law of nations, Story wrote, “It begins in
corruption and plunder, and kidnapping. It creates and stimulates unholy wars for the purpose of
making captives. It desolates whole villages and provinces for the purpose of seizing the young,
the feeble, the defenceless, and the innocent.” He concluded, “It stirs up the worst passions of the
human soul, darkening the spirit of revenge, sharpening the greediness of avarice, brutalizing the
selfish, envenoming the cruel, famishing the weak, and crushing to death the broken-hearted.”115
The international slave trade was, according to Story, a different practice than what took place
within the United States. Thus, as in his Charge, Story’s opinion revealed a fear of the domestic
political situation.
Story briefly alluded to the inherent contradictions of an otherwise dualist policy early in
his opinion. While the United States would endeavor to suppress the international slave trade, it
would maintain its domestic slave trade. “That [the slave trade] has interwoven itself into the
municipal institutions of some countries, and forms the foundation of large masses of property in
a portion of our own country, is known to all of us,” he wrote. “Sitting, therefore, in an American
court of judicature, I am not permitted to deny, that under some circumstances it may have a
lawful existence; and that the practice may be justified by the condition, or wants, of society, or
may form a part of the domestic policy of a nation.”116 A desire for the least incendiary path
possible may well have motivated Story’s decision. In a way, his opinion reflected the intricate
workings of a deft legal mind diligently laying out his argument, treading as lightly as possible.
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But, just like the nation he served, considerations of national union superceded his commitment
to the slave trade’s destruction.
Presenting his conclusions in this way, Story’s opinion offered room for broad
interpretation, ensuring the United States’ position as a sovereign nation. As an anonymous
“Notes” article in the Harvard Law Review observed, “On one hand, Story and other opponents
of slavery described the opinion as a denunciation of the slave trade under international law,”
but, also, “The decision could stand for a sovereign country’s right to be free from interference
with its regulation of slavery because Story’s opinion suggested that courts should not adjudicate
captures of foreign slavers.”117 Most importantly, as Finkelman argued, “Story’s solution
avoided a confrontation with the nation’s oldest ally over the ownership of the vessel.”118 The
case of the Jeune Eugénie was simply not the opportunity in which the United States wished to
risk its sovereignty. The Jeune Eugénie episode stood, to the Monroe Administration, therefore,
as a lasting example of the need for prudence. Despite evidence clearly pointing to the ship as a
slaver, Attorney General Wirt recalled, “It was determined in the case of the ‘Jeune Eugénie’ that
we had no right to meddle with the flag of France.”119 Whether it was a matter of “right” was
doubtful; whether it was a matter of will was certain.
On February 2, 1822, Ambassador Gallatin wrote to John Quincy Adams of disturbing
news that he had received from the British minister to France. “The British ambassador had
made a few days ago a remonstrance to this government with respect to one of the prizes of the
Alligator, retaken by the crew and carried to Guadeloupe, whence she is said to have sailed again
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for Africa with the American crew on board, and to have brought back a cargo of slaves to
Guadeloupe.”120 Within a month after Story released his decision, the Jeune Eugénie sailed again
to bring to Guadeloupe the human cargo of which the Alligator robbed it—a truly avoidable and
unfortunate end.
The case of the Jeune Eugénie marked the first significant US foray into international
slave-trade suppression. It would not be until the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 that the US
Navy rejoined the international struggle against the slave trade in any meaningful way.121 While
a disheartening reminder of the lack of political will, both domestically and internationally,
toward stopping the slave trade, the case reflects contemporary US foreign policy goals in an era
when the nation struggled to be viewed as a significant actor on the world stage. The incident,
which coincided with the culmination of contentious negotiations with France, proved to be the
manner by which the United States was able to assert its own autonomy in an international
environment that continued to challenge its sovereignty. To the United States, the slave trade was
thus the fulcrum with which it could balance itself between national and international priorities.
The years between 1808 and 1823, during which the United States negotiated the difficult
landscape of European prioritization of the slave trade’s suppression, coincided with a significant
change in US foreign policy. As early republican fears of the union’s impermanence faded and
gave way to more stringent antebellum defenses of slavery, the United States debated the role it
was to play in international politics, straddling the line between earnest and insincere actions
against the international slave trade. When the USS Alligator seized the Jeune Eugénie, the
United States briefly joined Europe as an enforcer against the inhuman traffic. Although the ship
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was certainly a slaver owned by American citizens, the US government encouraged the court to
relinquish the ship to the French government to avoid any further challenges to its sovereignty.
The case of the Jeune Eugénie thus exemplifies the US government’s approach to the
suppression of the slave trade prior to 1824, appearing to adhere to European priorities while
maintaining its own sovereignty. In the terminology of Timothy Patrick McCarthy and John
Stauffer, the Jeune Eugénie incident was the origin, no matter how unsteady, of the United
States’ dealings with the issue of slave-trade suppression. The executive branch had protected the
independence of the federal judiciary, which, in their words, proved to provide the means to the
slave trade’s destruction.
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CHAPTER II: THE MEANS AND ENDS: FREEDOM INTERNATIONAL?
By the summer of 1772, thirty-one-year-old James Somerset had been enslaved most of
his life. Purchased at age eight by Scottish-born Virginia merchant Charles Steuart in August
1749, Somerset had lived a relatively privileged life as an enslaved person. According to Steven
M. Wise, he was said to have “enjoyed his master’s affection” and, by adulthood, “had become
Steuart’s intimate, a trusted manservant, and, at times nearly his master’s alter-ego.” Steuart had
lavished Somerset with “silks, stockings, and ribbon” and allowed him significant freedom to run
errands in and out of his duties. Yet Somerset was still enslaved.122
When Somerset accompanied him to England in 1769, Steuart—by then the senior-most
customs collector for British America—expected that the slave’s years of loyal service would
continue. But, in late 1771, Somerset ran away. On the run for fifty-six days, Somerset was
eventually captured and, on Steuart’s orders, placed aboard a ship bound for Jamaica, where he
would be worked to death as punishment for his betrayal. Through the intervention of three
unknown petitioners, however, a writ of habeas corpus was filed with Chief Justice William
Murray, Lord Mansfield, of King’s Bench. Somerset was temporarily released. He consulted
with abolitionist Granville Sharp, while the court would consider whether Steuart had the right to
decide his fate.123 Six months later, in June 1772, Mansfield’s decision in the case disputed the
legitimacy of slavery in the common law. “It is so odious that nothing can be suffered to support
it but positive law,” Mansfield declared. “Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow from
a decision, I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by the law of England, and therefore the
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black must be discharged.” Unless expressly provided for in municipal law, Mansfield held,
slavery had no basis in the English legal tradition.124
The place of the slave trade in US law is a matter of historiographical debate. There is,
importantly, consensus that Lord Mansfield’s 1772 opinion in Somerset v. Stewart was the
common law basis for legal abolition.125 It was this principle that asserted freedom to prevail in
legal jurisdictions unless local legislation expressly provided for the condition of slavery.126
Scholars, however, disagree on how the decision manifested itself in the laws of the United
States following the Revolution. While some have suggested that it had either limited effect on
the early federal government’s actions or led to the Constitution’s proslavery provisions,127
others have accepted that, in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution, the decision influenced
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the Founders in their efforts to set the institution of slavery on its path to eventual destruction.128
Robert M. Cover, however, has asserted that the Somerset, or freedom, principle spurred both
antislavery and proslavery efforts during the early national period. Its effect was multifaceted,
undergirding states’ gradual emancipation laws while simultaneously leading to the Fugitive
Slave Clause’s insertion in the Constitution. Without the insertion of the Fugitive Slave Clause in
the Constitution, he asserted, prevailing notions of international reciprocity meant states would
not recognize another state’s enslaved property; as a result, slaves fleeing to free jurisdictions
would otherwise have not been required to be returned. But he noted that, in instances where
slaves fled to free jurisdictions, judges felt the need to word their decisions with incredible care
and precision. Not to assert the principle during this time, he concluded, was considered to hold
the potential to “universalize” slavery.129
Even among scholars who agree that the freedom principle manifested itself in the
antislavery efforts of the Founders, there is a divergence of opinion on whether Somerset shaped
US law once the constitutional system was well in place. Paul Finkelman has suggested that,
after having guided the antislavery jurisprudence of the early republic, judges in Northern states
deliberately abandoned the freedom principle for the sake of national union, only to recover it
during the rise of radical abolitionism.130 James Oakes, on the other hand, has downplayed that
there was any intentionality behind the apparent gap between the freedom principle’s
applications. His argument instead emphasizes that slavery had not yet, during this period,
become the central issue of national politics.131 But both historians notably point to the same
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case, Commonwealth v. Aves, as a turning point toward the ultimate defeat of slavery in the
United States.132
The question of the freedom principle’s place in antebellum American law is not
insignificant. How that idea affected jurisprudence during the era reveals the degree to which
justice in the United States was the pawn of the Slave Power. It is, importantly, a matter of focus.
It is the distinction between the interpretations of James Oakes and Don E. Fehrenbacher.
Whereas Oakes’ Freedom National tells of the rise of antislavery politics through the steady
construction of legal precedents across the antebellum period, Fehrenbacher’s The Slaveholding
Republic emphasizes that these cases frequently failed. Where Oakes saw the steady barrage
against slavery as the signs of its ultimate destruction and the ascension of a Republican party
intent on abolition, Fehrenbacher depicted the legal arguments of antislavery advocates as
rhetorical devices and the Republican party far from earnestly antislavery. In this light,
Fehrenbacher could say without hesitation that the federal government, with its judiciary overtly
proslavery, was under slavery’s control.133 Without emphasizing the freedom principle,
Fehrenbacher’s interpretation lends itself not only to a portrait of a coopted, proslavery federal
government, but a blurred distinction between federal and state sanctions of slavery. Focusing on
the freedom principle means the difference between focusing on the decisions in which the
judiciary tied the hands of the federal government against interfering with slavery and
highlighting the long-term effort to build a legal basis for abolition, which, while often met with
failure, was essential for emancipation to occur. Pointing to the slave trade, this chapter
embraces Oakes’ interpretation, expanding his argument to the international sphere.
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The literature on court cases during the antebellum period has historically revolved
around instances of domestic law.134 Viewing fugitive slave cases such as Prigg v. Pennsylvania
and Dred Scott, historians have highlighted the highly constrained position in which the federal
government could act in relation to domestic slavery. Finkelman, whose numerous works on law
prior to the Civil War have primarily discussed fugitive slave cases, has shown that the decisions
in these cases aligned with proslavery forces and has claimed support of slavery was an essential
element of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence during the period.135 Even Oakes, in
Freedom National, provides little discussion of the slave trade outside of the Amistad case,
focusing heavily on the relationship of the freedom principle to fugitive slave cases. He has
nevertheless alleged that the freedom principle could be applied abroad.136
The slave trade offers the opportunity to study the slavery question from a different
perspective. Some scholars have, admittedly, carried their analyses of domestic cases to the slave
trade while maintaining their arguments. Finkelman, for example, has argued that slave trade
cases still reflect a pattern of proslavery jurisprudence, and he has emphasized that they had little
effect on the state of slavery within the United States.137 Attempting to apply Fehrenbacher’s
broader argument to US slave-trade suppression, Sarah A. Batterson has suggested enforcement
of US laws against the slave trade was never a federal priority, citing the US Navy’s Africa
Squadron as the clearest evidence of failure.138 But even Fehrenbacher admitted that there were
periods in which the laws against the slave trade were effectively enforced, despite those
suppression efforts being the made by the “slaveholding republic.”139 As Earl M. Maltz has
134
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importantly noted, the slave trade represented one of the few areas in which the federal
government could control slavery, its authority coming directly from the Constitution. Certainly,
he held, the fugitive slave cases that arose throughout the antebellum period shined a spotlight on
the sectional crisis. Maltz has argued that US laws against the slave trade, regardless of their
enforcement, were a clear antislavery commitment by the federal government and has rejected
the idea that the Supreme Court was consistently proslavery until Dred Scott.140 An aspect of
antislavery clearly prescribed by the Constitution, US laws against the slave trade complicate the
image of a federal government entirely yielding to the Slave Power.
With radical abolitionism’s rise in the 1830s, more traditional legally grounded
abolitionism gave way to the moral appeals of immediatist lawyers. As legal scholar Robert M.
Cover showed nearly fifty years ago, the fractured nature of the abolitionist movement
“produced an impulse to use litigation as a dramatic forum for ideology.” Courtrooms became
the sites for dramatic spectacles where the plight of enslaved humanity was put on full display.141
Abolitionist attorneys meanwhile grew increasingly more ideological in their arguments, moving
away from mere appeals to judges’ generosity or pity, which had occasionally characterized the
pleadings of traditional antislavery advocates, to assertions of uncompromising morality. “It is
one thing,” Cover wrote, “to be begged to act in a particular way by appeal to the presumed
magnanimity of the man and the institution, quite another to be threatened with scorn and
damnation for being a gutless sycophant.”142 Although these cases predominantly dealt with
fugitive slaves, there were instances in which these abolitionist attorneys used these techniques
against the slave trade.143 Carrying forward Cover’s argument, Jeannine Marie DeLombard has,
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more recently, argued that, through their numerous publications, the abolitionists took their
ideological battle being waged in the courtroom to the public. Abolitionists, she held, took
advantage of a preexisting American culture of legal spectatorship. Using the trials of fugitive
slaves as an integral part of their propaganda, abolitionists framed their struggle in terms
relatable to a substantial portion of the reading public, thereby cultivating greater support.144
The trials in the Amistad case in many ways fit the framework of Cover and DeLombard.
To those who saw them in the courtrooms of New London, the Amistad Africans, in Rediker’s
words, “performed slavery,” highlighting the moral repugnance of slavery through their
quintessentially human displays of emotion and suffering.145 The Africans were further exhibited
in the abolitionist press; through interviews and treatments, their personalities were circulated to
the press to garner financial support for their defense.146 The Amistad case, so significant in the
American collective memory of the slave trade, represented the non-legal courtroom strategies of
radical abolitionism.
In Freedom National, Oakes depicted antislavery advocates having slowly, over time,
constructed and perfected a legal attack on slavery. This offers a framework through which the
United States’ slave trade cases may be viewed. Case after case, these antislavery lawyers
chiseled away at the edifice of slavery. And, by the Civil War, their argument was strong enough
to bring about the institution’s destruction.147 In many ways, this argument recalls the form of
Revolutionary-era abolitionism used by the Pennsylvania Abolition Society suggested in Richard
S. Newman’s The Transformation of American Abolitionism. Newman wrote, “A steady buildup
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of narrow judicial victories, PAS strategists argued, would hamper slavery’s operation as a
national institution and compel even southern masters to support gradual abolition schemes.”
Although Newman distinguished this earlier form of abolitionism as not intending to challenge
slavery’s nationwide existence, that the antislavery lawyers of Oakes’ narrative endeavored,
through the freedom principle, to reiterate time and time again that slavery was purely a local
institution reflects this Revolution-era strategy.148
That the US government routinely took slave traders to court, prosecuting them under the
laws enacted by the founding generation, is a crucial element toward understanding the United
States’ journey to total emancipation.149 These trials honed federal law against the slave trade,
priming the judiciary for the traffic’s later destruction. This pursuit of slave-trade suppression
through the judiciary represented the continuity and culmination of legalistic antislavery, which
brought the United States closer to freedom on a nationwide scale. Using three vignettes, this
chapter will show that the tactics of traditional, legalistic abolitionism manifested themselves in
the admiralty proceedings against slavery. The forfeitures of slave ships provided the baseline for
the slave trade’s suppression, without which the freedom principle could not have been used with
success. All that was needed was the right administration, intent on ensuring slave traders would
not escape with impunity. For, without the slave trade’s eradication, domestic abolition had little
hope of permanence.
“What Could Be Done with Honest Exertion and an Adequate Force”
In early April 1820, the USS Cyane traveled south along the African coast toward the
slave trading center of Cape Mount, at the mouth of the Gallinas River. The ship’s presence off
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African shores was part of a new, proactive approach to slave-trade suppression. A year earlier,
the US Congress enacted another in a series of slave-trade laws, providing $100,000 for the
president to use the “armed vessels of the United States” for policing the international slave
trade. Under the law, the US Navy was not only to patrol the coasts of the United States but
those of Africa as well. This was a bold, unprecedented push by Congress. The United States
appeared to commit itself to foreclosing the slave trade, and the Navy was given the means to do
so. Quickly, however, debate in James Monroe’s cabinet resulted in the targeting of the funds
toward another, more indirect aspect of antislavery: colonization. Although the act’s
appropriation had undoubtedly been intended to go to the Navy, the American Colonization
Society (ACS) found itself with freshly brimming coffers. An ACS agent on the ground in Africa
would manage the funds, while the Navy would ensure colonists’ safe conduct to the developing
community.150 By December 1819—two years before the Monroe administration would show its
prioritization of national sovereignty over slave-trade suppression in the Jeune Eugénie case—
the fifth president announced that his cabinet had begun making arrangements for a US warship
to escort agents to Africa “in time to meet the delivery of any persons who might be taken by the
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public vessels and landed there.”151 The Cyane was that warship.152 Its 1820 patrol along the
coast of Sierra Leone resulted in the first significant enforcement of US slave-trading laws. And
its seizures established the legal precedent that admiralty forfeitures were the most reliable
method of slave-trade suppression.
Much attention has been paid in the literature to the Supreme Court’s 1825 decision in
the case of the Antelope for its weak condemnation of the slave trade, which seemed implicitly to
sanction the ship captain’s conduct. A US revenue cutter had seized the vessel, allegedly the
property of a Spanish citizen, off Florida in 1820, after it had been taken and for some time
operated by pirates.153 Chief Justice John Marshall wrote the court’s opinion. He highlighted
that, although a growing number of countries had moved to abolish the slave trade, not all states
had banned it. Because there was no international consensus on the trade’s illegality, the traffic
in Africans across the Atlantic was, he held, not contrary to the law of nations. Marshall
nevertheless admitted that the trade went against the law of nature but asserted that it was not
piracy. Because of this, he held that the right of search did not apply to the trade in peacetime
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and that the vessel’s seizure was unlawful.154 He recognized and granted restitution for only a
portion of the claims—specifically, those from Spanish, rather than Portuguese, claimants.155
Apparently rejecting Congress’ suppression legislation passed only a few years earlier,
Marshall’s opinion stymied the enforcement of US law. His strange, divided method of
restitution concerning the enslaved cargo, moreover, has been suggested to have been an
indication of his support of the slave trade.156 In the literature, the Antelope decision has emerged
as the preeminent antebellum slave-trade case until the Supreme Court’s Amistad decision of
1841, standing in glaring opposition to any suggestion of a United States committed to the slave
trade’s suppression. Although federal prosecutions of slave ships admittedly diminished after the
Antelope case, to focus on Marshall’s decision, however, ignores the significant volume of slaveship forfeitures upheld by the courts during the 1820s, a trend that began with the Cyane’s 1820
voyage.157
Having been delayed for some time with heavy harbor ice, the Cyane left New York in
February 1820 under the command of Captain Edward Trenchard.158 The ship, captured from the
British off Madeira by the USS Constitution in 1815,159 accompanied a merchant brig bearing
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nearly ninety African Americans and ACS agents across the Atlantic to Sherbro Island, Sierra
Leone.160 The pair arrived in mid-March 1820.161 Depositing the colonists on the island,
Trenchard assigned a midshipman and some of the Cyane’s crew to help them settle in.
Trenchard and the Cyane traveled south to scout out a more hospitable location for a permanent
settlement.162 It was on this surveying mission that, on the morning of April 5, 1820, Trenchard
spotted fourteen ships anchored at the mouth of the Gallinas, likely waiting to receive enslaved
cargoes.163
As soon as the slave ships saw the Cyane bearing down on them, they each tried to make
sail. The water was calm; the wind was sparse. Knowing that the ships had little chance of
escape, Trenchard ordered each of the Cyane’s boats to stop them. On one boat was the Cyane’s
first officer, Lieutenant Silas H. Stringham, who pursued the Science.164 Once the twenty-one-
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year-old lieutenant reached the ship, it took only moments for him to reach a conclusion on its
slaving character. Along with “muskets, tobacco, and calicoes, the usual cargo for the slave
trade,” Stringham found fifty pairs of irons but no slaves. But Stringham also found documents
implicating several men in the Science’s slaving voyage, a Cuban resident of New York named
Eugene Malebran, the Science’s captain Adolphus La Coste, and a man called Francisco
Mathieu.165 Among those documents were letters, written in French, from Malebran to Mathieu
and La Coste, but, as Stringham later testified, the letter to La Coste bore clear instructions on
how the captain was to acquire slaves. The letter directed “him to proceed to Porto Rico, where
the vessel was to be changed into Spanish; and after procuring shackles, handcuffs, etc., to
proceed on the contemplated voyage. Another person, at Porto Rico, was to assume command of
the vessel. He was to be the captain on paper; but La Cost, the real captain … was to receive
further directions from the brother of the defendant” in Cuba. In Cuba, La Coste would deposit
the slaves, referred to in the letters as “merchandise,” and, in exchange, be paid based on the
number of Africans he delivered. Stringham noted that “the word ‘slaves’ was not mentioned.”
Convinced that the Science was a slaver, Stringham seized the ship under the 1818 Slave Trade
Act for having been outfitted for the trade in the United States.166
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Stringham also inspected the Endymion, anchored nearby. There, the lieutenant found a
similar state of readiness, bearing all the necessary equipment for the Middle Passage. The
captain, Alexander McKim Andrews, who had been pulled from a small boat frantically paddling
for the shore, was, Stringham learned, a citizen of Baltimore and a US Navy midshipman on
furlough.167 The search yielded an American register, a berth deck, a large quantity of water, two
large cabooses—or kitchens—and plenty of provisions. Testifying before the federal circuit court
in New York, Stringham recalled that the ship “had every appearance of a vessel engaged in the
slave trade.” The court report noted that this was “equipment of which the witness was well
acquainted,” including a “large quantity” of handcuffs. The Endymion had not yet taken on
slaves, but that did not make it any less of a slave ship. When Andrews admitted that he and his
vessel were American, the Cyane seized its prize.168
The Cyane also seized the Plattsburgh. Unlike the Science and the Endymion, however,
the Plattsburgh’s national origin was unclear. It bore all the signs of a slaver, with barrels of
handcuffs and 300 kegs of gunpowder, along with grape, canister, and round shot being found
aboard. But it was allegedly owned by Spanish citizens. Registered as an American vessel in
Baltimore in 1817, the Plattsburgh had been owned by American citizens Thomas Sheppard,
John N. D’Arcy, and Henry Didier. When it left the port of Baltimore in December 1819, the
ship was also under the command of an American citizen, Joseph F. Smith. It arrived in
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Santiago, Cuba—despite officially having left Baltimore for St. Thomas—where Sheppard,
D’Arcy, and Didier sold the ship to George Stark for $12,500.169
The Plattsburgh’s buyer, Stark, also owned the brig Eros, which had been in the port of
Baltimore at the same time as the Plattsburgh. The Eros had been outfitted at Baltimore for the
slave trade. When it departed the port soon after the Plattsburgh, it was briefly detained by port
authorities on suspicion of being a slaver, but the port’s collector “being satisfied, upon inquiry,
that the owner of the Eros had no intention of having her engaged in the slave trade, afterwards
released her, taking out some few of her equipments.” According to some witnesses, the
Plattsburgh, having cleared the port of Baltimore without any suspicion of being a slaver,
collected the manacles and cannon shot needed for a trip to Africa further down the Chesapeake
Bay. Waiting there, at New Point Comfort, ten to twelve days, the Plattsburgh rendezvoused
with the Eros, took on Stark, and sailed together for Santiago.170
Arriving in Santiago, the Plattsburgh became a Spanish vessel through a straw sale. Sold
again, this time to a Cuban named Juan Marino, for $8,000, the ship was further altered for the
slave trade. Given Spanish documents, its name was changed to the Maria Gertrudes. Part of
these alterations included the onloading of the kegs of gunpowder that the crew of the Cyane
later noticed, which had been transferred from the Eros to the Plattsburgh. The Plattsburgh’s
original crew was mostly discharged, except for the captain, two mates, six to eight men, and
Stark. These men remained aboard during the Plattsburgh’s journey to Africa—despite the ship
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being under the “nominal” command of a Cuban named Gonzalez—and were aboard when the
ship was captured by Stringham and the Cyane.171
Although the Plattsburgh flew the Spanish flag, the Cyane’s seizure proved justified.
Upon his return to the United States, Stringham entered a letter into evidence that left little doubt
as to the Plattsburgh’s true ownership. Smith and the other Americans were, the letter suggested,
the true orchestrators of the slaving voyage. “Sir, I wish you to get the schooner down to Moro in
the morning,” the letter read. “And get the men quartered to the guns, and station them on the
tops and forecastle, the same as on board armed ships, and get all ready for going to sea tomorrow night. After you get down to the Moro, send the boat, with four men, for me.” The letter
was signed “Yours, Jos. Smith.” This, coupled with the fact that the logbook was kept in English
and that, as Stringham and others of the Cyane observed, the crew and even supposed captain of
the Plattsburgh seemed deferential to Smith and Stark, was evidence enough that the ship was an
American-led slaver.172
The following morning, the officers of the Cyane gathered to ensure that the ships could
be claimed as prizes. All told, the Cyane had captured six ships. The investigation concluded that
four were American slavers. As for the other two, Trenchard reported: “not exhibiting sufficient
marks to identify them, I did not think proper to detain.”173 In his unpublished 1973 dissertation
on the US Navy’s efforts at slave-trade suppression from 1819 to 1862, Earl E. McNeilly noted
that “Although no slaves were found on board the American owned vessels, they were obviously
equipped for the trade and sent off under prize crews for trial in New York.” The number of
ships that he calculated differs from the record. However, he continued, “Of the remaining
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captures, the nationality of three was so hopelessly confused that they were simply destroyed
with the excuse that they were unseaworthy, and the slaves which they had already embarked
were landed at Sierra Leone.” As for their arrival in New York, McNeilly wrote that “There is no
record … that any of these prisoners were ever tried under federal anti-slavery legislation.”174
The “remaining” ships to which McNeilly referred is unclear. Trenchard’s April 10, 1820, letter
failed to mention this detail. What is known, however, is that Stringham was appointed the prize
master of the Cyane’s captures and led them, together, back to the United States;175 and, most
importantly, the prisoners were, contrary to McNeilly’s claim, put on trial.176
The three schooners arrived in New York over the evening of May 26–27, 1820.177 The
thirteen prisoners of the Science, Endymion, and Plattsburgh arrived in Boston on July 6, 1820,

174

McNeilly, “The United States Navy and the Suppression of the West African Slave Trade,” 47; Canney, Africa
Squadron, 9. It appears that Canney unquestioningly repeats McNeilly’s claims.
175
“Original Document: Extract from Journal of the U.S.S. Cyane, 1820,” Magazine of American History: A
Monthly Illustrated Journal 30, no. 1–2 (July–August 1893): 92–95,
https://books.google.com/books?id=U5o_AQAAMAAJ&pg=PT2#v=onepage&q&f=false. The Magazine of
American History reprinted several entries from Captain Trenchard’s logbook from April 5 to April 10, 1820, in its
July 1893 issue. Among those entries are Trenchard’s account of the initial seizures, his orders the following day to
the Cyane’s officers to inspect the seized vessels, and those officers’ subsequent report. According to that report,
Lieutenants Matthew C. Perry and Stringham, along with two midshipmen, the ship’s master, and the ship’s coastal
pilot were completely convinced that the four ships were slavers. As to the Endymion, on April 6, they wrote, “Upon
a close scrutiny we are of the opinion that the sole object of her being in this place is the procuring of slaves: indeed
we have good evidence that she has her cargo of slaves nearly completed, and that they are now confined in irons at
a town near the river, called Seymoboe. She is completely fitted for the accommodation of slaves, has on board
several thousand gallons of water, and a very large quantity of rice, the common food of Negroes.” They continued
explaining their findings of the other vessels: “We have also examined the other vessels embraced in your order, and
find that they are all deeply engaged in the traffic of slaves. There is but one, however, of those under foreign flags
that we can ascertain is acting in contravention to the above law … the schooner Esperanza (formerly the U.S.
Revenue Cutter Alert) now under Spanish colors. She sailed last from Charleston, S.C., without a clearance … the
majority part of her crew who were American citizens.” As for the Science and Plattsburgh, “We find that the
Dechosa, or Science of New York, is owned by E. Mallebran of New York … There is little doubt of her being
American property, and consequently we are of opinion that she is violating the laws of the United States. We can
only learn that the Maria Gatthreust or Plattsburg of Baltimore sailed from Baltimore … and proceeded to this coast
in quest of slaves. The number of her men and her strong armament induces us to believe that she is not only a
vessel engaged in the traffic of slaves, but she is fully prepared to commit piratical aggressions on the flag of any
nation.” An extract of a April 10 letter by an anonymous officer of the Cyane, presumably Trenchard, was also
published in the National Intelligencer on June 19, 1820. See “Of the Coast of Africa,” National Intelligencer, June
19, 1820.
176
Malebran, 26 F. Cas. 1145; Andrews, 24 F. Cas. 815; La Coste, 26 F. Cas. 826.
177
“Suppression of the Slave Trade,” National Intelligencer (Washington, DC), May 30, 1820.

68

transported separately via the brig Rebecca.178 A week later, these prisoners were brought before
Judge John Davis at the US District Court for Massachusetts. The judge examined each of the
prisoners, trying to determine their nationality as well as the extent of their culpability. As the
Boston Daily Advertiser reported, “The prisoners appeared to be principally foreigners, of almost
all nations, and shades of complexion.” In addition to the eight known Americans, there were a
Dane, a Prussian, natives of Southeast Asia and the Caribbean, and one man who claimed to
have simply been born at sea. Two of the men, in fact, were black. One of them, John Thomas,
was quoted as having told the judge that he had not asked about the nature of the voyage before
he signed onto the crew: “He did not know … about the object of the voyage, he shipped only as
a seamen [sic] before the mast and ‘studied only what wages he was to have.’” Sympathizing
with the uninformed sailors, the article declared that “We have seen complaints made that the
punishment of this class of offences should fall upon the ignorant agents, instead of the more
guilty contrivers and instigators of the crime … It is necessary for the security of society, that
they should be held responsible who are guilty of the overt act.” With evidence still to be
provided, Davis decided that they should remain in custody until their trials and set bail for the
sailors at $3,000 and, for the ships’ masters, $6,000.179
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Federal prosecutors in New York and Boston in fact did go after the “instigators of the
crime.” The first case to go to trial was that of the Science’s owner, Eugene Malebran, in
September 1820. The Cuban resident of New York was indicted there on twenty-eight counts
under the Slave Trade Act of 1818 for having prepared the ship for the slave trade within the
waters of the United States. In those twenty-eight counts, however, the prosecution had failed to
state the locations from which the Science had intended to procure and deliver its cargo. US
Attorney Robert Livingston Tillotson called his witnesses one by one, including Lieutenant
Stringham, who testified to the Science’s slaving character.180
Once Tillotson rested the case for the prosecution, Malebran’s attorney, Irish immigrant
Thomas Addis Emmet addressed the bench. Despite being an active abolitionist, heavily
involved with the New-York Manumission Society, Emmet believed that it was his “professional
duty to provide a defense” for his client, regardless of the charge. He thus raised an objection to
the indictment. “It appears from the proof,” Emmet said, “that the place where they [the enslaved
cargo] were to be procured was at Cape Mount, on the coast of Africa, and that to which they
were to be transported was Trinity De Cuba. Both these places must, therefore, have been known
to the grand jury; and therefore the indictment cannot be maintained.” The evidence to which he
referred were Malebran’s letters, which Stringham had recovered from the Science months
earlier, that provided specific instructions for the ship’s journey. He continued, “There is no
principle in criminal law better settled than this, that if a person is indicted for stealing goods of a
person to the jurors unknown, and it appears, in proof, upon due inquiry, might have been
known, that the indictment cannot be supported.” The judge agreed and counselled the jury to
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acquit Malebran. At the prosecution’s insistence, the defendant was held over for retrial during
the following term, although this appears never to have come to fruition. The United States’ first
prosecution of a slave trader following its commitment to the trade’s suppression had failed on a
technicality.181 Malebran’s trial had shown that even sustaining an indictment against an accused
slave trader would be difficult.
Alexander McKim Andrews, captain of the Endymion, was also tried in New York in
September 1820. Prosecutors, armed with an abundance of evidence, indicted the Navy
midshipman and Baltimore native under the 1800 Slave Trade Act for intending to transport
enslaved Africans between foreign countries. Lieutenant Stringham was again called to testify. In
addition to finding equipment common to the slave trade aboard the Endymion, Stringham
recalled to the court clear admissions of guilt that Andrews had made upon his ship’s seizure.
Andrews had first admitted, according to Stringham, that the Endymion was the Cyane’s lawful
prize, a confession that implicitly admitted participation in the slave trade.182
But Andrews’ tendency to brag also revealed the lucrative nature of the slave trade.
Despite having been captured, Andrews had claimed to have already guaranteed the
transportation of 150 enslaved persons by way of another ship. The sale of those Africans, alone,
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meant that Andrews could pay back the Endymion’s owners for the loss of the ship. But Andrews
noted that the Endymion’s loss was far from insignificant, for, had it not been captured, Andrews
would have earned $200,000 in addition to his wages of $200 per month. At a time when the
average merchant seaman made $15 per month, Andrews boasted, he paid his sailors $40.
Adding to these mindboggling figures, testimony from a Dr. Wiley, an acquaintance of Andrews,
suggested that the defendant had made it well known around his hometown of Baltimore that he
would have paid $2,000 to any attorney who could “free him from his embarrassment.”183
Although an enormous financial loss to the Endymion’s owners, Andrews remained financially
unscathed and had ensured his bosses would recoup their losses.
Also represented by Emmet, Andrews, like Malebran, not only had the benefit of shrewd
legal counsel but also pure luck. Emmet argued that the statute on which the indictment was
based was only intended to prevent sailors from serving on slave ships and that this prohibition
did not apply to ship captains. Pointing to the provisions of the recent 1819 act, the prosecution
argued that the position “contended for by the opposite counsel would render its provisions
nugatory.” The judge concurred, finding that even a ship’s captain served for its owners and,
therefore, was subject to the act. The trial concluded, and the jury deliberated. But, when it came
time for the jurors to deliver their verdict, just eleven appeared. The court learned that “one of
them on his way to the court had fallen down in a fit” and was incapable of attesting to his
decision. Although the judge decided to remand Andrews for another trial, no retrial appears to
have ever taken place. One New York juror’s unfortunate—and incredibly untimely—seizure
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thus meant a slave trader’s escape from justice.184 It was quickly becoming apparent that
evidence alone would not be enough to convict an individual slave trader.
There seemed, however, to be redemption not long after Andrews’ case was dismissed.
Two of Malebran’s sister cases, United States v. La Coste and United States v. Smith, went
before the US Circuit Court for the Massachusetts district beginning on Thursday, November 9,
1820. Adolphus La Coste, the Science’s captain, and Joseph F. Smith, captain of the Plattsburgh,
were indicted under the 1818 Slave Trade Act for having sailed from New York intending to
“procure” Africans to be “held, sold and disposed of as slaves.” When the trial ended on the
evening of Saturday, November 11, the jury briefly deliberated and returned a guilty verdict.185
Both defendants appealed their convictions. La Coste asked for a retrial, contending that,
if any crime had been committed, it fell within the jurisdiction of the New York district, as the
Science had been outfitted in the port of New York. Smith, having sailed the Plattsburgh from
Baltimore, used a similar argument, replacing the suggested jurisdiction within that of the
District of Maryland. Coupled with what they claimed were ambiguities in their original
indictments, both La Coste and Smith also asked for his sentence to be postponed. “We have
heard nothing that has induced us to change our opinion,” Justice Joseph Story wrote in the La
Coste case. “If the crime was not committed within the port of New York, but only by sailing out
of the port, which was contiguous to the high seas, there was nothing which could prejudice the
defendant in the omission.” The ambiguities, too, were immaterial. The convictions of La Coste
and Smith were upheld,186 and the two slave traders were sentenced to five years’
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imprisonment.187 Despite the subsequent setbacks of the Jeune Eugénie affair, apparatuses of the
US government—the US Navy and the federal court system—had shown themselves willing to
take slave traders to court to enforce its anti-slave-trade laws and had won. Its commitment to
slave-trade suppression was enshrined in legal precedent.
But the lessons of the final case involving the Cyane’s seizures offered an even more
effective strategy for combatting the trade. In 1825, the Supreme Court heard the claim of Juan
Marino in the case of The Plattsburgh. Although not a criminal case under the Slave Trade Acts,
the US Supreme Court was asked to decide how the US government was to handle forfeitures in
slave-trading cases. As prize master, Lieutenant Stringham was responsible for ensuring that the
Plattsburgh be rendered the Cyane’s prize on his arrival with the ship in New York. He filed a
libel of information with the District Court of New York, requesting that the Plattsburgh be
condemned and forfeited. Stringham’s libel asserted the Cyane’s right to the ship as prize under
the act of 1794, for having been outfitted for the slave trade within the jurisdiction of the United
States, and under the act of 1800, for being an American-owned vessel engaged in the slave
trade. The US District Attorney for New York subsequently condemned the ship under those
acts, and the circuit court affirmed the condemnation. Marino, the Cuban to whom George Stark
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allegedly sold the ship in 1820 prior to its journey to Africa, appealed the forfeiture, claiming he
was the Plattsburgh’s rightful owner. Coming before the Supreme Court, the appeal revolved
around whether the ship’s journey had begun in the United States or under Marino’s auspices,
after the purported sale in Cuba. If Marino orchestrated the voyage, the ship would not have been
liable to forfeiture, as he was a Spanish citizen.188
After the parties presented their oral arguments on March 8 and 9, Justice Story delivered
the court’s opinion on March 14, 1825. He viewed the Plattsburgh’s sale with suspicion. As he
had learned in the case of the Jeune Eugénie, over which he had presided at the circuit court for
the Massachusetts district in 1822, bills of sale could not be given face value in cases involving
alleged slave ships. Despite the recorded testimony of the ship’s former owners attesting to the
sale, Story understood the thinking of American citizens hoping to engage in the trade.
“Certainly the Court have nothing to do with the conscience of the Spanish claimant, if he has
established a bona fide, legal ownership,” he admitted. “But that is the very point in controversy.
This is not the case of an ordinary trade, where no disguise is necessary or useful. It is the case of
a trade prohibited to American citizens under very heavy penalties, penalties which have since
been aggravated to the infliction of capital punishment.” He carefully spelled out the increasingly
common practice among US citizens intending to engage in the trade: “If carried on at all, it
must, therefore, be carried on by Americans, under the disguise of foreign flags; and, it is
notorious, that in the colonial ports of Spain, there is little difficulty in procuring all the
apparatus for the use of the national flag.” Story argued that there was reason to suspect that the
Plattsburgh’s sale had been feigned as a form of deception.189
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Moreover, that the alleged Spanish owner had kept on board the ship’s prior owner and
captain seemed to Story a strange and unwise business decision that only proved guilt. Their
presence aboard was doubtfully uninvolved. Story asserted that any foreign merchant engaging
in either a legitimate business or the slave trade would endeavor to do everything possible to
avoid possible seizure by US vessels. “He cannot but know,” Story reasoned, “that American
cruisers are in search of those who violate our laws respecting this traffic; and he would deem it
the highest imprudence to place his property in a situation in which it might justly be suspected
of an admixture of American interests.” Pointing to the letters found aboard providing
instructions to the Plattsburgh’s supposedly former captain, Joseph Smith, as well as the
testimony of Lieutenant Stringham, Story believed that it was obvious Smith was directing the
ship’s slaving voyage. The court concluded that the Plattsburgh’s slaving mission had begun in
Baltimore, within the jurisdiction of the United States. Rejecting Marino’s assertions that the
ship had been outfitted under his direction, Story held that the Plattsburgh had taken part in “a
meditated infringement of the acts prohibiting the slave trade.” Future slaving voyages needed
only to have begun their preparations in the United States to be in violation of US laws
forbidding the slave trade to be subject to forfeiture.190
The Cyane’s seizures marked the United States’ first attempt to apply the laws enacted by
Congress over the preceding decade. Although two of the criminal cases failed to result in
convictions, Adolphe La Coste and Joseph F. Smith were convicted as slave traders in
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contravention of US law. Convicted before the 1820 Piracy Law took effect, their prison
sentences, albeit brief, and fines, however small, fell within the ranges allowed by the Slave
Trade Act of 1818.191 After the USS Alligator seized a handful of ships off the African coast in
1821, one of which set off the Jeune Eugénie affair with France, public perceptions of the slave
trade’s conduct shifted. Believing that the trade had been set on the course to extinction, it was
believed, there would be no further need for Navy-led slave-trade suppression. The Navy’s
regular Africa patrols would be withdrawn, not to reappear for another twenty years.192
Reflecting on the cases, the National Gazette speculated on their impact. The initial
arrival of the ships and their imprisoned crews had aroused public support of US slave-trade
suppression, but whether that was to change the trade’s conduct was unclear. The “salutary
effect” of the ships’ seizures and the testimony of Stringham and others that American sailors
and vessels were engaging in the trade in great numbers had “produced a strong sensation in the
public mind.” This would, the Gazette predicted, spur public support for an expanded US Navy
presence along the African coast to suppress the slave trade. “The success of the Cyane in so
short a time,” the newspaper explained, “shews what could be done with honest exertion and an
adequate force. The United States may discharge their duty, without consenting to subject their
shipping any where, in time of peace, to British search.” The Cyane’s seizures showed that the
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United States could effectively contribute to the international slave trade’s demise, an
achievement not yet completed that demanded continued effort.193
But, even then, the existence of domestic slavery stood as a blatant cancer, undermining
the nation’s principles, according to the Gazette. The United States had to be “consistent” in its
dealings with slavery. “To pass acts of death against the maritime slave trader,” the Gazette
declared, “and yet overlook the domestic negro driver, and preach in Congress that hereditary
servitude is an institution expressly sanctioned by holy writ and natural law, and that it may be
justified by convenience and profit; to admit with all honor and kindness into the Union, a
community which persists in maintaining it upon those grounds, and without any colourable title
of necessity, is to pursue a career of self-contradiction, destructive of the moral influence and
good repute of our penal legislation.” The newspaper argued that slavery’s continued existence
compromised the United States’ ideals but that the Founders’ vision for the United States bore a
promise of freedom that had not yet been fulfilled. The 1808 Act Prohibiting the Importation of
Slaves had been the prognosis that saw a path to the young nation’s cure. It had set in motion the
Founders’ plan by which the scourge of slavery would be eradicated in the United States. In
1820, the Cyane administered the first dose of treatment, the beginning of American enforcement
of the slave trade. Although the ship’s seizures brought only two convictions of slave traders,
their vessels, the vital means by which they conducted the trade, were forfeited, a tremendous
financial loss. Through these cases, federal prosecutors learned the critical lesson that convicting
individuals for slave trading would be harder than seizing their property. The cases that the
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Cyane spawned would, therefore, serve as the basis for federal slave-trade suppression moving
forward.194
The Interim: Webster-Ashburton and the Amistad
The years following the Cyane’s successes saw the US Navy’s temporary withdrawal
from slave-trade suppression on the African coast. Although slave traders were taken to court for
violations of the slave-trade laws, the Antelope decision and broader federal policy minimized
the proactivity of enforcement. Many of the cases that arose relitigated the legitimacy of
forfeitures and the distribution of prize money, as in the cases of the Josefa Segunda, which
appeared and reappeared before the Supreme Court during the second half of the 1820s and
throughout the 1830s.195 Coinciding with the antebellum period, these years would initially see
subtle action taken against the slave trade. But naval enforcement, which had surfaced and
submerged at the end of the early republic, would reemerge with renewed strength. With at least
thirty-two court cases prosecuted during the period,196 steady progress would characterize the
apparent lull during the period between the Antelope decision in 1825 and the Civil War, as the
United States moved ever so slowly toward staunch slave-trade suppression.
Most significantly, larger, international forces ensured the United States’ return to the
coast of Africa. Although recent historians have framed it as a deliberate attempt to ensure
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against British interference with domestic slavery,197 the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, signed in
1842, expressly provided for Anglo-American cooperation on the issue of slave-trade
suppression. Agreeing to a “sufficient and adequate squadron … in all not less than eighty guns,”
the United States and United Kingdom jointly swore to permanent patrols against the trade.198
The US Navy’s Africa Squadron, created under the treaty’s provisions, seized thirty-six ships in
the following twenty years, with each taken to the United States and adjudicated under the slavetrade laws.199 But the sparse, infrequent seizures, coupled with the fluctuating size of the fleet,
has led historians, such as Donald L. Canney, to deem the Africa Squadron unsuccessful,
particularly when compared to the long-term success of the Royal Navy’s anti-slave-trade
patrols.200 Nevertheless, to dismiss the US Africa Squadron as a failure would be to ignore the
realities of the antebellum US Navy. In the post-Webster-Ashburton period, except for one year,
the US Navy consistently employed on average five ships—twelve percent of its entire fleet of
thirty-three ships—to the slave trade’s suppression. The Royal Navy, the largest navy in the
world with 283 ships in active service which protected a worldwide empire, devoted thirteen
percent of its entire fleet in 1837—some eighteen ships—to the same task. For the US Navy to
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commit a similar percentage to slave-trade suppression was, regardless of its ability to seize
slavers, a far greater commitment.201
The slave-trade cases that arose during this period raised questions intertwined with the
freedom principle. When a Jamaican-born slave, Curranee, who had immigrated to Georgia with
his enslaver as a minor years earlier, learned of the United States’ 1808 ban on the importation of
slaves, he filed suit to recoup the amount that he had paid toward his freedom on the grounds that
his servitude was nullified upon the age of twenty-one. The federal district court of Georgia
agreed that he had been free since he entered the United States a decade prior.202 Contrarily, in a
case where Louisiana-owned slaves had travelled abroad with their enslavers but returned
unaccompanied, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney held that the slave-trade laws did not apply to
temporary journeys outside the country, drawing a clear distinction between the property rights
of domestic slavery and the importation of slaves.203 Even as judges limited the effects of the
slave-trade laws, judicial precedent was slowly coming to affirm and reaffirm the United States’
position against the slave trade.
In the antebellum period, the Amistad case has emerged as one of the most well-known
cases involving the slave trade. Both rhetorically and practically, the Amistad’s legal
consequences were not insignificant. Admittedly, David Brion Davis and Howard Jones have
suggested that the case’s effects were more indirect, for the Amistad revealed the judicial
system’s antislavery potential. Forgoing these conclusions, Don E. Fehrenbacher, in his The
Slaveholding Republic, insisted that its effects were limited to the rhetorical realm. Noting that it
was a diplomatic “irritant” for the rest of the antebellum period, Fehrenbacher’s Amistad was a
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hollow one. But his focus was purely on the Supreme Court’s decision. From this, he concluded
that “In spite of all the notoriety and emotionalism surrounding it … It settled no major issue and
contributed little to the development of American slave-trade law.”204 But, as James Oakes has
shown, John Quincy Adams’ 1841 oral argument before the Supreme Court was a “précis of
antislavery constitutionalism.” In emancipating the slaves, the Supreme Court, he demonstrated,
assented to Adams’ argument. It accepted his contention that slavery was bound purely to the
jurisdictions that provided for it with legislation.205 The Amistad case, therefore, was a critical
step toward the expansion of the freedom principle beyond the United States’ borders.
The Amistad case was as much the victory of legal antislavery as it was of the new forms
of immediatist abolitionism. Radical abolitionists at the time saw the Supreme Court’s verdict as
a measurable success through which their broader efforts could be justified. Their force was
certainly essential in mobilizing public opinion in the Africans’ favor and spurred the essential
donations that allowed their litigation to succeed.206 However, their conception of where the case
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fit into the effort for nationwide emancipation importantly recalls the strategy of antislavery
lawyers during the period. The abolitionist Lydia Marie Child, for example, clearly rationalized
the Amistad case as part of a long-term legal strategy of immediatism in an editorial for her AntiSlavery Standard in the summer 1841. The Emancipator endorsed her view, publishing the essay
in its July 22, 1841, issue. In it, Child explored the answer to the question “What have you
done?” referring to the “occasional despondency” felt among abolitionists when their copious
efforts failed to bring about marked results. “Let those who ask what we have done,” she wrote,
“look at the generous excitement, the universal public sentiment, excited in behalf of the
Amistad captives.”207
The Amistad was part of a larger strategy, Child stressed. She described one instance in
which a Philadelphia abolitionist was questioned on the success of his work. “‘What have you
abolitionists done? The colonizationists have done something; they have at least transported a
few thousand negroes to Africa; but what have you done, except excite an uproar?,’” he was
asked. “The man responded, ‘Some men might choose to supply Philadelphia with water, by
carrying it down to Fairmount in a gill cup; and if they worked with diligence, and had plenty of
money to hire carriers, they might soon point to a barrel full, as the result of their labors. This the
colonizationists are doing. Meanwhile, we abolitionists are laying the pipes, which shall conduct
the water all over the city, and give every man the benefit of the whole reservoir.’” Child saw
abolitionism’s efforts, no matter how small, as victories for the enslaved. “Not in vain have we
worked with diligence and zeal, at laying the pipes,” she asserted. “All over the land are proofs
that the water has been conveyed. No where [sic] in the free States can slaves be hurried off into
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the power of infuriated masters, without judge or jury. One after another, the State Legislatures
have granted such unfortunate individuals a fair trial, while people grant them abundant
sympathy.” She concluded, “There is no need to inform the South, at least, that it is now much
more difficult than of old to secure a runaway slave.”208 To Child, the abolitionist fight would
crescendo in emancipation. That emancipation would, however, result from the careful
construction of a legal framework by which every enslaved person would be removed from
bondage. The Amistad was simply a step toward a future time in which freedom reigned across
the entire globe.
“It Is Truly Dignified and Just, Right and Salutary”
Forty years of legal groundwork would be vindicated following the inauguration of a
Republican administration in 1861. At noon on February 21, 1862, Nathaniel Gordon was
informed that his execution would be carried out before the hour’s end. In his cell at New York
City’s Halls of Justice, known as the “Tombs,” a deputy US Marshal helped him get dressed,
administered a tall glass of whisky, and tied his arms to lead him to the gallows. Gordon
desperately hoped that President Lincoln would save him from his fate. His sentence had, after
all, been postponed before. Nearly three weeks prior, Lincoln had ordered his execution be
delayed from its original date, February 7. He, along with countless friends and family, had sent
petitions to both judicial and executive branches, pleading for his sentence to be reduced. His
attorney had met with President Lincoln and had petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ a
certiorari, both to no avail; and his wife had met with Mary Todd Lincoln while her son Willie
lay ill on his deathbed. The President, however, remained adamant that Gordon’s sentence be
carried out. The law was clear. Seeing it as his duty not to offer even a commutation, Lincoln
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noted in his stay-of-execution order on February 4 that the only reason for the postponement was
that, in all the time Gordon had spent soliciting a change in his sentence, the prisoner had not
taken the time to reconcile himself with God. “In granting his respite,” Lincoln wrote, “it
becomes my painful duty to admonish the prisoner that, relinquishing all expectation of pardon
by Human Authority, he refer himself alone to the mercy of the Common God and Father of all
men.” Nathaniel Gordon became the first and only person that the United States ever executed
for slave trading.209
Gordon’s story began four decades earlier when he was born in Portland, Maine, in 1826.
All Gordon’s life, US law maintained that slave trading was piracy, but no administration during
his nearly forty years had followed through with the statutorily defined punishment as Lincoln
would. It is likely that he had long been involved in the slave trade and that his father, also called
Nathaniel, was, too, a slave trader. As James A. Rawley pointed out, a Nathaniel Gordon of
Portland, Maine, was charged in the Southern District of New York for importing a slave from
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Guadeloupe in 1838. By 1848, a man of the same name, captaining the ship Juliet, was pursued
and boarded off the coast of Rio de Janeiro by the USS Allegheny. An eleven-hour search
yielded no damning evidence of the ship’s slaving character, and the Juliet was allowed to go on
its way. It was rumored that, only a few weeks later, the Juliet returned to Brazil with an
enslaved African cargo.210 Although it is uncertain whether this was Gordon, his father, or
another man going by the same name, Ron Soodalter identified this 1848 journey as Gordon’s
first slaving voyage.211 Three years after the Juliet’s voyage, a Nathaniel Gordon returned to
Brazil with the Camargo, bringing 500 enslaved Africans. Soon after, the ship was detained, and
its crew was charged for slave trading. But Gordon was nowhere to be found. Not insignificantly,
the US consul—the embodiment of the federal government abroad—encouraged Brazilian
authorities to prosecute the crew. He believed, however, that Gordon had snuck back to the
United States with impunity.212
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The consul’s assumption proved correct. For it was not until 1861 that Gordon would
face the long-deserved consequences for his slave trading. Gordon had departed New York on
his ship, the Erie, in the spring 1860, destined for Havana. There, the port authorities and the US
consul approved the ship for travel, and Gordon and the Erie cleared for the Congo River on
April 9.213 As the Erie left the port of Havana, the US consul contacted the US Navy and State
Departments to alert them of the ship’s impending presence on the African coast.214
By August 7, the Erie laid anchor at Sharks Point, inside the mouth of the Congo. Over
the preceding few weeks, Gordon had negotiated with local traders to acquire an enslaved cargo.
In exchange for 150 hogsheads of whisky, Gordon received 897 Africans. Half adults and half
children, the youngest was only six, the oldest just forty. Gordon jammed them together in the
ship’s small hold. The fit was revoltingly tight. As Soodalter illustrated, the Nightingale, a slaver
intercepted by the US Navy around the same time as the Erie, held 961 wedged-together slaves
at the time of its capture, but it was twice the size of the Erie. Gordon was swift. Without making
extensive considerations as to their food and water, he had stowed away the Africans and made
sail within only forty-five minutes.215
As dawn turned to daylight the next day, the Erie was fifty miles away from the Congo’s
mouth destined for Havana. Spotting the Erie sailing northward, the USS Mohican, a ship of the
Africa Squadron, began pursuit. Gordon noted his pursuer and, incorrectly thinking the Mohican
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was a British warship, ordered the Erie to hoist an American flag to deter against boarding.
However, the Mohican was an American vessel. It was charged with suppressing the slave trade
and, in turn, enforcing US law. By eight o’clock on the morning of August 8, the Mohican,
having put a shot across the Erie’s bow, sent a boat to inspect the ship.216 Lieutenant John W.
Dunnington, a Southerner, led the boarding party.217 When he arrived, the crew put up little
resistance, acquiescing to his orders. He later testified that “when I got on board I met a man on
the gangway; as I went over I spoke to him, and asked him if he was captain of the ship; he did
not answer me; made a motion, pointed towards Mr. Nathaniel Gordon; I advanced towards Mr.
Gordon, who offered me his hand, and asked me to walk down in the cabin.” But Gordon offered
little more help. Dunnington recalled, “I asked him (Gordon) for the ship’s papers; he replied she
had none; made no other answer; I asked him if he was captain; he answered, ‘No.’” When
Dunnington enquired as to the captain’s identity, Gordon conveniently claimed that “the captain
died in the Congo” and that he did not know who was now in command of the ship. Dunnington
ordered Gordon to lower the Erie’s colors and informed him that, although he had not seen any
slaves aboard, the Mohican was seizing the ship as its prize.218
While Gordon and the Erie’s crew complied with Dunnington’s order, Dunnington heard
voices from belowdecks. “The negroes were shouting, yelling, crying, etc.,” Dunnington
remembered. “I looked down to see how thick they were; I saw a cargo of naked negroes,
negresses and children, all stark naked except some few of them; they were all closely stowed,
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spoon fashion; the stench that came up was very bad; there were none dead or appearing to be
dying.”219 Lieutenant Henry D. Todd, who boarded the Erie after Dunnington’s initial inspection,
later testified that “it was impossible to put a foot down on the deck without treading on a
nigger.” The stench of death and human waste was putrid. “Some of the negroes,” Todd recalled,
“had corn cobs and cotton in their nose to keep the stench away; some of them were covered
with running sores, some of them fell sick and died very rapidly.”220 Concerned about the
condition of crushed captives below, Dunnington questioned Gordon about the extent of the
Erie’s provisions. Gordon, careful not to offer too much information, only stated that he did not
know whether the ship had enough food and water to make it the 1,500 miles to Monrovia. When
the Erie reached the Liberian capital fifteen days later, just 867 Africans disembarked; thirty had
died along the way.221
A grand jury was empaneled shortly after the Erie’s return to New York on October 3,
1860.222 It indicted Gordon on five counts under the fourth and fifth sections of the 1820 Piracy
Act.223 While this statute provided for capital punishment against those who engaged in the slave
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trade, it had only been successfully used once before, five years earlier, in United States v. Smith.
But President Buchanan had been quick to pardon the alleged slave trader, the German-born
Smith.224 In 1860, Buchanan’s appointee as US Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
James I. Roosevelt, appeared reluctant to proceed with Gordon’s prosecution. He thus proposed a
plea bargain. In exchange for the names of Gordon’s financial backers, the slave trader could
escape with a short prison sentence and a $2,000 fine.225
When news broke of the offer, the Republican press lambasted Roosevelt’s feeble
attempt to root out the network of slavers based in New York City. “In the view expressed by
Judge Roosevelt, that public opinion, both at the North and South, has ceased to regard this
crime as deserving a pirate’s doom—and in his further statement that, even in case of conviction
of the full offence, the President [Buchanan] would ‘probably pardon’ the guilty man or men,”
Henry J. Raymond, editor of the New York Times, wrote, “we confess to a shock of not pleasant
surprise, a stunning of all the moral senses, and a confusion of ideas, such as must result
whenever a deeply-rooted and long-venerated belief is swept suddenly away from before us.”
The precedent of presidential pardons could not hold. The slave trade had to be stamped out then
and forever. “The Slave-trade is not, unhappily, a plant of such weak growth in our midst that it
requires to be watered in advance with these tear-drops of Executive clemency. Rather is it [sic]
a spreading and poisonous weed, requiring vigorous arms, unflinching industry and the most
unyielding discharge of every duty on the part of our law officers charged with its repression.”
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Raymond concluded, “If Mr. Buchanan desired to signalize the last days of his unhappy term by
giving assurance of impunity to this crime, he could not have chosen a better means than the
declarations made by Judge Roosevelt.”226 Although there was public sentiment advocating
against Gordon’s punishment, a slave trader could no longer get off scot-free by 1860.227
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With the entry of the Lincoln administration in March 1861, Republican Edward
Delafield Smith replaced Roosevelt as US Attorney. While his attempts to avoid a trial in the
Gordon case had seemed to foreshadow an abandonment of the slave trader’s charges, Roosevelt
had failed to act on the case until the end of his tenure. Gordon meanwhile sat in prison; as
weeks turned into months, he still waited for word of his almost-certain release.228 But Smith’s
arrival brought sudden changes. Within three months of his appointment, Smith constructed the
government’s case against Gordon. And, on Tuesday, June 18, 1861, the trial began with the new
US attorney personally conducting the prosecution.229
Smith opened his case by grounding his argument in the freedom principle upon which
antislavery advocates and the fledgling Republican Party had steadily built over the preceding
decades. He referred to Gordon’s attorney, Philip J. Joachimsen, who as part of the jury selection
process had asked a prospective juror about his opinions on slavery. US attorney Smith recalled,
“The question put to the juror was—as to what ought to be done or could be done with the slaves
which inhabit that section of the country?” But the Gordon case was, Smith emphasized, not a
matter of slavery “policy” within the United States; rather, the case dealt with a “cruel and
nefarious” trade occurring on the high seas. “Here a crime is charged against a person—a crime,
though arising from the slave traffic, has no connection whatever with slavery as it at present
exists in the Southern states.”230 His emphasis drew a line between the foreign slave trade and
domestic slavery. And that line meant the critical difference between an institution within the
federal government’s purview to suppress and one considered untouchable, only subject to
municipal law.
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In the Gordon case, jurors were not simply asked to convict a man accused of slave
trading, Smith argued. Of course, whether Gordon was convicted would determine whether the
United States would allow the trade to continue. But Smith suggested that the case, too, bore the
potential to protect the delicate balance between free and slave states. To suppress the slave
trade—one of the few ways that the federal government could intervene in the slavery question
during the antebellum period—was a means by which slavery could be restricted from spreading
further into the territories. As the New York Herald explained, “whether thus being permitted to
proceed, it shall be further permitted in its effects and results to crowd the virgin soil of the
nation of the Territories of the country, indirectly through Cuba, with negroes to the exclusion of
the white man.”231 The continued influx of slaves from abroad would expand the enslaved
population of the South to levels that would undoubtedly menace, or even level entirely, the
cordon of freedom. While the prosecution of a slave trader did not directly deal with domestic
slavery, the federal government’s failure to prosecute would therefore undergird the strength of
the Slave Power.
Most importantly, however, Gordon’s prosecution harked back to the nation’s
revolutionary founding. To Smith, the 1820 Piracy Law under which Gordon had been brought
to trial was a clear legacy of the Founders’ vision for slavery’s existence within the federal
system. “The statute under which the indictment is founded,” he highlighted, “is a statute passed
by Congress, by that Congress who has bequeathed to us the form of constitution under which
we live.” It was an act that both Northerners and Southerners had passed because of its
importance to the founding generation. “A statute,” Smith continued, “the propriety of which and
the necessity for which, was universally admitted, and all the patriots of the land, represented in
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Congress by statesmen of character from every State, voted with alacrity and earnestness.”232 To
neglect the laws against the slave trade was, as Smith argued, to forgo the Founders’ vision for a
nation unshackled from the international slave trade.
Over the course of that Tuesday and into Wednesday, Smith and the prosecution
presented their case. Smith established, through witnesses, that Gordon and his parents had lived
in Maine since at least two years of age, making it unlikely—albeit not impossible—that he was
not an American citizen.233 To testify on the Erie’s seizure, the prosecution had been unable to
get Lieutenant Dunnington, the first of the Mohican’s officers to inspect Gordon’s Erie, because,
as a native of Tennessee, he had resigned from the US Navy just a few months earlier and joined
the Confederate Navy.234 Smith nevertheless received reliable and detailed testimony from
Lieutenant Todd, who attested to Gordon’s knowledge of the slaves’ condition and how to care
for them. He noted that the defendant had referred to Portland, Maine, as “home” and that he
consistently conducted himself as though he were “responsible for the ship.” Within a day and a
half, Smith had presented his case.235
Gordon’s attorney, Philip Joachimsen, had successfully prosecuted the slaver James
Smith half a decade earlier. For Gordon’s defense, Joachimsen wielded a three-part strategy,
which addressed several contingencies. Through his initial argument, he hoped to show that
Gordon was merely a passenger aboard the Erie, who had been traveling in the interior of Africa.
Because slave ships were some of the only vessels able “to get away from there,” Gordon had
just happened to seek passage by way of a slaver. Even if Gordon had been involved in the
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slaving enterprise, Joachimsen maintained that the United States did not have jurisdiction in the
case because the Atlantic did not flow into the Congo. As the Atlantic’s tide “did not ebb and
flow,” the river was bound within the jurisdictions of Portugal all the way to its mouth. Even had
Gordon been the ship’s captain, Joachimsen argued, a Spanish captain, officers, and crew
replaced the Erie’s original contingent before the Africans were brought aboard two days before
the Mohican intercepted it. But, regardless of these points, Joachimsen maintained that Gordon
was not an American citizen to begin with, thereby immune to prosecution under the Piracy Law.
To support these assertions, Joachimsen called Gordon’s mate, William Warren, whose
testimony conveniently left little room for Gordon to have been the mastermind of the Erie’s
journey. Warren, also under indictment for the same charge, claimed that “he joined the Erie in
England, went from thence to Havana and thence to the Congo.” Warren claimed that “After the
negroes were shipped, the vessel went to sea under the direction of the Spanish captain and that
he did not see Capt. Gordon do anything after the negroes were taken on board.”236 Filled with
inconsistencies and alternative explanations, Gordon’s falsehood-based defense almost seemed
to underscore his guilt. But it was with this story that Joachimsen rested his case within less than
a day.
The next morning, June 20, 1861, Judge William D. Shipman offered a charge to the jury.
Laying out the statutory requirements for conviction, he made little effort to veil his own
opinions. When considering Warren’s testimony, he urged they use caution: “The defence has
offered the evidence of a person who is indicted as an accomplice in this same offence as to this
transaction in the Congo River, and there is no other evidence to show that the national character
of this vessel was changed but his statement of what took place there.” He stressed that “The

236

“Law Reports,” New York Times, June 20, 1861.

95

testimony of accomplices is to be scrutinized in the light of the circumstances.” And, as to
Gordon’s claims of not being an American citizen, Shipman noted that “It is fair for you from the
fact that no evidence is given on the part of the defendant to show anything to the contrary that
he has no such evidence.” After the jury deliberated that evening, they returned the following
morning in disagreement. Although the press speculated on the jury’s balance, Shipman
nevertheless declared a mistrial.237 Whether Gordon was even to be convicted seemed uncertain.
Smith quickly moved for a new trial, but it would not be until the fall that it would
recommence. Judge Shipman had ordered that jurors be brought in from outside the city and
slated the trial to begin at the beginning of July.238 But, by July 15, the case was indefinitely
postponed because of the availability of witnesses.239 When the parties returned to court on
November 6, 1861, Smith and Joachimsen reenacted their previous presentations, calling most of
the same witnesses and relying on the same arguments for the next three days. After the
presiding judge, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Nelson, issued his charge to the jury, the jurors
returned with their verdict within twenty minutes. Like the first trial, it had lasted two days.
Gordon’s defense had presented a weak and nearly self-defeating argument. But, this time,
Gordon had been found guilty.240
On November 30, 1861, Judge Shipman sentenced Gordon. His remarks condemned both
the slave trade and the particular cruelties of Gordon’s case. “The evidence of your guilt was so
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full and complete as to exclude from the minds of your triers all doubt,” he reminded the slave
trader. “You are soon to be confronted with the terrible consequences of your crime.” Because of
this, Shipman encouraged Gordon to receive counsel from “ministers of religion, and let your
repentance be as thorough and humble as your crime was great.” He emphasized, “Do not
attempt to hide its enormity from yourself; think of the cruelty and wickedness of seizing nearly
a thousand fellow beings, who never did you harm … Remember that you showed mercy to
none.” God, Shipman instructed Gordon, showed mercy to all, however. “Do not flatter yourself
that because they belonged to a different race from yourself that your guilt is therefore lessened.
Rather fear that it is increased,” he asserted. “In the just and generous heart the humble and the
weak inspire and call for pity and forbearance, and as you are soon to pass into the presence of
that God of the black man as well as the white man, who is no respecter of persons, do not
indulge for a moment the thought that he hears with indifference the cry of humblest of his
children.” Shipman sentenced Gordon to be hanged on February 7, 1862.241
Although the United States had convicted its first slave trader for piracy, Gordon was not
concerned, adamant that, as in the case of James Smith, a pardon would come. Gordon had
appealed his sentenced through the courts.242 His friends and family had sent petitions across the
federal government for his commutation. And the Supreme Court denied their petitions for writs
of either prohibition or certiorari, asserting that the court had no appellate jurisdiction in the case.
Once Gordon’s death warrant had, moreover, “passed out of the hands of the court, and the
warrant is in the hands of the marshal commanding him to execute the judgment of the court,”
Chief Justice Taney held, the judicial system could do no more.243 The executive branch offered
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his only route for hope. With President Lincoln already having rejected the requests of convicted
slave trader and his supporters, Gordon nevertheless waited, futilely, for the president to alter his
destiny.
By midnight on Friday, February 21, 1862, no word had come signaling any change of
heart on the part of the president. Wanting to end his life on his own terms, Gordon attempted
suicide by strychnine shortly after three o’clock that morning. The prison’s physicians were
quickly called and had, by ten o’clock, revived him. Assured to be alive, his life could now be
ended by the authority of the federal government. But Gordon was barely conscious. The
marshals had, in the intervening two hours, poured liquor into him to the point of total
drunkenness. “The man was not sober,” Harper’s Weekly reported, “that is, so powerful had been
the effect of the poison that, in order to keep him alive till the necessary moment, they had been
obliged to give him whisky enough to make an ordinary man drunk three times over.” When the
time came, the inebriated Gordon was lifted onto a chair outside his cell, where Lincoln’s
February 4 order was read to him. Hoisted to his feet by two marshals, he was marched to the
prison yard, heavily supported by his escorts. Reaching the gallows, a hood was placed over his
head, and the noose was put around his neck, adjusted and synched to the proper place and fit.
Then, as quickly as the process began, Gordon fell four feet, suspended only by his neck. His
body’s weight caused only the noise of a gruesome thud when it reached the end of the tether.
“The body swayed hither and thither for a few moments, and all was quiet. No twitchings, no
convulsions, no throes, no agonies. His legs opened once, but closed again, and he hung a lump
of dishonored clay.” After months of frenzied efforts trying to stop his execution, Gordon’s trip
to the gallows spanned all of a half an hour.244
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The diarist George Templeton Strong reflected on Gordon’s execution the next day.
“Veré dignum et justum est, æquum et salutare,” he declared. “It is truly dignified and just, right
and salutary.” He noted the countless petitions that swarmed Lincoln prior to the event and
commended his “firmness.” Strong remarked how “pitiful” Gordon’s “exit” from the world had
been, mentioning his suicide attempt and drunkenness before the criminal’s demise. He also
looked abroad, considering how the United States’ execution of a slave trader might be seen by
the “pharisaical shop-keepers & bag-men of England.” From all this, he drew a pointed
conclusion: “Vivat Lex—and may it promptly exterminate every man who imports niggers into
this Continent.”245 The law, codified forty years before, had finally prevailed.
The foundations for US slave-trade suppression were laid long before Gordon’s
execution. The forfeitures of slave ships had formed the basis for the steady accumulation of
precedent, which would allow the judicial system to execute Gordon without question.
Beginning in the 1820s, when a slew of cases was brought before federal courts at all levels, the
slave trade was consistently taken to court. Despite declining numbers of appellate cases in the
1830s, the US government still took slavers to court throughout the decade, adding to the
example set ten years earlier. But, with the Amistad case at the dawn of the 1840s and the
Webster-Ashburton Treaty two years later, the volume of cases noticeably increased. But these
cases during the 1840s and 1850s built on the models founded in the preceding two decades. On
the Civil War’s eve, the slave trade’s illegality, despite having been enshrined in law forty years
earlier, was cemented in judicial precedent.
Gordon’s execution in February 1862 stands as a symbolic end to the antebellum period’s
sustained legal efforts at slave-trade suppression. Certainly, his death coincided with the entry of
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a Republican administration—the empowered manifestation of antislavery—into the executive
branch and the disintegration of the antebellum federal union, along with its accompanying
limitations on peacetime federal action against slavery. But James I. Roosevelt had called on
forty years of steady prosecution against slave trading property and plea deals for lesser offenses
when he indicted Gordon for a capital offense only to start the bargaining process. Precedent in
the Smith case showed that, if convicted, the President would intervene, either pardoning Gordon
or, at the very least, commuting his sentence. Despite this, Edward Delafield Smith, Lincoln’s
prosecutor for the Southern District of New York, proceeded on that indictment. He tried Gordon
to the fullest extent of the law knowing that the change in government meant the slave trader
could not escape execution if convicted. By 1862, the United States had reached a position from
which the execution of a slave trader could be conducted as explicitly stated in the law.
The repeated prosecution of slave traders marked the antebellum period. Regardless of
the degree to which these prosecutions were successful, that they took place at all is revealing.
Examining cases involving violations of the slave-trade laws complicates the image presented by
Don E. Fehrenbacher of a federal government that passively allowed, if not encouraged, the
Slave Power to steer its policy. Looking at the US government in macro perspective,
Fehrenbacher charted the growing hold that slaveholders gained across the antebellum period.
But he ignored that the lower echelons of the federal government were undermining the strength
of the slave trade by confiscating the vessels on which traders trafficked human beings. It was
through the unmemorable processes of admiralty law that antislavery-minded attorneys brought
the powers of the federal government to bear against slave traders, recalling the methods of an
earlier generation of abolitionism while laying the foundations for a later time, when the law
could be fully executed. Despite decisions made at higher levels of government, these
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prosecutions did occur, and they ultimately limited the scope of slavery. By sanctioning the tools
by which slave traders conducted their illicit traffic of people, these cases helped minimize the
number of Africans forced into bondage and ensured that slavery would exist only within the
borders of those jurisdictions in which it was already lawful. In the process, they showed that
freedom reigned internationally. Respecting the slave trade, the United States was not a
consistently slaveholding republic; it was an abolitionist one. Throughout the antebellum period,
therefore, the federal court system served as the means—to use McCarthy’s and Stauffer’s
term—by which antislavery advocates could assault the slave trade. Exactly who those
opponents of the slave trade were, however, highlights the limitations of the historiographical
definition and character of abolitionism.
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CHAPTER III: CHARACTER: THE AMERICAN COLONIZATION SOCIETY,
ABOLITIONISM, AND “THE GREAT SAFETY VALVE OF THIS UNION!”
“You well know, my dear Sir, how faithfully I labored … to bring back the Society to its
Constitutional and neutral ground respecting Slavery,” wrote wealthy, antislavery-minded New
Yorker Gerrit Smith to Ralph Randolph Gurley, secretary of the American Colonization Society
(ACS), in November 1835. “The ineffectualness of these efferts [sic],” Smith declared, “is
manifest in fact, that the Society is now, and has been for some time, far more interested in the
question of slavery, than in the work of Colonization—in the demolition of the Anti-Slavery
Society, than in the building up of its Colony.”246 To Smith, the colonization movement had
strayed into an issue where it did not belong. Colonization, a fundamentally abolitionist idea
which aimed to provide an outlet for emancipated slaves and to cut off the transatlantic slave
trade at its source, had become distracted by the internal politics of antislavery. An idea that
continued early abolitionists’ interest in suppressing the international slave trade, colonization
seemed, even when working within its “Constitutional” objects, out of step with the broader
abolition movement. Smith’s critique nevertheless raises an important question as to the ACS’s
place in the story of antebellum abolition.
By the mid-1830s, an irreconcilable feud had emerged between proponents of
colonization and supporters of immediatism, who had established the first national antislavery
organization, the American Anti-Slavery Society, in 1833. With few visible successes, their
numbers shrinking, and their finances desperately strained, colonizationists struggled to persuade
the public of their plan’s viability. The departure of so many wealthy, high-profile donors, like
Gerrit Smith, within such a short span of time has led several historians to conclude that, by
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1840, the ACS was obsolete—philosophically antiquated and financially impracticable. As
growing numbers of antislavery advocates moved away from the gradualist, legalistic approaches
that characterized the post-Revolutionary period and instead embraced calls for slavery’s
immediate end, increasingly fewer abolition-minded individuals saw colonization as a feasible,
let alone acceptable, undertaking. The ACS had suffered from this change in antislavery
sentiment. In the decade since he had first become involved in the colonization movement, Smith
had emerged as the ACS’s most notable benefactor. A landowner from Upstate New York, Smith
had played an important role in the establishment and early successes of the New-York State
Colonization Society, which formed in 1829.247 Involved with the national society since 1826,
Smith had devised two separate schemes to rescue the national society’s precarious financial
situation. One, which became known as the “Gerrit Smith Plan,” aimed to raise $100,000 on the
society’s behalf over ten years through one hundred of his most affluent friends each pledging
annual contributions of $100.248 In another, in 1834, Smith more urgently offered $5,000 if the
nation’s wealthiest colonizationists in turn provided $45,000.249 Yet the society continued to
falter.
But, by 1835, Smith saw that abolitionism was decidedly moving away from
colonization. A professed believer in the necessity of slavery’s ultimate destruction, Smith’s
views had long resembled those of other colonizationists, holding that the presence of free
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African Americans was the foremost deterrent to abolition and, therefore, their emigration was
the best path to total emancipation.250 After a decade of working with the society, however,
Smith began to see the colonization movement as stifling the attainment of abolition.
Increasingly open to immediatist ideas, in October 1835, Smith attended a meeting of the
Garrisonian New York State Anti-Slavery Society in Utica, only twenty-five miles from his
home in Peterboro. When a mob of three hundred people forced their way into the church in
which the convention was being held and drove the one-thousand-person convention from the
town, Smith invited the abolitionists to reconvene at his home. There, despite his years of fervent
support of colonization, he declared, “the great principles of your society have ever been my
principles … I feel it to be not only my duty, but my privilege and pleasure, to identify myself
with you, as far as I conscientiously can, and to expose my property, and reputation, and life, to
the same dangers which threaten yours.” Smith felt “obliged to become a member.”251
In January 1836, the ACS entered its fourth year of crisis. Approaching its twentieth
anniversary, the society had, since 1832, hemorrhaged members and, in turn, a vital fundraising
tool through which it could carry out its mission. Publishing Smith’s letter in its January issue,
the ACS’s monthly publication, the African Repository and Colonial Journal, expressed mild
regret at Smith’s “defection” but asserted that the society had “adhered strictly to its
constitutional objects.” It continued, “we might easily show … that the Anti-Slavery Societies
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have, from their origin to the present time, waged a war of extermination against the
Colonization Society.” Regardless, “even had it adopted, as it has not done, the line of conduct
imputed to it by Mr. S. [Smith], it would only have exercised the legitimate right of self-defence,
whatever might be thought of the policy of thus acting.”252 The ACS saw Smith’s critique as
merely one more in a long line of unjustifiably maligning attacks against the society and hoped
that its members would see it in much the same way. But the audience to which the African
Repository directed this claim was growing smaller by the day. Among abolitionists, the ACS
was no longer a legitimate route to slavery’s eradication in the United States. Examining its
position as a means to the slave trade’s suppression, however, reveals a more nuanced portrait of
colonization in the larger story of abolitionism.
Historians have noted the rise of Garrisonianism as a clear demarcation in the chronology
of antislavery, separating Revolutionary-era gradualism from antebellum immediatism. Richard
S. Newman demonstrated two distinct periods in the history of abolitionism, distinguished by
tactical differences. While earlier antislavery advocates pursued government action to stamp out
slavery slowly, the 1830s saw a shift toward Garrison’s emotionally based calls for the swift
abolition of a moral evil, according to Newman.253 As the voices of early republican gradualism
faded into obscurity, submerged by the volume of immediatist fervor, so too did the popularity of
gradualist schemes such as colonization. Drawing proslavery accusations from immediatists
while still trying to work with Southern slaveholders, the colonization movement embodied the
transition between eras of abolitionism, as advocates of the slave’s cause navigated the multitude
of ways to grapple with the increasingly divisive sectional issue of slavery.
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The historiography of colonization has largely embraced the immediatist critique that
contemporarily emerged during the antebellum debate over colonization. Nowhere has this been
more prominent than in discussions of colonizationists’ motivations. Racial prejudice, common
within even the most ardent antislavery circles of the nineteenth century, has lingered as one of
the most frequent criticisms of the colonization movement, particularly in the wake of the Civil
Rights Movement. As early as 1832, William Lloyd Garrison accused colonizationists of acting
out of racial bias, “persecuting the blacks even unto a strange country, and verily believing they
are doing God service,” rather than accepting that the United States was African Americans’
“only legitimate home.”254
Newman as well as other recent historians of abolitionism such as R. J. M. Blackett and
Manisha Sinha have carried the immediatist assessment into the present, pointing to the
centrality of African Americans in the transatlantic antislavery movement and their nearly
wholesale rejection of colonization. Focusing on the ACS’s origins, Douglas R. Egerton focused
on the role of Charles Fenton Mercer in the organization’s founding. By naming Mercer—a
class-obsessed, slaveholding Southerner who desired to create a controlled environment for free
African Americans, whom he believed to be a hopelessly inferior group—as colonization’s
originator, Egerton questioned the organization’s abolitionist character. Each of these historians
showed that the ACS was a racist organization, which both recognized that racial prejudice
existed in the United States but had no intention of confronting the problem. As Blackett
explained, “The ACS contended that the problem of prejudice in the North could be solved by
providing blacks with a country of their own, an environment in which racism could not
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exist.”255 More harshly, in The African Colonization Movement—one of the few monographs
written on the organization—P. J. Staudenraus suggested that colonizationists believed the
presence of African Americans was a greater “social ‘evil’” than slavery itself.256
The politics of colonization have similarly been deemed unsuccessful and ideologically
hollow. In a 1979 article, David M. Streifford studied the rhetorical role of republican ideology
in the colonization movement. While slavery was not thought to contradict the republican
system, it permanently cast African Americans into an inferior class, making social stratification
and wealth inequality endemic. Through this, class became racially specific, and notions of
equitable wealth distribution assumed the hallmarks of racial homogeneity. Although they
sectionally tailored their appeals—characterizing their efforts as humane in the North and
respectful of property rights in the South—colonizationists used republicanism, Streifford
argued, in an attempt to garner support for their work. Streifford echoed Smith’s critique of an
immediatist-obsessed ACS. As the antebellum period progressed and sectional interests became
more divided, colonizationists focused more heavily on attacking Garrisonian abolitionism than
on expatriating African Americans to Liberia.257 More recently, Eric Burin and Sharla M. Fett
have similarly suggested that colonizationists used slave-trade suppression as a self-serving “tool
with which to pry open the federal coffers.”258 In the literature, therefore, colonization has
emerged as the self-interested opportunist of antislavery politics.
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But Burin showed in his Slavery and the Peculiar Solution that the ACS was,
fundamentally, an abolitionist organization with significant political implications. Burin accepted
Mercer’s role in the ACS’s founding and granted that emigration to Liberia was consistently
low.259 But he argued that, despite being rooted in racism, colonization was not an innately
proslavery ideology, as immediatists suggested. Although they thought African Americans
suffered a degraded condition in the United States, colonizationists thought that, in Africa,
“outside the canopy of prejudice,” black Americans would thrive. Prejudice could not be
corrected domestically, but it would not be a barrier abroad. It was because of colonizationists’
desire to elevate the status of free African Americans, according to Burin, that proslavery
politicians prevented the ACS from obtaining federal funding for emigration to Liberia.260
Regardless of the numbers, with each emigration, the ACS undermined slavery.261
Connecting the ACS to the gradualist Pennsylvania Abolition Society, moreover, Beverly
C. Tomek contended that colonization bridged the two generations of abolitionism established by
Newman. Importantly, Tomek’s portrait stressed the complexity of antislavery activism.
Colonizationists were gradualists, seeing the scheme as a “logical corollary” to slavery’s
eventual destruction in the United States. Comprised of both politically focused activists of the
gradualist vein and reform-minded humanitarians who came to dominate immediatist
abolitionism, colonization was a broad movement, whose belief in a long, sustained assault
against slavery made it no less abolitionist. The racism on which previous historians had focused
to discount colonization as an abolitionist idea, furthermore, did not jeopardize its antislavery
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integrity. One … area in which terminology needs clarification,” Tomek explained, “involves a
general tendency among some social historians to see ‘antislavery’ as always benevolent.” But,
she continued, “‘antislavery’ can take on a selfish, even racist, meaning.”262
When taking historical figures at their word, the historian moves at his or her own peril.
The carefully constructed, persuasively minded rhetoric of a past individual or group—
particularly when the context in which that rhetoric was born was as contentious as antebellum
discussions over slavery and abolition—demands skepticism. Yet, in examining the American
Colonization Society, this skepticism has perhaps failed, or at least misled, historians. Wielding
too narrow a definition and too simplistic a view of abolitionism, the historiography has looked
past the consistent, coherent appeal that colonizationists articulated from the movement’s
founding and adjudged it hollow in meaning. But colonization was an abolitionist movement that
specifically addressed the suppression of the transatlantic slave trade. Through a colony on the
African coast, colonizationists aimed to support the federal government’s efforts at slave-trade
suppression, shutting off slave traders’ access to the African interior and providing harbors for
warships patrolling against the slave trade. At annual meeting after annual meeting throughout
the antebellum period and during the Civil War, colonizationists painted the emigration of
African Americans to Africa as a foundational step toward the solution of the republic’s
existential problem: slavery. There were a multitude of approaches to antislavery, each created
and advocated by fallible human beings bound within the constraints of their time and place.
Regardless of the motivation, scheme, or timeframe, agitation against slavery must be considered
as such. The abolitionist character of colonization, particularly regarding the slave trade’s
suppression, must not be ignored.
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As colonizationist Joseph R. Ingersoll explained at the annual ACS convention in January
1849, the organization hoped to solve several problems at once. Colonization, he claimed,
offered African Americans the “opportunity to escape from a country where their condition is the
most unhappy” and white Americans “an opportunity to repair in some small degree the breaches
which we have made upon their race for centuries past; and to offer some slight atonement for
the wrongs which we have done them.” The task at hand was daunting and of paramount
importance. He declared, “We say not too much when we speak of Colonization as the great
safety valve of this Union!”263 Colonization, he believed, was essential for abolition.
Slavery had lingered as a blemish upon the United States’ revolutionary principles since
the nation’s inception. “Now is the time,” declared Quaker David Cooper in an anonymously
published 1783 pamphlet, “to demonstrate to Europe, to the whole world, that America was in
earnest, and meant what she said, when, with peculiar energy, and unanswerable reasoning, she
plead [sic] the cause of human nature, and with undaunted firmness insisted, that all mankind
came from the hand of their Creator equally free.” With its newly found independence from
Great Britain, the American colonies faced a concerning dilemma over slavery that, as Cooper
highlighted, posed the potential to undermine the new nation’s most treasured principles.
Although independent, the thirteen colonies had not extended liberty to all people living within
their borders, and, to those Americans who detested slavery, the presence of enslaved African
Americans stood as a stain on the nation’s republican character. Cooper continued, “Let not the
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world have an opportunity to charge her conduct with a contradiction to her solemn and often
repeated declarations; or to say that her sons are not real friends to freedom.”264 To Cooper,
whether the world would view the republican system that emerged from the American
Revolution as sincere required slavery’s abolition.
Published as America’s thirteen colonies, recently divorced from Great Britain, charted
their own course, Cooper’s pamphlet represents a clear assertion of Revolutionary-era
antislavery, which deliberately linked the United States’ founding principles to the obvious
contradiction of domestic slavery. Undoubtedly, this contradiction weighed heavily on the minds
of antislavery advocates in the years after the Revolution. Driven by Revolutionary republican
sentiments along with religious beliefs,265 these early advocates established “abolitionist”
societies across the North, which pushed local legislatures to enact laws leading to gradual
emancipation.266 Their efforts were not limited, however, within the states. Rather, these
abolitionist societies also emphasized the closure of the foreign slave trade as a tool to fulfilling
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the Revolution’s principles; they saw abroad a crucial answer to the problem of slavery and a
potential first step toward nationwide emancipation.267
Of course, to identify the motivations behind the 1808 ban on the importation of slaves as
purely the result of republicanism ignores the themes of international abolitionism.
Conversations on the suppression of the external slave trade connected American antislavery
advocates to their counterparts across the Atlantic. In Britain and on the Continent, abolitionists
devoted considerable attention to the slave trade, although, by the time that the United States
entered its antebellum period, this had transformed into a concern over free labor more than the
earlier moral motivations of Granville Sharp and William Wilberforce.268 Nevertheless, the slave
trade was a priority of international abolitionism. While republicanism may have added greater
urgency to the slave trade’s closure, the United States’ constitutional promise to suppress the
slave trade was, at its root, abolitionist in character.
From its inception, the American Colonization Society considered itself an abolitionist
organization in the same vein as those across the Atlantic. ACS members revered the work of
early English abolitionists, particularly those involved in the establishment of Sierra Leone,
praising their efforts to eliminate the slave trade and improve the lives of those affected by
slavery. Calling on the American public for support, the ACS cited Thomas Clarkson’s writings
on the slave trade as evidence of the need for Christian intervention.269 As ACS agents scoured
the West African coast for land on which to build a colony, they first sought the advice and
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approval of Wilberforce’s African Institution, which governed Sierra Leone.270 And, when the
ACS began to publish its monthly magazine, the African Repository and Colonial Journal, it
provided a lengthy, eight-issue summary of a six-year-old biography on Sharp, the originator of
the Sierra Leone scheme.271 Laudatory of these pioneering abolitionists, the ACS saw only
continuity between its work and that of those striving to effect abolition abroad.
Colonizationists believed that slavery could not permanently exist in the United States.
But, unlike the immediate abolitionists who emerged in 1820s, their goal was not to persuade
others toward broader abolition. Reflecting the views of the Founding generation,
colonizationists labored under the impression that most Americans believed in the need for
slavery’s ultimate destruction. As Ralph Randolph Gurley explained in a defense of the ACS
published in the society’s magazine in April 1833, “All or nearly all Americans, cherish the
desire and expectation that [slavery] will be one day abolished.”272 Presupposing nationwide
acceptance of a future in which slavery would be abolished, colonizationists did not believe it
necessary to argue for slavery’s abolition. As a result, their antislavery position, so often implicit,
can be overlooked.
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More fundamentally, however, colonizationists accepted that slavery was a local
institution with which outside forces could not interfere. Whether rhetorical or sincere,
colonizationists embraced federalism as preventing national action against slavery. Gurley
connected the ACS’s mission to the Framers’ vision for a national union. “In what circumstances
do [the society’s] supporters find themselves, while they now promote the plan of this
institution?” he asked in his open letter to ACS members in 1833. “They are living under a
constitutional government of twenty-four United States,” he replied, “united for national
purposes and the common welfare, but in other respects separate and distinct, each having the
entire regulation of its own peculiar institutions and interests, and not responsible to other states
… or to the national government, either for the character of such institutions and interests, or for
the laws it may enact, or the measures it may adopt, to preserve and defend them.”273
Consequently, to colonizationists, Southern cooperation was key to slavery’s destruction.
Rather than castigate slaveholders for participating in an evil system, colonizationists sought to
build national consensus, actively working with Southerners to facilitate abolition. “Nothing can
be safely and peacefully done for the direct and immediate abolition of slavery, but with the
consent of the masters,” Gurley declared. Colonizationists understood that, with time, the
enslaved population of the United States would only grow, potentially building a progressively
larger barrier to manumission. Gurley maintained that the ACS was only interested in the
emigration of free African Americans, therefore respecting Southern property rights. And,
playing to Southern fears of a growing free African American population that could incite
violence among the enslaved, the ACS asserted that general emancipation was a greater evil than
slavery itself. “The question is not whether slavery as it exists, in law and practice, in our
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southern states, be, to a great extent, a violation of the principles of Christian duty between man
and man, and ought, therefore, so far as it is such violation, to be immediately modified and
abolished,” wrote Gurley. The question, he claimed, was “what are the means to be used by the
humane and religious, to change the will of those who alone have the power, and incline them
safely and wisely to remedy the evil.”274 Colonization, Gurley and other ACS members believed,
was that incentive.
Because they advocated seemingly forced general emancipation, the immediatist
approach was dangerous, colonizationists suggested. Gurley spurned what he called
“fundamental errors of opinion,” which endangered “the stability of our Union,” that
immediatists advocated. Included among them were that “slavery ought to be abolished by
means, not acting solely through, but to a great degree against and in defiance of the will of the
South” and that “the best way, if not the only way, to produce the abolition of slavery in this
country, is to thunder forth denunciations against it as a flagrant crime, universally, against God
and man, not to be tolerated under any modifications, for a moment, but to be destroyed at a
blow.” To Gurley, if this approach continued, abolitionists would create “a conflict, between the
North and the South, more appalling than ever witnessed in our country” would be produced.275
By removing the factors that discouraged manumission, colonizationists saw their
scheme as laying the groundwork for abolition, keeping Southern minds open to the possibility
of emancipation. “The prosecution of this work is already introducing into the slaveholding
States, inquiry and discussion respecting the evils of the existing structure of society there, and
the possibility of abolition,” wrote the Christian Spectator in March 1833. “African colonization,
so far as it is successful, will bring free labor into the fairest and most extended competition with
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slave labor, and will thus make the universal abolition of slavery inevitable.”276 Liberia, to
Gurley, was “a blessed asylum to the free man of color, and … the hope of the slave.”277
Colonization would, its proponents believed, foster the cooperation of slaveholders, facilitating
the ongoing process of emancipation.
The ACS saw slave-trade suppression as inexorably linked to the success of the Liberia
colony. To them, colonization was part of a larger strategy of suppression. Colonizationists
closely monitored the progress of the slave trade’s conduct,278 and they presented a memorial to
Congress pressing for the trade to be declared piracy prior to the enactment of the 1820 law that
did so.279 In his speech at the society’s 1851 meeting, Henry Clay named the slave trade’s
suppression to be “another great object connected with Colonization, and only less important
than that, which is to be achieved by the successful colonization of the Western Coast of Africa.”
Clay dismissed naval patrols as the sole means of eliminating the “most odious of all human
traffic” and pointed to colonization as offering the unique advantage of creating a permanent
presence along the African coast. “It has been a desideratum amongst the statemen of Europe as
well as with some statesmen of our own country. They thought that the best mode of suppressing
the slave trade; was by keeping up constantly squadrons on the coast of Africa, to prevent the
egress of slaves,” he noted. “But we have solved the great and interesting question as to the mode
in which the slave trade ought to be suppressed. We have shown the most effectual and complete
method by which there can be an end put to that abominable traffic, and that is by Colonization.”
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While he did not think that the US Navy’s Africa Squadron should be disbanded, Clay suggested
that colonization’s effectiveness rendered a large force unnecessary.280
According to colonizationists, the areas that the ACS settled along the African coast
would prevent slave traders from gaining access to the continent’s interior. As Liberia grew in
size, the colony carefully acquired territory in areas where the slave trade had thrived. With each
acquisition, the organization’s members rejoiced. The ACS’s annual report for 1851 reprinted the
speech of Liberian president Joseph Jenkins Roberts, who noted the recent annexation of the land
surrounding the Gallinas River. What had “been for years the principal slave depot on the
western coast of Africa,” where the Jeune Eugénie and the seizures of the USS Cyane had been
intercepted thirty years earlier, were now within the Liberian domain. With this, Roberts
continued, “we see the absolute extinction of the slave-trade from Sierra Leone to Cape Palmas.
That the Liberian Government is able to prevent its re-establishment, now, in the day of her
strength and independence, fostered by powerful nations, we have a sufficient guaranty by what
she has done at Messurado, Bassa, and Trade Town, in the time of her infancy and weakness.”281
Colonizationists believed that, by colonizing the West African coastline with African
American settlements, a systematic program of “civilization” would replace the illicit trade.
Crucial to this was Christianization. Colonizationists argued that native West African culture had
created an unstable system of intertribal wars and offered no instruction against the evils of the
slave trade. Without Christian teachings, the trade would only continue. “The natives are so
wedded to the traffic,” reported the Liberia Herald in 1849, “it having descended to them as an
heir-loom from their fathers—that they are easily roused into hostility against any and every
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thing they are taught to believe is arrayed against it.”282 A month later, the publication
concluded, “The slave trade cannot be abolished with the present war system. Colonization and
religious instruction is the true method. The common people on the coast are slaves.”283 With
such a religious foundation in place, colonizationists thought that Liberian colonists would
encourage native Africans to turn from slave trading and toward lawful commerce.
Similarly, the ACS hoped to “improve” the lives of recaptured Africans. According to the
1819 Slave-Trade Law, the US government was to return any enslaved Africans seized in its
efforts to suppress the slave trade to Africa. The ACS argued whether the law’s “spirit” could be
genuinely enforced “without establishing a settlement on some part of the African coast, to
which captives may be sent, and where they may be sent, and where they may be received,
supported and instructed in the arts of civilized life. To land them on the coast, and to leave them
exposed to a repetition of those outrages which had originally destined them to a life of slavery,
would seem to accomplish very imperfectly, if at all, the humane and enlarged views of the
government.”284
The ACS’s belief in the colonization program is not to say the organization did not
support the US Navy’s presence along the African coast, however. Rather, colonizationists
encouraged its continued existence. When the USS Cyane seized four slave ships in 1820, the
society declared the voyage to “have adorned our flag with a brighter trophy than its most
splendid achievements have ever won.”285 And, as Congress debated withdrawing the WebsterAshburton Treaty’s mandated squadron in the early 1850s, the ACS warned of the consequences.
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If withdrawn, “The American flag would certainly be resorted to as protection in the nefarious
traffic,” wrote the Liberia Herald in 1855. “And in the presence of these squadrons, the cruel
trade would be resuscitated with all its horrible concomitants of wars, robbery, bloodshed and
death. This would cause the utility of their continuance to be questioned by their respective
governments, and they would perhaps be withdrawn also; handing over the entire coast to the
tender mercies of practical slave-traders.”286
But colonizationists held that, to suppress the slave trade, required a joint program of
colonization and naval patrols. “The slave trade will be more easily put down by the combined
energies of Colonies and Naval force acting in concert,” wrote the Liberia Herald in August
1849. “It would be eventually destroyed at a given place by a colony alone without the aid of a
naval force; but the process would be tedious. A long time would be required to effect it.”287
To the modern viewer, the efforts of the American Colonization Society seem, at the very
least, out of step with abolitionism. Straining to distinguish themselves from the American AntiSlavery Society and other immediatist organizations and endeavoring to work with slaveholders,
colonizationists emerge from the history of abolition as the embodiment of an American republic
increasingly in thrall to the Slave Power. In their desire to cooperate with the South in the
expulsion of black Americans, colonizationists appealed to the notions of racial hierarchy that
undergirded human bondage and soothed slaveholders’ consciences. Members of the ACS
believed, it cannot be denied, that the United States would not survive as a multiracial republic.
Having been subjugated within the confines of bondage for two centuries, black Americans
would, according to their view, never reach equal status to that of whites in the Union, forever
barred from broader social acceptance by the collective memory of racially specific enslavement.
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Rather than confront racial prejudice while demolishing slavery, as immediatists urged,
colonizationists preferred to remove the subjects of that prejudice. This was undoubtedly a
compromise with the absolute evil that was slavery, and it was certainly one rooted in
colonizationists’ ideas of race.
But, regardless of the antiblack sentiments that motivated it, the ACS’s abolitionist
character cannot be ignored. Colonizationists worked to build a colony in Africa because they
foresaw a future in which American slavery was vanquished. This was a gradualist approach, to
be sure. Through Liberia, they provided an attractive alternative to those slaveholders for whom
the presence of blacks after emancipation discouraged manumission. Colonizationists did not
intend to spurn Southerners, for they believed that slavery’s abolition meant undertaking a
sustained, long-term process of emancipation that required slaveholders’ cooperation. It would
be in shipload after shipload, year after year, that free African Americans, they imagined, would
be removed from the United States and slavery eradicated. That they strove to work with
Southerners therefore does not speak to a weakness in abolitionist principles. In fact, it suggests
more that colonizationists aimed to bridge the sectional divide for the sake of national union than
it reveals the proslavery organization that immediatists claimed them to be. Theirs was a scheme
whose philosophical framework called upon the priorities of an earlier era in the nation’s history,
when slavery was not the entrenched institution and point of controversy that it became in the
antebellum period. Whether colonizationists actively sought to persuade Southerners to manumit
their slaves is irrelevant because, to them, Liberia’s existence alone was an inducement.
Abolition, no matter how far in the future, was nevertheless the society’s goal.
Embracing the focus of abolitionists in the post-Revolutionary era, colonizationists also
recognized that abolition first required the Atlantic slave trade’s destruction. Just as it served to
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entice slaveholders to manumit their slaves, Liberia, colonizationists hoped, would aid in
foreclosing the slave trade. The colony would come to occupy hundreds of miles of coastline,
shielding a portion of the African interior from the raids of slave traders and offering harbor to
British and American warships suppressing the traffic of Africans to the Americas. A sizable
portion of colonizationists’ efforts were notably colonialist in nature, directed toward morally
improving and proselytizing natives through the introduction of “civilized” African Americans.
It cannot be denied, however, that, through this project of uplift, colonizationists fundamentally
aimed to attack the slave trade, striking at what they perceived to be the causes of native
complicity. While their methods bore the hallmarks of imperialism, their intentionality must not
be misconstrued. For domestic slavery to die slowly, there could be no doubt that the
international trade had first been totally suppressed. In viewing the presence of a colony on the
African coast as valuable in its worth as a method of slave-trade suppression, therefore, the ACS
underscored its continuity with traditional, gradualist approaches to abolition.
Immediate abolitionism disrupted the politics of slavery. This applied to broader
abolitionism as much as it did slavery’s defenders. In its wake, any organization that failed to
advocate a similarly urgent call for slavery’s destruction justifiably appeared inadequate, and, to
this, the American Colonization Society was not immune. The subject of immediatist ire, the
ACS symbolized the republic’s powerlessness to deal on equal footing with the slaveholding
South. But, accepting too readily immediatists’ critique, the historiography has judged the
society’s goals as at worst proslavery and at best mired in racial prejudice, ignoring the
abolitionist foundations on which it operated. The American Colonization Society was an
abolitionist organization, which functioned within a pre-antebellum constitution that recalled the
Framers’ vision of a negotiated, measured abolition whose first step was the slave trade’s
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suppression. By the antebellum period, the increasingly fervent and sectional debate over slavery
brought an end to earlier hopes of gradual emancipation, and, with each last-minute compromise,
a peaceful abolition faded from the realm of possibility. The ACS spanned these two eras and,
consequently, challenges how modern historians have defined abolitionism. The society’s
continued operation, unappreciated by contemporary immediatist critics, bridged antebellum
abolition to the Constitution’s sole promise on slavery: the end of the Atlantic slave trade.
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CONCLUSION
Until the six bells chimed on the last dog watch on September 25, 1860, the USS
Constellation’s surroundings had been placid. The sea and sky were calm, and the moonlight
shone on the ocean’s even surface, illuminating the horizon. But the crew of the US warship
could not simply revel in the evening’s tranquility, for their mission demanded perpetual
readiness.288 Dispatched by the US Navy to West Africa in the summer of 1859 to fulfill the
United States’ obligations under the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, the Constellation was tasked at
intercepting American vessels and ships fraudulently sailing under false colors engaging in the
slave trade.289 Slavers exploited any opportunity to smuggle their human cargoes away from the
African coast, but the favorable conditions of this peaceful autumn night offered little place to
hide. Shortly after the watchman rang the six bells signaling seven o’clock, such a ship was
spotted two miles off the Constellation’s starboard bow. As soon as the ship in turn sighted the
US warship bearing down upon it, it swiftly turned into the wind, and the Constellation followed
in pursuit.290
Slowly, over the course of three hours, the Constellation gained on the ship. The US
warship fired a shot in front of the ship to signal it to halt, but the unidentified vessel did not
heed the warning, its crew struggling to keep the ship’s distance from their pursuer. Water casks,
whole hatches, and anchors were thrown overboard to lighten the ship. As one sailor aboard the
Constellation recalled, “everything that was moveable” was discarded to eke out the slightest bit
of extra speed. Another shot was fired in front of the vessel, again without effect. To distract
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their pursuer, the vessel’s crew even released one of their boats in the hope that the Constellation
would stop and inspect it, thereby allowing the pursued vessel an escape. But these attempts
failed. And, at around ten o’clock, the Constellation found itself within hailing distance of the
other vessel, which could now be identified as the Cora. The Constellation fired a third shot. The
Cora again ignored the command. To this, Captain John Nicholas of the Constellation ordered
his ship’s guns be lowered and fired into the Cora’s masts. Tearing through the rigging of the
Cora’s front mast, the shot did not persuade the ship to comply. Only the threat of another blow
brought about an end to the chase.291
The Constellation lowered a boat and sent a boarding party, armed with pistols and
cutlasses, to inspect the ship. After a few minutes, the leader of the party hailed the
Constellation, alerting Nicholas of his findings. “Constellation Ahoy!” The first lieutenant
shouted. “Halloa,” Nicholas responded. “We got a fine fat prize,” the lieutenant declared, “chock
full of darkies.” For, in addition to the twenty-five men of the Cora’s crew, the US sailors had
discovered 705 enslaved Africans aboard. Those shackled men, women, and children were
naked, desperate for food and water, wedged together below deck as if they were livestock, and
terrified of what was to come, but they, along with the ship in which they had been imprisoned,
was now the seized prize of a US government vessel.292
The Cora’s seizure only a month before the fateful election of 1860 stands out as a
curious and conspicuous contradiction to the generally accepted narrative of a United States
whose foreign policy on the eve of the Civil War was the captive of slaveholders intent on
spreading slavery across the globe. The ship’s seizure is significant in a number of ways. For
one, as the 1850s came to a close, calls for the reopening of the slave trade abounded. That a US

291
292

Leonard, September 25, 1860, in USS Constellation on the Dismal Coast, 147–148.
Leonard, September 25, 1860, in USS Constellation on the Dismal Coast, 148.

124

warship acted—and was ordered to act—in a manner explicitly foreclosing the trade’s conduct
suggests the futility of those appeals. Moreover, during a time when abolition was a sectional
concern, that a warship of the federal government would pursue and seize a slave ship, an act
with indisputable antislavery implications, is noteworthy. Finally, that the Constellation was
tasked with patrolling Africa for slavers in the first place is of incredible significance, showing
that the United States was not merely a passive supporter of international efforts to suppress the
African slave trade; suppression of the slave trade was rather an avowed and active commitment
that it vigilantly strove to pursue.
With the inauguration of the Lincoln administration in 1861, and the Civil War that
followed, the federal government would pursue a harsher policy of slave-trade suppression.
Although Lincoln withdrew the US Navy’s Africa Squadron in the summer of 1861 to participate
instead in the Southern blockade, the administration’s negotiation of the Lyons-Seward Treaty
with the United Kingdom in 1862 signaled the end of the United States’ objection to
international cooperation on slave-trade suppression on the basis of sovereignty.293 Conceding to
a right to search and promising to seize ships bearing specific signs of engaging in the slave
trade, the United States renewed its international commitment to the trade’s destruction with
greater force.294 Domestically, in a series of cases before the Supreme Court in 1864, the federal
court system affirmed the legitimacy of seizures made on evidence of the slightest preparations
for the slave trade.295 Under the Republican administration, freedom had become a point of
national policy with international implications.
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Historians have generally ignored the international slave trade and thus skewed modern
interpretation from historical reality. While the historiography of the antebellum period accepted
that suppression of the international slave trade was a US diplomatic commitment, it has
dismissed the sincerity with which the young republic pursued the policy. Don E. Fehrenbacher’s
argument has dominated the literature’s view of federal policy during the period. How the United
States could pursue a patently antislavery position abroad while, at home, half the states in its
union held human beings in bondage reflects, after all, a curious dichotomy in the fledgling
republic’s position on the world stage. A nation founded and bound in union through a
constitution that protected slavery’s existence—and that, arguably, led to the emergence of a
domestic Slave Power—implemented policies that reflected the Founders’ intentions of eventual
eradication by choking off the institution’s supply. The proactive efforts of the US government
to seize and adjudicate slavers on the high seas illustrates an antislavery position at the federal
level, which could not have been adopted domestically during the antebellum period. An
examination of federal cases involving seized slavers from 1820 to the Civil War reveals an
antislavery-minded US government not sufficiently addressed in the historiography. These cases,
in fact, lay bare a distinct portrait that joins the historiographies of US diplomacy, the coming of
the Civil War, and abolitionism, rooting them in the traditional, legalistic antislavery of the
nation’s revolutionary founding.
From 1820 to 1862, the United States slowly came to fulfill the promises of its
constitution. After the ten-year pause in slave-trade suppression that followed the 1808 ban on
the importation of slaves—largely resulting from the dispute with the United Kingdom over the
rights of the independent United States—the 1820s brought about renewed abolitionist action
against the trade. The Jeune Eugénie affair in 1821 vividly illustrated, however, that the young
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republic faced a conundrum over whether to join British-led efforts at suppressing the slave trade
or acquiesce to its ongoing conduct. Choosing to prioritize national sovereignty, the United
States allowed its courts to settle the affair, withstanding French pressure to hand over the ship
without trial. The incident revealed that, while it released the ship to the French, the United
States was not acting under proslavery bias, but within the early republican priority of national
independence. In the forty years that followed, the courts continued to play a significant role in
US suppression efforts, adjudicating the seizure of slave ships and trying slave traders for their
crimes. While only one person was ever executed under the 1820 law that declared slave trading
piracy, the federal courts routinely adjudicated the seizures of slave ships throughout the
antebellum period, constructing and perfecting the legal mechanism for the trade’s eventual
abolition. Meanwhile, arising in the early republic and continuing through the Civil War, the
gradualist American Colonization Society maintained a sustained assault against the slave trade
and an alternate route to abolition by encouraging manumission through the repatriation of
African Americans to the African coast. The society adds to the understanding of abolitionism by
underscoring the true breadth of abolitionism. As these elements jointly show, the antislavery
sentiment of the Revolutionary era carried into the antebellum period, as the federal government,
its courts, and antislavery activists constantly drove toward the slave trade’s destruction.
Overlooking the slave trade, historians’ understanding of abolition has ultimately
suffered. As the diplomatic, legal, and social elements of this thesis have shown, to Americans
living in the antebellum period, there was no one clear route to domestic emancipation. The
contradictions that pervaded US society during the era preceding the Civil War bled over into
Americans’ management of the slavery issue. While the federal government could police the
international slave trade, its dealings with slavery at home were extremely limited. Yet, in
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seizing slave ships and returning illegally trafficked Africans back to Liberia, the United States
prevented the trade from adding to the domestic enslaved population, thereby limiting slavery’s
expansion. This was federal action abroad that impacted the domestic institution. Similarly, an
antislavery advocate, believing in the need for slavery’s eventual abolition, could argue for the
colonization of the West African coast with free African Americans to impede the slave trade
while simultaneously arguing that emancipation could not occur until all those in bondage, along
with anyone who looked like them, were removed from the United States. The colonizationist
work still subverted domestic slavery. Whether direct or indirect, whether calling for prompt or
slow change, and regardless of motivation, agitation against slavery was abolitionism and must
not be dismissed.
Examining the slave trade reveals that gradual abolitionism did not die out with the
1830s. Rather, the techniques of the earlier generation of antislavery so intertwined with the
American Revolution continued throughout the antebellum period. By focusing on the instances
in which the federal government and antislavery advocates worked to combat the slave trade, this
thesis has shown that notions of an entirely proslavery US government stray from historical
reality. Although on the surface appearing to protect slavery, assertions of sovereignty, as
evident in the Jeune Eugénie case, preserved the United States’ existence until a later time when,
with more power, it could work to foreclose the slave trade. With each slave ship forfeited in
federal court, moreover, the United States reiterated its commitment to the freedom principle,
limiting slavery’s paths to survival. And, through the African American settlement of the West
African coast, colonizationists strove to cut off the supply for further slaving voyages. American
actions against the slave trade between 1820 and 1862 consequently show a United States
travelling on the long road to emancipation.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE APPENDICES
The following appendices comprise different aspects of the research conducted for this
thesis. Each, related to the slave-trade suppression efforts discussed in the second chapter, charts:
the court cases that arose during the period from 1820 to 1865 (Appendix A); the slave ships that
the US Navy’s Africa Squadron seized following the Webster-Ashburton Treaty (Appendix B);
the US Navy’s ship presence along the West African coast from 1825 to 1860 relative to its
entire fleet (Appendix C); and the British Royal Navy’s ship presence along the West African
coast relative to its entire fleet upon Queen Victoria’s ascension to the throne in 1837 (Appendix
D). Given the space constraints inherent in a master’s thesis—as well as those that naturally
result from using a narrative form—these appendices serve to enumerate the breadth of evidence
from which the thesis’s conclusions were drawn and to illustrate the variety of research
techniques carried out that may not be evident within the thesis’s body. Ultimately, much like the
thesis itself, these appendices raise as many questions as they answer and illustrate a potentially
rich field to mine in future research.
Appendices A and B aim to show the extent of federal slave-trade suppression efforts.
Appendix A lists every court case found in the research process, regardless of whether the case
was integrated into the thesis’s body. These cases were found through searches for court reports
on the Westlaw legal database using search terms related to the slave trade and federal slavetrade laws. As acknowledged and explained in footnote forty-six of the introduction, in most
cases, only appeals appear in court reports. While these could well have been the only cases
brought to court over the slave trade during the antebellum period, it is likely that there were far
more cases than this list suggests. Similarly, Appendix B merely lists every ship seized during
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the post-Webster-Ashburton period. This table is transferred from Donald L. Canney’s The
Africa Squadron. No confirmation of this information has been made beyond Canney’s work.
Appendices C and D lay out the data gathered on American versus British naval
commitments against the slave trade. For the US Navy, in Appendix C, ship lists from 1825,
1832, 1848, 1851, 1853, 1858, and 1860 were uploaded into Microsoft Excel from the amateur
naval history website bluejacket.com, where they had already been digitally published in table
form. The Navy originally published these lists throughout the antebellum period in annual
books called the Register of the Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers of the Navy of the
United States. In addition to providing the duty station of every naval officer, these books listed
each ship in the Navy’s fleet and its present condition and location. After transferring the data
from bluejacket.com, the original source was consulted in each case to confirm the information.
Similarly, for the Royal Navy, the data already digitally published on naval-history.net
(transcribed from the 1838 publication The Navy List, Corrected to the 20th Dec., 1837) was
imported and confirmed against the original. For ships that lacked any data, Rif Winfield’s
British Warships in the Age of Sail, 1817–1863 (2014) was consulted. The spreadsheets were
then formatted for consistency, with columns searched for situation (whether “in commission,”
“in ordinary,” or “on the stocks”) and location. The tonnage, number of ships, and guns found
with each search term were tabulated and, calculating only “in commission” ships located in
Africa, percentages found relative to the entire “in service” navy. A sample spreadsheet for 1848
is given for the US Navy, while, with only one year, 1837 is provided in full for the Royal Navy.
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APPENDIX A: ALL SLAVE-TRADE CASES EXAMINED
Table A-1. All federal slave-trade cases examined in study, listed chronologically
Act(s) under
Year
Location of
which suit
Caption
Decided
Court
Citation
Seizure
brought
United States 1820
C.C.S.D.N.Y. 26 F. Cas.
Liberia
1818
v. Malebran
1145
United States 1820
C.C.S.D.N.Y. 24 F. Cas.
Liberia
1800
v. Andrews
815
(Endymion,
ship)
United States 1820
C.C.D.Mass.
26 F. Cas.
1818
v. La Coste
826
United States 1822
C.C.D.Mass.
26 F. Cas.
Liberia
1808, 1818,
v. The La
832
1819, 1820
Jeune
Eugénie
The
1823
C.C.D.Mass.
1 F. Cas.
1794, 1800, 1818
Alexander
362
The Emily
1824
US Supreme
22 U.S. 381 Charleston, SC
1794, 1808
and the
Court (on
(prior to
Caroline
appeal from
departure)
C.C.S.C.)
The St. Jago
1824
US Supreme
22 U.S. 409 Baltimore (on
1794, 1818
de Cuba
Court (on
return from
appeal from
Africa)
C.C.Md.)
The Merino,
1824
US Supreme
22 U.S. 391 Mobile, AL (en 1800, 1818
the
Court (on
route from
Constitution,
appeal from
Cuba)
and the
C.C.D.Al.)
Louisa
The
1825
US Supreme
23 U.S. 133 Liberia (in
1784, 1800
Plattsburgh
Court (on
1820)
appeal from
C.C.S.D.N.Y.)
The Josefa
1825
US Supreme
23 U.S.
New Orleans
1808, 1818
Segunda
Court (on
312a
(on return from
appeal from
Africa)
C.C.E.D.La.)
The Antelope 1825
US Supreme
23 U.S. 66 Savannah, GA
Court
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Caption
Curranee v.
McQueen
Governor of
Georgia v.
Madrazo

Year
Decided
[1828?]
1828

United States
v. Prestonb

1830

Ex parte
Madrazzoc

1833

United States
v. Battiste
The Garonne

1835

Emerson’s
Heirs v. Halld
Allen v.
United States
The
Catharinee
Strohm v.
United States

1839

United States
v. Isaac
Morris

1840

The Amistad

1841

The Tigris

1841

United States
v. Flowery

1845

1837

Court
C.C.D.Ga.
US Supreme
Court (on
appeal from
C.C.D.Ga.
US Supreme
Court (on
appeal from
C.C.E.D.La.
US Supreme
Court (on
appeal from
C.C.D.Ga.)
C.C.D.Mass.

Citation
6 F. Cas.
984
26 U.S. 110

28 U.S. 57

Location of
Seizure
No seizure

Act(s) under
which suit
brought
1808
1808

New Orleans

1808

32 U.S. 627

24 F. Cas.
1042
36 U.S. 73

1800, 1820

1840

US Supreme
Court (on
appeal from
D.C.E.D.La.)
US Supreme
Court
C.C.D.Md.

New Orleans
(on return from
Le Havre,
France)
38 U.S. 409 New Orleans

1808, 1818

1 F. Cas.
518
25 F. Cas.
332
23 F. Cas.
240

1794, 1800

1840

C.C.S.D.N.Y.

1840

C.C.D.Md.
(on appeal
from D.Md.)
US Supreme
39 U.S. 464
Court (on
appeal from
C.C.S.D.N.Y.)
US Supreme
40 U.S. 518 Culloden Point,
Court (on
CT
appeal from
C.C.D.Conn.)
D.Mass.
23 F.Cas.
Angola
1220
D.Mass.
25 F. Cas.
1124
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New York

1819
1800

1800

1818

Caption
United States
v. Libby
The Laurens

Year
Decided
1846

Court
C.C.D.Me.

Citation
26 F. Cas.
928
14 F. Cas.
1192
(subsequent
case as
1193)
16 F. Cas.
949
27 F. Cas.
218
24 F. Cas.
1280
10 F. Cas.
463
27 F. Cas.
1138
19 F. Cas.
1064
25 F. Cas.
754
27 F. Cas.
78
17 F. Cas.
36
3 U.S.
Cong. Rep.
C.C. 47
18 F. Cas.
817
25 F. Cas.
1375
26 F. Cas.
227
66 U.S. 503

1848,
1849

S.D.N.Y.

1848

S.D.N.Y.

1849

E.D.La.

1852

C.C.E.D.Pa.

1854

D.Mass.

1855

C.C.S.D.N.Y.

1855

C.C.D.Mass.

United States 1855
v. Darnaud
United States 1856
v. Naylor
The Merchant 1857

C.C.E.D.Pa.

Berryman v.
United States

1857

Court of
Claims

The Orion

1859

S.D.N.Y.

United States
v. Gould
United States
v. Haun
Ex parte
Gordonf

1860

S.D.Ala.

1860

C.C.S.D.Ala.

1861

United States
v. the
Augusta

1861

US Supreme
Court (on
appeal from
C.C.S.D.N.Y.)
S.D.N.Y.
24 F. Cas.
892

The Mary
Ann
US v. the
Ohio
United States
v. Brune
The
Glamorgan
United States
v. Smith
The Porpoise

S.D.N.Y.
C.C.S.D.N.Y.
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Location of
Seizure

Act(s) under
which suit
brought
1820
1794, 1800

New York

1800

New Orleans

1818
1820
1800, 1818,
1819, 1849
1820
1800
1820
1794, 1808, 1818

New York
New York

1800, 1808
1794, 1818

Mobile, AL

1818
1818
1820

Greenport,
Long Island,
NY

1794, 1818

Caption
United States
v. Santos
United States
v. Horn
United States
v. Kelly
United States
v. the Isla de
Cubag
The Slavers
(The Kate,
the Reindeer,
the Sarah, the
Weathergage)

Year
Decided
1862

Court
C.C.S.D.N.Y.

1862

C.C.S.D.N.Y.

1863

D.Mass.

1865

C.C.D.Mass.

1864

US Supreme
Court (on
appeal from
S.D.N.Y.)

Citation
27 F. Cas.
954
26 F. Cas.
373
26 F. Cas.
697
26 F. Cas.
551
69 U.S.
350, 366,
375, 383

Location of
Seizure

New Bedford,
MA
Boston

Act(s) under
which suit
brought

1818
1818
1794, 1818

Notes:
a
Previous case before the Supreme Court was reported as 18 U.S. 338 (1820).
b
This case involves the seizure of the Josefa Segunda, the same matter settled by the Supreme Court in 1825.
c
Despite the spelling discrepancy, this matter deals with the same Isabelita adjudicated in Governor of Georgia v.
Madrazo (1828).
d
This is the fourth dispute settled by the Supreme Court in the seizure of the Josefa Segunda twenty years prior.
e
This case involves the seizure of the Catharine, the ship over which Chief Justice Taney ruled in Allen v. US in
the Circuit Court for the District of Maryland that same year.
f
Gordon was found guilty of piracy under the 1820 act in US v. Gordon, 25 F. Cas. 1364 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861).
g
This is the third case involving the Isla de Cuba, the first being in 1860 (26 F. Cas. 553) and the second in 1864
(26 F. Cas. 548).

152

APPENDIX B: US NAVAL SEIZURES
Table B-1. Ships seized by US Navy Africa Squadron following Webster-Ashburton Treaty
No. Vessel
Captor
Date of Seizure
Location of Seizure
1
Uncas
Porpoise
March 1, 1844
Gallinas River
2
Spitfire
Truxtun
March 24, 1845
Pongas River
3
Patuxent
Yorktown
September 27, 1845
Cape Mount
4
Pons
Yorktown
September 30, 1845
Kabenda
5
Merchant
Jamestown
December 3, 1845
Sierra Leone
6
Panther
Yorktown
December 15, 1845
Kabenda
7
Robert Wilson
Jamestown
January 15, 1846
Porto Prava
8
Malaga
Boxer
April 13, 1846
Kabenda
9
Casket
Marion
August 2, 1846
Kabenda
10
Chancellor
Dolphin
April 10, 1847
Cape Palmas
11
Excellent
John Adams
April 23, 1850
Ambriz
12
Martha
Perry
June 6, 1850
Ambriz
13
Chatsworth
Perry
September 11, 1850
Ambriz
14
Advance
Germantown
November 3, 1852
Porto Prava
15
R. P. Brown
Germantown
January 23, 1853
Porto Prava
16
H. N. Gambrill
Constitution
November 3, 1853
Kongo River
17
Glamorgan
Perry
March 10, 1854
Kongo River
18
W. G. Lewis
Dale
November 6, 1857
Kongo River
19
Brothers
Marion
September 8, 1858
Mayumba
20
Julia Dean
Vincennes
December 28, 1858
Cape Coastal Castle
21
Orion
Marion
April 21, 1859
Kongo River
22
Ardennes
Marion
April 27, 1859
Kongo River
23
Emily
Portsmouth
September 21, 1859
Loango River
24
Delicia
Constellation
September 21, 1859
Kabenda
25
Virginian
Portsmouth
February 6, 1860
Kongo River
26
Falmouth
Portsmouth
May 6, 1860
Porto Prava
27
Thomas Achorn
Mystic
June 29, 1860
Kabenda
28
Triton
Mystic
July 16, 1860
Loango River
29
Erie
Mohican
August 8, 1860
Kongo River
30
Storm King
San Jacinto
August 8, 1860
Kongo River
31
Cora
Constellation
September 26, 1860
Kongo River
32
Bonito
San Jacinto
October 10, 1860
Kongo River
33
Express
Saratoga
February 25, 1861
Possibly Loango
34
Nightingale
Saratoga
April 21, 1861
Kabenda
35
Triton
Constellation
May 20, 1861
Kongo River
36
Falmouth
Sumpter
June 14, 1861
Kongo River
Source: Canney, Africa Squadron, 233–234.
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APPENDIX C: US NAVAL COMMITMENT TO SLAVE-TRADE SUPPRESSION
US Naval Commitment by Number of Ships, 1825–1860

US Naval Commitment by Number of Ships,
1825 - 1860
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
1825

1832

1848

1851

Total Number of Ships

1853

1858

Africa Number of Ships

Table C-1. Africa Squadron number of ships relative to entire US Navy
Total Number of Ships
Africa Number of Ships
1825
1832
1848
1851
1853
1858
1860

1860

19
20
35
33
33
34
37

1
5
4
4
2
7

Percentages
5.3%
0.0%
14.3%
12.1%
12.1%
5.9%
18.9%

Sources: These figures are based on the digitally transcribed versions of: Register of the Commissioned Officers and
Warrant Officers of the Navy of the United States, Including Officers of the Marine Corps, &c., for the Year 1825
(Washington, DC, 1848); Register of the Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Navy of the United States,
Including Officers of the Marine Corps, and Others, for the Year 1848 (Washington, DC, 1848); Register of the
Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Navy of the United States, Including Officers of the Marine Corps, and
Others, for the Year 1852 (Washington, DC, 1852); Register of the Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Navy
of the United States, Including Officers of the Marine Corps, and Others, for the Year 1854 (Washington, DC,
1853); Register of the Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Navy of the United States, Including Officers of
the Marine Corps, and Others, for the Year 1859 (Washington, DC, 1859); Register of the Commissioned and
Warrant Officers of the Navy of the United States, Including Officers of the Marine Corps, and Others, for the Year
1861 (Washington, DC, 1861). Each is found on https://www.bluejacket.com/index_site.html.
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US Naval Commitment by Guns, 1825–1860

US Naval Commitment by Guns, 1825 - 1860
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Table C-2. Africa Squadron Guns relative to entire US Navy
Total Guns
Africa Guns
Percentages
1825
1832
1848
1851
1853
1858
1860

476
390
685
595
669
667
588

12
72
66
88
32
73

Sources: For source attribution, see note to Table C-1.
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2.5%
0.0%
10.5%
11.1%
13.2%
4.8%
12.4%

1860

US Naval Commitment by Tonnage, 1825–1860

US Naval Commitment by Tonnage, 1825 - 1860
50,000
45,000
40,000
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25,000
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1832

1848

1851

Total Tonnage

1853

1858

Africa Tonnage

Table C-3. Africa Squadron tonnage relative to entire US Navy
Total Tonnage
Africa Tonnage
Percentages
1825
15,097
177
1.2%
1832
13,193
0.0%
1848
30,207
2,637
8.7%
1851
29,232
2,464
8.4%
1853
33,910
3,019
8.9%
1858
42,542
1,132
2.7%
1860
46,591
5,740
12.3%
Sources: For source attribution, see note to Table C-1.
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1860

Sample Data Table (1848)
Table C-4. 1848 US Navy Ship List
Class
Name

Rate
120

Tons

Situation
In
3,241 commissiona
In
3,680 commission

Location
Receiving Ship,
Norfolk, VA
Receiving Ship,
Boston

2,480 In ordinaryb
In
2,757 commission
In
2,633 commission

Norfolk, VA

2,633 In ordinary
On the
2,633 stocksc

Norfolk, VA

2,633 In ordinary
On the
2,633 stocks
On the
2,633 stocks
On the
2,805 stocks
In
2,257 Commission

Boston

1,607 In ordinary
In
1,607 commission

Norfolk, VA

Norfolk, VA

Ships of the Line

Pennsylvania

Ships of the Line

Franklin

74

Ships of the Line

Columbus

74

Ships of the Line

74

Ships of the Line

Ohio
North
Carolina

Ships of the Line

Delaware

74

Ships of the Line

Alabama

74

Ships of the Line

Vermont

74

Ships of the Line

Virginia

74

Ships of the Line

New York

74

Ships of the Line

New Orleans

74

Ships of the Line

Independence

74

Frigates, 1st Class

United States

44

Frigates, 1st Class

Constitution

44

Frigates, 1st Class

Potomac

44

Frigates, 1st Class

Brandywine

44

1,726 In ordinary
In
1,726 commission

Frigates, 1st Class

Columbia

44

1,726 In ordinary

Norfolk, VA

Frigates, 1st Class

Congress

44

1,867 In ordinary

Norfolk, VA

Frigates, 1st Class

Cumberland

44

New York

Frigates, 1st Class

Savannah

44

Frigates, 1st Class

Raritan

44

1,726 In ordinary
In
1,726 commission
In
1,726 commission

74
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Pacific
Receiving ship, New
York

Portsmouth, NH

Boston
Norfolk, VA
Sackett's Harbor, NY
Pacific

Mediterranean

Coast of Brazil

Pacific
Home Squadron

Class

Name

Rate

Frigates, 1st Class

Santee

44

Frigates, 1st Class

Sabine

44

Frigates, 1st Class

St. Lawrence

44

Situation
On the
1,726 Stocks
On the
1,726 Stocks
In
1,726 commission

Frigates, 2d Class

Constellation

36

1,452 In ordinary

Norfolk, VA

Frigates, 2d Class

Macedonian

36

New York

Sloops

Saratoga

20

1,341 In ordinary
In
882 commission

Sloops

John Adams

20

700 In ordinary

Boston

Sloops

Vincennes

20

New York

Sloops

Warren

20

700 In ordinary
In
691 commission

Sloops

Falmouth

20

703 In ordinary

Boston

Sloops

Fairfield

20

700 In ordinary

Norfolk, VA

Sloops

Vandalia

20

Norfolk, VA

Sloops

St. Louis

20

783 In ordinary
In
700 commission

Sloops

Cyane

20

792 In ordinary

Norfolk, VA

Sloops

Levant

20

Norfolk, VA

Sloops

Portsmouth

20

Sloops

Plymouth

20

Sloops

St. Mary's

20

Sloops

Jamestown

20

Sloops

Albany

20

Sloops

Germantown

20

Sloops

Ontario

18

792 In ordinary
In
1,022 commission
In
989 commission
In
958 commission
In
985 commission
In
1,042 commission
In
939 commission
In
509 commission
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Tons

Location
Portsmouth, NH
New York
European Seas

Home Squadron

Pacific

Coast of Brazil

Coast of Africa
East Indies
Pacific
Mediterranean
Home Squadron
Home Squadron
Receiving Ship,
Baltimore

Class

Name

Rate

Sloops

Decatur

16

Sloops

Preble

16

Sloops

Yorktown

16

Sloops

Marion

16

Sloops

Dale

16

Brigs

Boxer

10

Brigs

Dolphin

10

Brigs

Porpoise

10

Brigs

Bainbridge

10

Brigs

Perry

10

Schooners

Flirt

2

Schooners

Wave

1

Schooners

Phoenix

2

Schooners

Petrel

1

Schooners

Taney

1

Steamers

Mississippi

Steamers

Susquehanna

-

Steamers

Powhatan

-

Steamers

Saranac

-

Steamers

San Jacinto

-

Steamers

Fulton

4

Steamers

Union

4

10
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Tons

Situation
In
566 commission
In
566 commission
In
566 commission
566 In ordinary
In
566 commission

Location
Coast of Africa
Pacific
Coast of Africa
Boston
Pacific

194 In ordinary
In
224 commission
In
224 commission
In
259 commission
In
280 commission
In
150 commission
In
- commission
In
90 commission
In
90 commission
In
112 commission
In
1,692 commission
On the
2,450 stocks
On the
2,415 stocks

Philadelphia

1,446 In ordinary
On the
1,446 stocks

Portsmouth, NH

698 In ordinary
In
956 commission

East Indies
Coast of Africa
Coast of Africa
Coast of Brazil
Home Squadron
Coast Survey
Coast Survey
Coast Survey
Mediterranean
Home Squadron
Philadelphia
Norfolk

New York
New York
Receiving Ship,
Philadelphia

Class

Name

Rate

Tons

Steamers

Princeton

9

900

Steamers

Michigan

1

582

Steamers

Alleghany

2

989

Steamers

Vixen

3

240

Steamers

1

378

Steamers

Water Witch
General
Taylor

-

152 Tender

Pensacola, FL

Steamers

Engineer

-

Norfolk, VA

Store Ships and Brigs

Relief

6

Store Ships and Brigs

Erie

4

Store Ships and Brigs

Lexington

6

Store Ships and Brigs

Southampton

4

Store Ships and Brigs

Supply

4

Store Ships and Brigs

Fredonia

4

- Tender
In
468 commission
In
509 commission
In
691 commission
In
567 commission
In
547 commission
In
800 commission

Totals:
Ships, Guns, Tons

Situation
In
commission
In
commission
In
commission
In
commission
In
commission

Location
Mediterranean
Great Lakes
Mediterranean
Home Squadron
Home Squadron

Coast of Brazil
Mediterranean
Pacific
Pacific
Mediterranean
Pacific

76 2,071 92,692

Source: For source attribution, see Table C-1 for 1848 US Navy Register.
a

Ships listed “in commission” were, as King, Hattendorf, and Estes defined, in active service. Dean King, John B.
Hattendorf, and J. Worth Estes, A Sea of Words: A Lexicon and Companion for Patrick O’Brian’s Seafaring Tales
(New York: Henry Holt, 1995), s.v. “commission.”
b
King, Hattendorf, and Estes defined “in ordinary” as a ship “not fully manned and ready to sail, usually in some
form of storage or disrepair in a harbor or dockyard.” For this reason, ships listed “in ordinary” were not excluded
from “in commission” totals. King, Hattendorf, and Estes, A Sea of Words, s.v. “in ordinary.”
c
According to King, Hattendorf, and Estes, ships “on the stocks” are under construction. King, Hattendorf, and
Estes, A Sea of Words, s.v. “stocks.”
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Table C-5. Summary data table of 1848 US Navy Register
Percentages to Totals
Summary by
Situation

Qty
of
Ships Guns

Tons

Qty of
Ships

Guns

Tons

In Commission

46 1,003 44,808

60.5%

48.4%

48.4%

In Ordinary

21

684 27,265

27.6%

33.0%

29.5%

On the Stocks

9

384 20,467

11.8%

18.5%

22.1%

In Service

-

-

-

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Preparing for Sea

-

-

-

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

At Hoboken

-

-

-

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

76 2,071 92,540

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Totals

Table C-6. Recapitulation of adjustments
Total Ships “In Commission” from Summary Above

46

1,003

44,808

Less Ships that are “Receiving Ships”

(5)

(290)

(11,019)

Less Ships that are “Store Vessels”
Less Ships that are “Permanent Store & Receiving Vessels”

(6)

(28)

(3,582)

(11)

(318)

(14,601)

35

685

30,207

5
72
14.29% 10.51%

2,637
8.73%

Adjustments to Ships “In Commission”

Total Adjustments

Adjusted Total Ships “In Commission”

Coast of Africa total
As a Percentage of In Commission Vessels (adjusted)
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APPENDIX D: ROYAL NAVY COMMITMENT TO SLAVE-TRADE
SUPPRESSION (1837)
Table D-1. Total Royal Navy Ships 1837
Percentages to
Totals
Summary by
Situation

Qty of
Ships

Guns

Tons

Guns

Tons

In Commission

138

3,730 104,725

30.0%

32.7%

In Ordinary

133

7,718 192,439

62.1%

60.2%

Harbor Service

3

344

7,681

2.8%

2.4%

Gunnery training

2

216

4,594

1.7%

1.4%

Depot

6

376

9,374

3.0%

2.9%

Tender

1

46

1,088

0.4%

0.3%

Totals

283 12,430 319,901

100.0% 100.0%

Table D-2. Royal Navy ships assigned to the Cape of Good Hope and Coast of Africa 1837
Class
Name
Guns
Tons
Ships of the Line

Melville

74

1,767

Frigates(flagship)

Thalia

46

1,083

Sloops and Brigs

Childers

18

385

Sloops and Brigs

Pylades

18

433

Sloops and Brigs

Scout

18

488

Sloops and Brigs

Bonetta

8

319

Sloops and Brigs

Brisk

10

236

Sloops and Brigs

Buzzard

10

233

Sloops and Brigs

Charybdis*

10

232
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Class

Name

Guns

Tons

Sloops and Brigs

Columbine*

18

492

Sloops and Brigs

Curlew

10

233

Sloops and Brigs

Dolphin

3

319

Sloops and Brigs

Forester

10

230

Sloops and Brigs

Lynx

10

232

Sloops and Brigs

Partridge*

10

230

Sloops and Brigs

Pelican

18

385

Sloops and Brigs

Saracen

10

227

Sloops and Brigs

Waterwitch

10

323

18
13.0%

311
8.0%

7,847
7.0%

Totals: Ships, Guns, Tons
% to “In Commission” ships

Source: “Royal Navy Strength on Victoria's Ascension to the Throne, 1837,” http://naval-history.net/xGWRNOrganisation1837.htm. Ships were confirmed to have been assigned to the Cape of Good Hope and Coast
of Africa Squadron through: The Navy List, Corrected to the 20th Dec., 1837 (London, 1838), 59–82,
https://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015025976740; Rif Winfield, British Warships in the Age of Sail, 1817–
1863: Design, Construction, Careers, and Fates (Barnsley, UK: Seaforth, 2014).
Notes:
* Charybdis, Columbine, and Partridge were in transit to their duty stations in December 1837.
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